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Lay-out by Immins Naudé.
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In our previous 39 issues, we have had an average of 5.2 articles per issue. In this 40th issue, we happen to have six. There is something more to this number of six, however, than just that it is one more than the usual five. It is six in the sense of two times three. Common to all six of the articles in this issue, there is a relevant and urgent message of togetherness, but three start from a perspective of divergence and the other three focus on a view of convergence.

Two of the first three articles tackle problems related to the phenomenon of ethnicity, and the third takes into account both ethnicity and religiosity. In our field of dealing with conflict, these two phenomena, either singly or as a pair, very often play important roles. The crucial point is, however, that they do not play these roles as the phenomena they are, but due to the ways in which they are perceived, and/or interpreted, and/or utilised. After all, phenomena are apparent realities as observed by our senses. It is in our brains that our sensory impressions are processed – usually (fairly) reasonably, but also emotionally. The part of the brain where this takes place has been given the Late Latin name of ‘sensorium, from sens-, past participle stem of sentire “to feel”’.¹ Therefore, when we read these articles, we may just as well check our own and our own group’s observations, thoughts and feelings with regard to ethnicity and religiosity. (I am using

‘religiosity’ instead of ‘religiousness’ because it rhymes with ‘ethnicity’ and because religious conflicts are apparently usually based on features of a more external nature.)

What we find in the three articles are accounts of how ‘leaders’ play ethnic cards, or play other types of cards in ethnic ways, and thereby turn games that should have been friendly into divisive plots. By so doing, they not only usurp unfair advantage for their own power and wealth, but also inculcate a superior-us/inferior-them mindset in the people they are supposed to govern and guide. Such dominant politicians and their submissive polities are apparently observing the fascinating diversities on the human scene, but interpreting them as unfavourable differences. With perhaps good intentions, but more probably with own-interest motivations, they move away from be-friending feelings to be-foeing dispositions. Pages can be written here about the tragedy of such digressions into divergence, but in the articles that follow various deplorable realities and events are discussed and recommendations are given for rectification and remedy.

In the other three articles, various aspects of convergence are discussed: educating for reconciliation, realising the need for contentment, and even risking to rescue fellow-humans of other nationalities. These are just a few examples, but apart from sharing particular ideas, they may help to shift thinking from aversion to affinity.

With regard to attraction, the metaphor of gravity may be of interest. All around the globe – whether in Sudan or in Japan – we have the impression of being on top of the world. Our feet are kept on the ground by gravity, but this invisible power does not only attract us to the centre of gravity of the planet. It is an all-directional mutual attraction between objects with mass, which we also are. This metaphor may prompt us to imagine our human interrelatedness as an invisible but ever-present dynamic which can be stronger than the repulsive forces of prejudice, stereotyping and disliking, and can contribute to reconciliatory feelings, moves and results.

I do trust that the realities and the challenges we read about in these articles will prompt us to think more penetratingly and creatively about reconciling,
rescuing and rejoicing. When taken seriously and not superficially, each of these possibilities can produce astounding results – not just pretence, appearance or show, but frank engagement with root causes. In this regard, the combining of reconciliation with *truth* may be most relevant and urgent. For instance, where the divide between the desperate destitute and the comfortable affluent is still an undeniable reality, real reconciliation will be unattainable. With sadness, yet with hope as well, I have to add that for all the newness we enjoy in the new South Africa, we still have to overcome the economic separatedness of the old South Africa. Effectively narrowing (and eliminating?) this conflict-causing gap is a top priority task in South Africa, but probably elsewhere as well.

Another truth that has to be acknowledged and confronted, is that there are cases where divergence may be valid and mutually satisfactory. But such cases can be open-mindedly understood and accommodated – and may be quite compatible with an atmosphere of convergence.

So, with the relevant crucial truths in our critical minds, we may explore our very human ethno-culturalities and own-groupish tendencies, and creatively promote as much as realisable of inter-human togetherness. Informative and stimulating reading! And sustained research!
The ethnification of electoral conflicts in Kenya: Options for positive peace

Muema Wambua*

Abstract

Kenya has since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 experienced periodic electoral conflicts. In the analysis of these conflicts, however, there is an evolving tendency to perceive their causes as merely, or mainly, manifestations of negative ethnicity. In other words, there is the tendency on the part of the state, and non-state actors, to deliberately ‘ethnify’ extra-ethnic conflicts in the country in a phenomenon herein conceptualised as ethnification. The ethnification of extra-ethnic conflicts has caused the country to continually drift into an electoral-conflict trap. The failure to address substantive extra-ethnic factors which have historical, structural, institutional, legal, and cultural standpoints has constrained the pursuit of positive peace in the country. This paper, therefore, examines the evolving tendency to treat extra-ethnic electoral conflicts from the ethnic-identity premise. The centrality of underlying causes and rationales of electoral conflict that are extra-ethnic is highlighted, and a way forward for the pursuit of positive peace in the country is recommended.

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Keywords: conflict, conflict resolution, ethnification, Kenya, peace, peacebuilding

1. Introduction: The ethnification of electoral conflicts in Kenya

In contemporary conflict transformation processes, state and non-state actors at the national, regional, and global levels identify a broad range of factors that cause conflicts. A clear understanding of this range of factors is critical in instituting a proper foundation for conflict resolution in the pursuit of positive peace amongst people within societies and states. Kenya, like several other states in Africa, has experienced a series of conflicts, and in particular, electoral conflicts. The state of internal conflict in Kenya has prevented the maintenance of peace in the country. Since independence in 1963, the country has experienced electoral reversals and tensions (Kanyinga et al. 2010:16). This has led to a situation in which peace is mostly absent, or, if present, is just negative peace. The negative peace is, however, periodically interrupted by periods of manifest conflict, especially during general elections.

As a multi-ethnic country, Kenya’s pluralist elections are inevitably marked by ethnic undercurrents and strategising. Since the re-birth of pluralist democratic politics in Kenya in 1991, the country once defined as the beacon of peace in Africa has repeatedly suffered electoral conflict. During the 1992, 1997, 2007, and 2017 general elections, the country experienced electoral violence that led to loss of lives and internal displacement of persons (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights [KNCHR] 2017:5; Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence [CIPEV] 2008:383; Mwagiru 2008:1; Akiwumi Commission 1999:1; Oyugi 1997:55). While the triggers of these conflicts in the country are multi-dimensional and include historical, structural, institutional, legal, and cultural factors, they have always reflected an underlying ethnic-identity problem. This is because the foundation of pluralist democratic politics in the country was anchored on political party structures and strategies that originally segmented the country along ethnic alignments. Political leaders blatantly camouflage
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ethnic alignments as issues of nationalism as they attempt to secure ethnic backing and patronage that can propel them to power. Although the triggers of these electoral conflicts in the country are extra-ethnic, their analyses, and related interventions thereof, have frequently been selfishly ethnified and tainted by ethnic favouritism. This phenomenon is herein conceptualised as ethnification.

This study therefore seeks to examine the ethnification of the electoral conflicts that Kenya has experienced thus far, exploring its observable characteristics and underlying rationales. It also seeks to recommend a way forward in the pursuit of peace in Kenya. A brief historical background of electoral conflicts in the country is presented in the second section, while the various dimensions to electoral conflicts are examined in the third section. The fourth section explores the case of the 2007 electoral violence from the different extra-ethnic dimensions and shows how the conflict was ethnified and the rationale thereof. The fifth section provides options for positive peace for Kenya while the last section concludes by giving the way forward.

2. The historical context of electoral conflicts in Kenya

The historical trajectory of conflicts in Kenya, as is the case with other African states, assumes the colonial narrative. Since the invasion of Kenya in 1885, the British instituted the divide-and-rule strategy that ushered in their unfettered plunder of the country’s economic resources. The colonialists disempowered the indigenous communities by isolating them from Kenya’s rich economic zones (Munene 2012a:14; Oyugi 1997:42).

The quest for independence, as was articulated by the indigenous communities, resulted in colonial resistance. In the period from 1952 to 1958, Kenyans under the Mau liberation banner, successfully defeated the imperial powers and regained their sovereign rule when they acquired independence in 1963. However, the structural inequalities initially entrenched by the colonialists were accentuated by the newly inaugurated native rulers. This perpetuated structural differences that heightened
the unequal distribution of economic and political resources (Wamwere 2008:20).

In particular, class patronage in the unequal distribution of the land resource during the reign of President Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978) entrenched structural differences amongst the indigenous communities. The annexation of huge tracts of land, especially the productive ‘white highlands’ that were previously owned by the colonialists, was recognised as a terrible impropriety by the communities (Ajulu 1998:77; Adeagbo 2011:174). Besides grabbing prime lands, the Kenyatta administration entrenched structural injustices that have transcended political regimes to the present-day Kenya.

Similarly, the distribution of political resources, especially in the personalisation of power during the Kenyatta administration, established genuine resource distribution grievances that entrenched political divisions in the country. Notably, the colonial constitution, and the government institutions that were created thereof, advanced imperialist interests through neo-colonial power brokers. Yet, the political leaders in the Kenyatta administration would have known too well that the inequitable distribution of resources, both economic and political, was a recipe for violence given the overlap of ethnic and regional identities in the country. Through domination and manipulation of the political institutions, these leaders turned elections into structures for rewarding loyalists and punishing dissenting voices (Ajulu 2008:34; Mutua 2008:75).

President Daniel Moi’s administration (1978–2002) heightened the unfettered accumulation of state resources. The personalisation of state power, and the articulation of the political interests of the ruling elite, led to the massive plunder of state coffers and heightened the demand for constitutional and institutional reforms in the country. Nevertheless, Moi engaged in the divide-and-rule tactic thereby playing the ethnic card instituted by President Kenyatta into Kenya’s political contest. The president fiddled with ethnicity to gain political mileage (Ajulu 2008:35).
In order to hold on to power, Moi strategically seized the functions of state institutions. Through the Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act Number 7 of 1982 Section 2(A), the president transformed the country into a *de jure* one-party state (Korwa and Munyae 2001:2; Korwa and Vivekananda 2000:78). In return, this led to political agitation for constitutional reforms. However, the political leaders who were agitating for these reforms were temporarily silenced through political detention, while others were summarily silenced, eternally, through assassinations (Press 2015:205; Mutua 2008:75; Throup and Hornsby 1998:54).

The re-introduction of the democratic multiparty politics in Kenya in 1991 led to the embattled history of electoral conflicts in the country. Democratic politics occasioned the creation of a multiplicity of political parties, most of which were conceived without substantive political ideologies and served solely as political instruments to acquire political power. These parties were established by regional kingpins who made their ethnic positioning the basis for their power. The political parties were therefore rendered ethnic in their configuration against the nationalistic Kenya African National Union (KANU) party that had a well-established nation-wide support and patronage (Ajulu 1998:74).

The 1992 general elections were a major milestone in the development of the embattled democratic discourse in Kenya. After a protracted period of iron-fist rule under the Moi regime, the elections promised extraordinary relief after years of massive plunder, bad governance, and human rights violations. However, Kenya’s quest for democratic transition was dealt a massive blow by the political machinations of the Moi administration (Throup and Hornsby 1998:179). During this election, electoral malpractices were observed, in particular vote rigging and voter buying. The well-coordinated electoral conflict that was experienced in the Rift Valley during this election was disastrous (Oyugi 1997:54; Kenya National Assembly 1992; Akiwumi Commission 1999:2). In addition, political participation in this election had been reduced to ethnic mobilisation of the unemployed youth through propaganda and violence.
Similarly, the 1997 general elections were organised against a backdrop of an unrelenting quest for change of the Moi regime. The opposition parties, much divided against a common adversary, KANU, could not front a strong opposition against the then incumbent, President Moi. The electoral campaign during this election had exhibited signs of looming violence. Electoral malpractices such as vote rigging were observed during this election. Besides, electoral violence was witnessed in towns like Mombasa and Eldoret with observed loss of human life, and the increase of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), especially in the Rift valley, Nyanza, Western and Coastal regions (Brown 2011:127; Akiwumi Commission 1999:2).

The rather peaceful general election of 2002, sometimes described as a ‘transition election’, realised the democratic intentions of regime change and assured the people a period of relative, albeit negative, peace. During this election, President Mwai Kibaki, under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) umbrella, secured a landslide victory. This election provided the opportunity for a transition from Moi’s authoritarian regime to a democratic regime (Brown 2004:328).

The Kibaki administration, however, failed to inspire the resolve to pursue positive peace in the country. The immediate breakdown of the coalition over an alleged failure to honour a pre-election power deal, a supposed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as defined by the coalition partners’ leaders, Raila Odinga of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kibaki of the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK), led to renewed political antagonisms in the quest for constitutional reforms in the country (Ajulu 2008:49).

The 2007 general election, as discussed in detail in section 4, was held amidst deep political tensions. The campaign process was generally peaceful. The political parties, largely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the Party of National Unity (PNU), and ODM-Kenya, established nation-wide campaign machinery. Towards the end of the campaign period, opinion polls showed a head-to-head race between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki (Independent Review Commission [IREC] 2008:62).
During the electoral campaigns, hate media was perpetuated through vernacular radio stations. *Kass* FM radio, broadcasting in Kalenjin language, allegedly aired materials of xenophobic nature against the Kikuyu community. *Kameme* and *Coro* FM radio stations broadcasting in Kikuyu dialect had programmes that encouraged ethnic chauvinistic divisions. In addition, phrases such as ‘*madoadoa*’ (blemishes) and ‘getting rid of weeds’, in reference to the non-Kalenjin community living in Rift Valley, were aired by *Kass* FM. In addition, *Inooro* FM played Kikuyu dialect songs that imaged Raila Odinga as a murderer and even characterised the Luo community as lazy hooligans who do not pay rent (IREC 2008:100; Mwagiru 2008:12).

During this election, and especially the pre-election campaigns, militant groups instigated fear amongst Kenyans. For a long time, communities in Kenya had nurtured youths who had graduated to militias. These militias were supported by politicians. The Mungiki, Kalenjin Warriors and Baghdad Boys, for instance, were aided with financial support and weapons (machetes and arrows) that were subsequently used in the 2007 violence (CIPEV 2008:34; International Crisis Group 2008:11; KNCHR 2008:26; Khadiagala 2008:4).

After the presidential elections results were announced by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Chairman, Samuel Kivuitu, spontaneous and organised violence erupted that led to 1133 people killed, an estimated 700 000 people displaced, and excessive material damage (CIPEV 2008:383). Through international intervention, the conflict was resolved by means of a mediation process that led to the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act on February 28, 2008 (African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities 2008:42; Kenya National Assembly 2008; Mwagiru 2008:148). This contrived to bring about peace in the country (Munene 2012b).

But why do these electoral conflicts always assume a ‘*vita vya kikabila*’ (tribal conflicts) ethnic dimension? An analysis of extra-ethnic dimensions in Kenya’s electoral conflicts is explored in section 3 below,
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highlighting deliberate attempts to ethnify electoral conflicts through an ethnification agenda.

3. Characterising electoral conflicts in Kenya

An analysis of electoral conflicts in Kenya is compounded with contradictions and contestations, not least, in the democratic dispensation. Different dimensions of electoral conflict in Kenya can be examined. While the historical dimension is articulated in the foregoing section, an analysis of the structural, institutional, legal, cultural, and ethnic-identity factors in Kenya’s electoral conflicts is hereinafter examined.

3.1 Structural inequalities and interest aggregation

The historical background points to prevailing structural inequalities in the distribution of both economic and political resources, which played a major role in the cycle of electoral conflicts in the country (Mwagiru 2008:10; Wamwere 2008:30). In particular, the inequitable distribution of the land resource in the productive and economically viable regions in the country is observed as the main trigger of electoral conflicts in the country. Patterns of electoral conflict in the country mirror the contestations about the rightful owners of land in the Rift Valley, central highlands and the coastal regions. The unfettered accumulation of land by the ruling elite during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes relegated a portion of Kenyans into being squatters in their own land. Their quest to redeem their ‘rightful’ ownership of these lands has occasioned conflict, which was largely manifested during elections (CIPEV 2008:17; Lafargue and Katumanga 2008:22).

Besides the land question, the ruling elite in the country aggregated their political and economic interests using state machinery. In the effort to oppose particular economic and political interests of the ‘establishment’, political actors contest the policy agenda of incumbent leadership. Such contestation provokes the electorate, fuelling open defiance of the leadership. For instance, following president Moi’s iron-fist rule, civil society initiated calls for democratic consolidation in the country. In response to the
unfettered centralisation of executive power and the heightened plunder of state coffers, civil society’s quest for equitable distribution of political resources in the country led to violent confrontations (Kanyinga 2002:48; Mutunga 1999:27; Wanjohi 1993:30).

Economic marginalisation of some parts of the country has also heightened electoral conflicts in the country. As examined in section 2, the marginalisation of the ‘less productive’ regions of the country by the Kenyatta and Moi regimes disenfranchised the people. Inequitable economic resource distribution and skewed infrastructure development in most parts of the country heightened economic inequalities that trigger conflicts. In addition, resource-based conflicts occasioned by economic marginalisation have elicited the ‘we’ versus ‘them’ rich-poor dichotomy that sets the majority poor Kenyans against the minority elite (Nunow 2014:104).

It is due to such marginalisation that there is increased proliferation of militia groups, for instance, the Sabaot Land Defence Force, the Mungiki, Taliban and Mombasa Republic Council, who seek to agitate for inclusivity in the distribution of economic resources, and in particular, land (Nunow 2014:104; Mutahi 2005:84). The unfettered corruption during the Moi and Kenyatta regimes, as highlighted in major scandals such as the Goldenberg and Anglo Leasing, has further ruined the economic stability of the nation. This has intensified the grievances already experienced over matters arising during the electoral campaigns.

3.2 Institutional inadequacies in electoral contentions

In order to address the structural deficiencies highlighted in 3.1 above, critical institutions have been established, but they have yet failed to address electoral conflicts. At the heart of every electoral conflict in the country is an error of omission, or commission, by relevant state and non-state actors. State institutions have a tendency to intensify electoral conflicts in the country. For instance, the IREC (Kriegler Commission) observed that the commissioners and staff of the ECK were ill-prepared
to manage the 2007 general election. Even after declaring the incumbent, president Kibaki, as the winner of the contest, the then Chairman, Samuel Kivuitu, confessed in the full glare of the media that he actually could not certainly confirm the candidate who won the election (IREC 2008:2). The swearing-in of the president-elect at dusk in State House by the then Chief Justice Evans Gicheru heightened tensions in the country and eventually occasioned electoral violence.

In addition, institutions that are charged with investigating perpetrators of electoral conflict have repeatedly failed to implement their mandates. During the 1992, 1997, and 2007 electoral conflicts, there were hardly any perpetrators who have been prosecuted. And if any, they must have been found ‘not guilty’ of electoral offences, let alone criminal acts. The parliamentary motion in the quest to establish a Special Tribunal for Kenya to investigate and try the perpetrators of the 2007 electoral conflict was, on two occasions, defeated in the National Assembly with calls for ‘Let’s not be vague, let’s go to Hague’ (Girachu and Rugene 2009). The subsequent establishment of the International Crimes Division in the High Court to try the perpetrators of electoral conflict has failed to realise any justice for the victims and the perpetrators.

While state actors such as the electoral commission, judiciary and parliament have exacerbated the cycle of electoral conflicts, non-state actors too, consciously, heighten electoral tensions in the country. For instance, media stations in Kenya broadcast ‘untruths’ that perpetuate electoral conflicts. The media give greater attention to reporting on conflict and allocate less coverage to peace initiatives (Iraki 2014:95). Media stations broadcast biased and unverified accounts that heighten hatred among disenchanted viewers. Besides, they publish opinion polls that are choreographed by their political financiers (Oucho 2010:507; Mutahi 2008:145). Media stations also articulate foreign interests in their reporting and hence relegate national interest to obscurity (Munene 2008:153). Media houses even establish political affiliations that advance a certain political agenda with a view towards perpetuating their corporate interests (Iraki 2014:92; Makokha 2010:286; Ogenga 2008:127).
Besides, international state actors in Kenya perpetuate particular foreign interests. Foreign actors, who want to pursue political or economic interests in the country fuel political antagonism that manifests during electoral contests (Munene 2012a:109). For instance, the US funding of regime change programmes in the country in the wake of the 2013 general elections, and the blatant rejection of Uhuru Kenyatta’s candidacy as expressed in the ‘choices have consequences’ clarion call by US Assistant Secretary of State, Johnnie Carson, are indications of how foreign states fuel open defiance to regimes during elections (Gabe 2013; Lough 2013).

In addition, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Kenya perpetuate electoral conflicts in the country (Wamwere 2008:178). Some NGOs who thrive on the peace ‘enterprise’ have a conscious interest in perpetuating ‘hate dialogue’ with a view to increasing their profit and donor money (Munene 2014:4). The peace workers and peace employers are uncomfortable when generic peace exists and therefore manufacture conflicts to disrupt peace. These inadequacies observed within state and non-state institutions have heightened the need for enactment of legal regimes that would assure the realisation of peace in the country.

### 3.3 Legal infrastructure for peace

In addressing the aforementioned historical, structural, and institutional inadequacies, the need to reform the country’s legal infrastructure has been highlighted as critical in the realisation of peace. The country’s infrastructure for peace is deficient of legal frameworks that would assure pre- and post-election peace. The clamour for constitutional reforms in the country led to the repealing of Section 2 (A) of the Constitution in 1991 thereby occasioning a return to multi-party democracy. In response, civil society organisations, for instance, the Citizen’s Coalition for Constitutional Change, the Centre for Multi-Party Democracy, and the National Council of the Churches of Kenya, agitated for constitutional reforms (Nasong’o 2014:100; Mutunga 1999:17). Political parties, for instance the Forum for Restoration of Democracy and the Democratic Party, were also involved in the quest for constitutional review (Nzomo 2003:190; Munene 2001:55).
The return of a multiparty democratic system, however, ushered in a zero-sum electoral cycle in the country. Electoral processes were henceforth structured within a legal regime that isolates the winners from the losers at the end of every electoral cycle. This accentuated the ‘we’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy in the country. On the one hand, the ruling political party dominates and has assured access to political and economic resources. On the other hand, the opposition is marginalised, with a minimal share in political and economic resources.

The enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act 1997 provided a legislative framework to guide a people-centred quest for a new constitution. The establishment of the Prof. Yash Pal Ghai-led Constitution Review Commission heightened the impetus for a new constitution. The subsequent enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act of 2001 led to the formulation of a draft constitution (Bomas draft) that was presented for adoption at the Bomas Constitutional Conference, but was rejected. The then Attorney General, Amos Wako, nevertheless, presented another draft (Wako draft) to the Parliament for adoption, leading to the 21st November 2005 referendum. This draft was, however, also rejected (Wamai 2014:67). This heightened political tensions in the country, culminating in the 2007 electoral conflict.

In 2008, parliament enacted the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act that provided a legal framework for constitutional review. The Committee of Experts and the Parliamentary Select Committee presented a draft constitution to the parliament that was approved on April 1st 2010. On August 4th 2010, the draft constitution was subjected to a referendum and adopted. The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, hence created a legal framework for addressing historical, structural and institutional inadequacies. It has entrenched key principles of democracy and good governance which include: devolution of power, human rights, equality, inclusiveness, accountability and transparency, separation of powers, rule of law, public participation, civil liberties, institutionalism, and sustainable development. It is however deficient on peace. While the constitution is instrumental in addressing structural and institutional deficiencies in the pursuit of peace, there is
hardly any constitutive Act which expressly legislates on the pursuit of peace in the country, not even the National Cohesion and Integration Act, 2008. The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, 2012, nevertheless provides a framework which if enforced can realise a sense of peace in the country.

3.4 The ‘culture of violence’ in elections

Besides the historical, structural, institutional, and legal dimensions, electoral conflicts in Kenya may further be explored from a cultural dimension. There is a culture of violence in the country which is firmly ingrained in societal norms and practices. In most communities, the youth, in particular boys, are encultured to be warriors. For instance, in the Kalenjin community, boys are initiated into adulthood through cultural rights that fashion them as warriors and as protectors of their community and property, especially land (CIPEV 2008:76; KNCHR 2008:60). Besides, electoral violence in the country is funded through organised criminal militia networks that are ‘ordained’ by cultural elders. The networks are covertly funded by political actors who have interests in power aggregation in the country (Lafargue and Katumanga 2008:25).

The oathing practices repeatedly observed during electoral periods show the importance of culture as a dimension when analysing conflicts in the country. The practice of oathing is embedded within the cultures of communities, and, as to religion, most communities have sentimental attachment to their cultural traditions. Such traditions also affect the conflict management processes (Munene 1997:31). Cultural propaganda that is passed down across generations heightens the ‘we’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy which permeates the country’s political processes. The oathing ceremonies involve making sacrifices to the ancestors aimed at protecting one’s family, land, and other property in times of conflict. The youth are therefore encultured into being militants, who always align with those who share their cultural indoctrinations.
Communities who practise male circumcision as a cultural aspect fallaciously regard men from other communities without this initiation practice as unfit to hold national leadership positions (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2008:4). For example, during electoral campaigns, candidates from the Luo community have been taunted as unfit for national leadership, simply because they are ‘culturally inferior’. Cultural tags, for instance ‘ihii’ (uncircumcised boys), are attached to such leaders (CIPEV 2008:107; KNCHR 2008:128).

In addition, electoral conflicts in Kenya are culturally engendered. On the one hand, men are encultured to be warriors in their communities and are in most cases the perpetrators of physical violence. On the other hand, women are viewed as victims of electoral violence. However, women are not only victims, but also perpetrators who are used as weapons of war (Ali 2014:71). While girls and women do not necessarily join the boys and men in violence, they provide resources and praises of war to men to fight for their families. This acts as a catalyst to the conflicts (Golicha and Elema 2014:116). This culture of violence hence advances the ‘we’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy between competing ethnic identities as explored in 3.5 below.

3.5 Competing identities: ‘Forty-two against two’?

The identity dimension, most especially the ethnic-identity dimension, is one of the most significant when it comes to analysing electoral conflicts in Kenya (Wamwere 2008:9; Oyugi 1997:53). Kenya is composed of forty-four ethnic identities, commonly defined in the derogatory form as ‘tribes’. The argument is therefore used that electoral conflicts in the country are based on ethnic affiliations. It should be considered, however, that Kenyans co-exist peacefully until the political leadership elevates ethnic persuasions and sensitivities in their quest for political power especially during elections.

The apparently fallacious ‘Kikuyunisation’ and ‘Kalenjinisation’ of political debates on power distribution in the country propagate ethnic hatred and repudiate any well-intended argument for national unity. ‘Kikuyunisation’
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and ‘Kalenjinisation’ subtleties are used to promote the continued domination of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic identities in national leadership. Three of Kenya’s presidents; Jomo Kenyatta, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta, are from the Kikuyu ethnic group while Daniel Moi is from the Kalenjin ethnic group. Since these two ethnic identities have dominated political leadership, there is a growing agitation against them. Further, ethnic-based appointments into positions of authority intensify the ethnic identity-based political discourses (Munene 2012a:138).

The tendency to isolate these ethnic groups in analysing electoral conflicts in the country has permeated national discourses on Kenya’s conflict transformation process. The constant ethnification of political arguments has taken centre-stage in electoral processes in the country. For instance, the consistent serialisation of electoral contestations using ethnic connotations such as: ‘ethnic coalitions’, ‘ethnic entrepreneurs, ‘ethnic chieftains’, ‘ethnic cleavages’, ‘ethnic manipulation, and ‘ethnic chauvinism’, anchors an ethnic perspective that erroneously permeates national dialogues on conflict resolution (Murithi 2009:3).

Besides, there is an emerging tendency for regional and religious arguments to assume ethnic alignments. The incessant calls, as recorded during the 1997 elections, for the people from the countryside (wabara) to leave the Kenyan coastal towns highlight the regional ethnic identity-based arguments in Kenya’s electoral process. In addition, the calls for secession emanating from complaints of marginalisation by successive governments have heightened regional differences in the country. For instance, in 2008, the Mombasa Republican Council militia group under the ‘Pwani si Kenya’ slogan (‘The Coast is sovereign territory independent of Kenya’) heightened calls for the territorial independence of the coastal region (Chonghaile 2012; Goldsmith 2011). After the August 8, 2017 general elections, there were also repeated calls for secession with a view to isolate the Central and Rift Valley regions of Kenya due to their perceived ethnic domination in the country’s political leadership. This secession debate had previously been raised in March 2016 by David Ndii, a prominent economist, who in an article entitled ‘Kenya is a cruel marriage, it’s time we talk divorce’ elicited
national conversations on issues of economic and political marginalisation in the country (Madowo 2017; Ndii 2016).

Religious identity differences have also permeated Kenya’s ethnic discourse. Religious leaders openly enter into political alignments during election periods. For example, Raila Odinga’s signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Muslim community under the National Muslim Leaders Forum in 2007 was a clear attempt to introduce religion-based ethnic divisions in Kenya’s already polarised political scene (Cussac 2008:50; Maupeu 2008:286). These regional- and religious-identity differences are oriented along ethnicity as the prime factor for political alignments.

After exploring the historical, structural, institutional, legal and cultural factors playing a constitutive role in ‘ethnifying’ electoral conflicts, and thereby obstructing the pursuit of positive peace in Kenya, we may now turn to an exposition of the ethnification of the 2007 electoral conflict.

4. The ethnification of electoral conflicts: The 2007 conflict

The 2007 electoral conflict provides a case illustration of the continued ethnification of electoral conflicts in Kenya. Peace scholars, peace practitioners, and political commentators most importantly identify structural factors in the distribution of economic and political resources as the key triggers of electoral conflict in Kenya. However, analyses by scholars and practitioners mostly give prominence to the identity-based ethnic dimension and focus less attention on the extra-ethnic dimensions.

Notably, commentators observe that structural factors, and in particular the distribution of the land resource is the main trigger of the 2007 electoral conflict. For instance, Mwagiru (2008:10) posits that the inequitable distribution of the land resource that was carried out after the post-colonial period is the main trigger for electoral conflicts in the country. This argument is further reiterated by Munene (2012a:14) and Wamwere (2008:20) who assert that the colonialists hived-off huge productive tracts
of land from the native communities. At independence, these lands were never returned to the rightful owners, but were occupied by the elite who to the present-day perpetuate the interest of the ruling class. This argument is asserted by Oucho (2010:496) who observes that the 2007 electoral conflict was a manifestation of long standing structural factors especially in the inequitable distribution of land in the country.

Institutional weaknesses in Kenya are also highlighted in the context of the 2007 electoral conflict. The ECK lacked the political integrity, independence and capacity to administer a credible general election. The mismanaged tallying process and contested announcement of presidential election results contributed to the electoral conflict (IREC 2008:2). The arbitrary unilateral appointment of ECK commissioners by the then incumbent, President Kibaki, to replace the commissioners whose terms had ended, was also observed as a contentious issue (IREC 2008:31). The independence of the judiciary and its ability to administer a fair electoral petition was questioned. In the outbreak of the 2007 electoral conflict, the ODM leadership was categorical that it would not petition the matter in law since the courts were prejudiced against the opposition. Political parties as institutions also contributed to the electoral conflict due to the ethnic utterances of their leadership during the electoral campaigns (IREC 2008:56). The politicisation of the Administration Police (AP) during the campaigns further heightened electoral tensions (Kariuki 2008:158).

Besides state actors, non-state actors also fuelled the electoral conflict. During the 2007 electoral conflict, Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), and the clergy, orchestrated ethnic hatred by advancing and defending the biased political positions of the ethnic communities in defiance of their professed religious ideals (CIPEV 2008:217; Maupeu 2008:291). Hate speech perpetuated by radio stations, and in particular vernacular stations, spurred the electoral conflict. Kass FM radio, broadcasting in the Kalenjin language, and Kameme, Coro and Inooro FM radios, broadcasting in the Kikuyu dialect, aired ethnic chauvinistic comments that heightened animosity between the communities (CIPEV 2008:295; IREC 2008:100).
Legal inadequacies also contributed to the electoral conflict. In 2007, political power in the country was centralised. Therefore, the competition in the quest for access to and control of political leadership was observed as a cause of the electoral conflict. Lack of legislative policy frameworks to address historical injustices, and in particular, of a land policy to guide in the resolution of the land question, was observed as a cause to the electoral conflicts. Besides, there was the apparent lack of a legal framework to guide in national cohesion and integration (Oucho 2010:498).

Oathing ceremonies took place (CIPEV 2008:69), and there were reported cases of forcible circumcision of Luo men in Naivasha and parts of Central Kenya (HRW 2008:48; KNCHR 2008:60). The argument of an engendered culture of violence is well supported by evidence that Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) was employed as a tool for intimidation during and after the 2007 electoral conflict. Concerns were also raised about sexual violence on women in the IDP camps (Bayne 2008:3; CIPEV 2008:252).

However, while extra-ethnic factors and in particular historical, structural, institutional, legal, and cultural factors sufficiently explain the cause of the 2007 conflict, commentators ‘ethnified’ its analysis. For instance, Wamwere (2008:39) gives prominence to the ethnic dimension, claiming that ethnicity is like a national ideology and a way of life in Kenya. In his analysis of the conflict, Wamwere perpetuates the fallacious narrative that Kenya is a country that has structured ethnic hatred, a country which has an ethnic legacy, a country whose philosophy is ethnic accumulation, and a country whose leaders propagate ethnic power. He observes that Kenya has adopted tribe as its standard unit of domicile identity and further argues that the country is held captive by negative ethnicity and is on an assured path towards genocide. This argument was shared by influential leaders in the country, for instance, Raila Odinga, who argued on Aljazeera television that the government under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki was committing genocide (Hasan 2016).

In addition, Wamwere (2008:30) portrays the Kikuyu elite as people who huddle together and organise themselves as a single ethnic-based political
force in order to defend their ‘extraordinarily’ enterprising interests in the country. Wamwere observes that the ‘Kikuyu diaspora’ (in reference to members of the Kikuyu community living in the Rift Valley and Coast regions), has entrenched ethnic elite tyrants who have robbed people of their land all over Kenya.

The CIPEV (2008:344) also emphasises the ethnic dimension in the analysis of the 2007 violence. It highlights that the conflict had a distinct ethnic dimension and was organised by ethnic leaders on the basis of ethnic groups, and in particularly the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and the Luo. The analysis insinuates the ethnic dimension by identifying the number of people killed on the basis of their ethnic identity. For example, the report highlights that the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, and the Kisii ethnic communities were the most affected with 278, 268, 163, 158, and 57 people killed, respectively. This analysis ‘ethnifies’ the true reflection of the conflict. Rarely does the report define the victims as Kenyans; they are generally identified on the basis of their ethnicities.

The KNCHR analysis of the conflict assumes the ethnic dimension. In a report on the conflict, KNCHR highlights that there was existing ethnic rivalry between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities. This gives prominence to the ethnic characterisation of the electoral conflict. The report establishes the argument that there were widespread and systematic ethnically targeted killings. At the extreme, KNCHR (2008:5) establishes a narrative that leaders tried to perpetuate genocide against the Kikuyu.

KNCHR’s analysis further asserts that Kenya administers ethnic politics based on ethnic chauvinism. The report notes that Kenyans only elect their ethnic kin due to the zero-sum political competition in the country. It highlights that the widespread ethnic mobilisation in the country contributed to the electoral conflict. In addition, the report maintains the ‘foreigner-indigenous’ analysis of Kenyans living in the Rift Valley. In particular, the Kikuyus who live in contested zones in the Rift Valley are seen as foreigners hosted by the indigenous Kalenjin (KNCHR 2008:52).
The analysis hence gives prominence to the ethnic dimension in examining this electoral conflict.

In a report of the organised violence observed in the Rift Valley, HRW (2008) also establishes an ethnic standpoint in its analysis. HRW clearly points out that the tension over land ownership was the main structural trigger of the conflict. The report also indicates that lack of a strong constitutional order contributed to the violence. HRW (2008:36) however, defines the conflict as ethnic-based by outlining how ethnic tensions that transcended the previous general elections had permeated the 2007 electoral conflict. The report further observes that political manipulation of ethnicity is a tradition in Kenya. HRW (2008:35) further accentuates the inter-ethnic hatred narrative between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin by noting that the ethnic reprisals in Rift Valley were orchestrated by Kikuyu militias. The land question in the analysis fades, and ethnic hatred is accorded prominence. The Kalenjin-majority Kikuyu-minority argument advanced in this report perpetuates the ethnification of the electoral conflict. Phrases like ‘ethnic-tensions’, ‘inter-ethnic violence’, ‘ethnic-based reprisals’, ‘ethnic-rhetoric, ‘kikuyu chauvinism’ and ‘ethnic kinsmen’ are prevalent in the analysis of the report. This accentuates the ethnic characterisation at the expense of other extra-ethnic dimensions that actually occasioned the electoral conflict.

A review of the electoral conflict by Bayne (2008) also propels the ethnic dimension at the expense of extra-ethnic factors. The report highlights that the main triggers of the conflict were structural factors such as historical land injustices, and institutional factors such as the blatant attempt to manipulate the results of the presidential vote by the ECK. Bayne (2008) further notes that institutions such as the media and political parties promoted the conflict. The report also indicates that the conflict was fuelled by organised militia activities. However, Bayne (2008:4) relegates these extra-ethnic dimensions and proposes an ethnically charged argument that the conflict was an ethnic contest between Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities. In Bayne’s analysis, the political contest between the belligerent parties (PNU and ODM), the patrimonial winner-take-it-all
constitution, disempowered institutions, and weakness of the security secto are barely examined. This analysis thereof shifts from the other extra-ethnic dimensions to the ethnic warfare argument.

In a review of the electoral conflict and related interventions, Murithi (2009), argues that the electoral conflict was occasioned by an increased instrumentalisation of power which was used to gain, secure, and entrench economic advantage in the country. However, the analysis shifts from instrumentalisation of power to the ethnic manipulation and ethnic chauvinism that were entrenched in Kenya during the pre-colonial and colonial period. Murithi (2009:2) de-emphasises the interest-based dimension of instrumentalisation of power and instead ethnifies the conflict by engaging in ethnic connotations such as ‘ethnic power blocks, ‘coalitions of ethnic groups’, ‘smaller ethnic groups’, and ‘ethnic dictatorship’. This characterisation ethnifies the analysis.

The foregoing analysis of the 2007 electoral conflict highlights the tendency to ethnify extra-ethnic conflicts in Kenya's electoral process. What could be the underlying rationale for ethnifying extra-ethnic conflicts in the country? First, the ‘we’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy in Kenya's electoral processes is not based on sound ideological or policy standpoints, but on ethnic alignments. The multi-ethnic nature of the country’s demography has fortified ethnicity as an identity factor with which individuals within communities associate. In essence, the country has not crafted a sense of nationhood, but is more a conglomerate of ethnic nations.

Secondly, colonialism pitted ethnic communities against each other. As examined in section 2, the white settlers displaced the indigenous communities from the rich productive zones in the country, especially in the productive central highlands, the Rift Valley, and the coastal regions. The displaced communities were therefore made squatters on their own land. In re-settling in other parts of the country, they were seen by the local communities as strangers and intruders. The antagonism that was entrenched amongst the different communities transcends discourses
on integration and national cohesion and has hence permeated national politics.

It is therefore due to extra-ethnic factors and lack of nationhood that the cycle of electoral conflict persists in Kenya. The failure to address historical, structural, institutional, legal and cultural inadequacies constrains the conflict resolution process in the country. While addressing the extra-ethnic factors can result in positive peace, it is in ethnifying the conflicts that political leadership can identify with their followers with a view to gaining political mileage and patronage. In whipping up ethnic emotions, politicians heighten differences amongst the people and perpetually cause the country to drift into the electoral conflict trap. Once the violence is provoked, political leaders are able to rise into national leadership either through appointments or in power sharing arrangements, as was observed after the 2007 electoral conflict.

5. Options for pursuing positive peace in Kenya

The ethnification of extra-ethnic conflicts, and in particular, electoral conflicts, has had a negative effect in the pursuit of positive peace in Kenya. After the 2007 general election, and the subsequent spontaneous and organised violence that erupted, the country adopted major structural, institutional and legal interventions that contrived to bring about peace. However, the occurrence of violence in the country after the 2017 general elections indicates that the country is yet to realise effective conflict transformation. While the Constitution of Kenya 2010 has laid a legal infrastructure that would assure peace and stability in the country, there still persist historical, structural, institutional, legal and cultural deficiencies that constrain the pursuit of peace.

In the endeavour to realise positive peace, several interventions need to be initiated. Firstly, there is the need to address historical injustices that were meted out to the local communities during the colonial era. In particular, there is the urgency to resolve injustices surrounding land distribution in the country. Land that was annexed from local communities during the
The ethnification of electoral conflicts in Kenya: Options for positive peace

colonial period should be re-allocated or re-assigned to rightful owners. This will resolve the antagonisms amongst the communities who assert claims and counter-claims on the ownership of tracts of land in the Rift Valley, central highlands, and coastal regions. In addition, there is the urgency to address other economic inequalities with a view to fostering equalisation and countering the apparent marginalisation of less developed regions in the country.

Secondly, there is a need to ensure structural reforms in the country especially in the distribution of the political power resource. The political atmosphere in the country has, since the advent of multi-party democratic politics, been ethnified. Political alignments, and realignments, are based on ethnic configurations. Hence, political parties and coalitions or alliances are not anchored on sound ideology, but on the tyranny of ethnic numbers. This ethnifies the political processes including but not limited to electoral campaigns and voting processes. In addressing this challenge, there is therefore the need to reform the power structure in order to counter the zero-sum electoral processes in the country that on the one hand elevate some parties as winners while on the other hand relegating other parties, and their related coalitions, to being perennial losers.

Thirdly, institutional strengthening is of great import in assuring positive peace in the country. Institutional failure contributes significantly to the cycle of conflict in the country. The tragedy is that key institutions in the country have been ethnified. Hence, political appointment into critical institutions is seen as rewarding certain ethnic groups in the country with a view to gaining loyalty and political patronage. Besides, the independence and integrity of key institutions are diminishing. Key institutions that would assure peaceful transfer of power are increasingly being compromised by the ruling elite. For instance, the electoral commission has on several occasions been accused of manipulating electoral results, thereby leading to violence in the country. In 2007, ODM party’s candidate Raila Odinga accused the ECK of rigging the elections in favour of the then incumbent, President Kibaki. In the 2013 general elections, the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) accused the Independent Electoral
and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of rigging the elections in favour of Jubilee Alliance’s candidate Uhuru Kenyatta. Subsequently, in the August 8 2017 elections, the National Super Alliance (NASA) accused the IEBC of rigging the presidential elections in favour of Jubilee Party’s candidate and the then incumbent, President Kenyatta. Consequently, NASA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. The Court nullified the results citing IEBC’s irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of the results and called for fresh elections that were held on October 26 the same year. It is by strengthening institutions, and in particular the IEBC, that the country will be able to break away from the cycle of electoral conflicts and attain positive peace.

Fourthly, while institutional strengthening can assure integrity in electoral processes, it is in enacting and enforcing sound legal regimes that the country would attain national cohesion and integration. The Constitution provides a legal framework that if fully enforced can lead to peace and stability. Through devolution of economic and political power, the country has since the enactment of the Constitution moved towards equality and inclusivity. However, the structure of governance requires a legal review in order to counter the zero-sum political contests in the country. The presidential system of government constrains political stability in the country, as the winning political party or coalition fully enjoys power at the expense of losers. Probably, a parliamentary democracy would best assure equitable power distribution in the country as winners will have relatively fewer gains to win and losers will have relatively less gains to lose.

Fifthly, there is a need to institute measures to counter the culture of violence in the country. This would involve promoting tolerance and understanding among all ethnic, religious and regional formations in the country. This will help to promote nationhood which is critical to enhancing peace and stability in the country. It is also important to address the prevailing social constructions and cultural stereotypes that identify some communities as inferior to others. In addition, there is the need to tame hate speech and hate media that accentuate the prevailing negative cultural and ethnic differences in the country. Of greater import is the
need to engage a gendered discourse on conflict resolution in the country with a view to integrating the efforts of both men and women in the pursuit of positive peace for the posterity of the nation.

6. Conclusion and way forward

Electoral conflicts in Kenya are well defined in historical, structural, institutional, legal, cultural, and ethnic-identity discourses. There is however a deliberate attempt to ‘ethnify’ extra-ethnic electoral conflicts in the country. The ethnification process has been accentuated by analysts and commentators who in their explication of the conflict transformation process in the country exalt the ethnic dimension without according prominence to other critical extra-ethnic dimensions.

In the endeavour to attain the still elusive positive peace in the country, peace and conflict scholars, and practitioners, should realise the need to propel Kenya’s peace discourse beyond the ethnic dimension. In their quest for conflict transformation, they should interrogate the historical, structural, institutional, legal, and cultural factors that accentuate the cycle of electoral conflicts in the country. As Munene (2012b) argues, peace is a contrived reality, in that it has to be deliberately created. In the pursuit of positive peace, it is, therefore, the duty of state and non-state actors to interrogate the extra-ethnic causes of electoral conflicts in the country.

In a nutshell, as analysed in this study and typified in Table I below, this paper highlights the need to understand the various dimensions for analysing electoral conflicts in Kenya. The paper highlights that it is rather fallacious to always give prominence to the ethnic-identity dimension at the expense of other extra-ethnic dimensions in the analysis of electoral conflicts. No doubt, the tendency of state and non-state actors to ethnify extra-ethnic conflicts has constrained conflict transformation processes in the country. It is therefore the obligation of all actors to counter the ethnification agenda since it constrains the pursuit of positive peace in the country.
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<td>1. Historical</td>
<td>Unresolved historical injustices about land distribution contributed to the conflict.</td>
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<td>Resolving historical injustices about land distribution remained key campaign agendas for opposition parties.</td>
<td>Unresolved historical injustices about land distribution triggered the conflict in the Rift Valley, Central and Coast regions.</td>
<td>There were established initiatives to address historical injustices through the land and TJRC commissions.</td>
<td>The land question fairly addressed. IDPs resettled. TJRC report not fully implemented.</td>
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<td>2. Structural</td>
<td>Centralisation of power, executive control of the judiciary and parliament, and adoption of pluralist politics heightened the political antagonism.</td>
<td>Centralisation of power, executive control of the judiciary and parliament and marginalisation of opposition regions heightened political antagonism.</td>
<td>Increased civil society calls for independence of institutions and decentralisation of power through policial reforms heightened antagonisms.</td>
<td>Centralisation of power, executive control of the judiciary and parliament, and extreme human rights violations heightened violence.</td>
<td>Devolution of power enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya (2010) assured equitable distribution of political economic resources and stability.</td>
<td>Devolution has led to equitable distribution of resources. It has however, balkanised the country along ethno-political county lines.</td>
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<td>3. Institutional</td>
<td>Weak institutions, e.g. ECK, judiciary, and police contributed to the violence. Political parties and civil society activities led to violent antagonism with State.</td>
<td>Weak institutions, e.g. ECK, judiciary, and police contributed to the violence. Political parties and civil society activities contributed to reforms. ECK Peace committees were critical in peace-building.</td>
<td>Strong party coalitions (NARC), vibrant media and civil society groups contributed to reforms. ECK Peace committees were critical in peace-building.</td>
<td>Weak institutions esp. the ECK, judiciary, police, fuelled the violence. Hate media, pollsters, FBOs, NGOs, and political parties heightened the violence.</td>
<td>Institutional reforms in the executive judiciary, parliament, and police assured stability. TJRC, NCIC, and land commissions assured reforms.</td>
<td>Lack of credibility in IEBC led to violence. The integrity of the Supreme Court was put into question. NCIC failed to address hate speech.</td>
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### The Ethnification of Electoral Conflicts in Kenya: Options for Positive Peace

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**Quest for constitutional reforms by IPPG, NCEC heightened tensions between civil society, political parties, and the State.**

**Political parties and civil society agenda for constitutional reforms united the nation against the dictatorial KANU regime.**

**The failed constitutional reform agenda, i.e., the 2005 referendum, heightened political antagonisms.**

**Political parties and civil society agenda for constitutional reforms united the nation against the dictatorial KANU regime.**

**The Constitution of Kenya (2010) laid the framework for peace and stability. The ICC process acted as a deterrent to conflict.**

**Legal infrastructure for peace had failed. There was failed enforcement of legal regimes that would assure peace.**

**Ethnic politics led to forcible removal of some ethnic groups from the Miteitei farm in the border of Rift Valley, Western, and Nyanza regions.**

**Social media fuelled ethnic hatred. Ethnic hatred was not pronounced.**

**Militia activities reduced compared to 1992/1997 elections. Militia/vigilante groups were outlawed by the State.**

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Sources


The ethnification of electoral conflicts in Kenya: Options for positive peace


The ethnification of electoral conflicts in Kenya: Options for positive peace


Muema Wambua


Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia

Bekalu Atnafu Taye*

Abstract

The current regime in Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and redesigned the country along ethnic lines as soon as it took political power in 1991. The aim of this article is to examine the prevalence of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and to evaluate the potential causes of the conflicts that followed in the past twenty-five years. There are competing claims, for and against federalism. And though it may be accurate to state that the founding principles of federalism have few ideological shortcomings, it may be that technicality issues (types and forms) may hamper the imposed federal system in Ethiopian. Thus, ethnic conflicts prevailing in Ethiopia may be caused by such technicality problems and the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia needs an urgent reconsideration before the case moves to the worst scenario.

Keywords: conflict, ethnic, Ethiopia, federalism, EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front), politics

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Operational definition of ethnic conflict: Ethnic conflict is a dispute between two or more ethnic/tribal groups caused by the politicisation of tribal identity by self-seeking politicians.

1. Introduction

Federalism as an ideology, like socialism, communism and liberalism, is a pragmatic term which refers to the sharing of power among autonomous units and is considered to advocate the values of ‘unity in diversity’ or ‘shared rule and self-rule’ (Watts 2008:1) and to give regions some authority of their own. In his definition of federalism, Watts (2008:9) suggests that a federal system of government is one in which there is a division of power between one general and several regional authorities, each of which acts directly through his own administrative agencies. From a theoretical stand-point, the importance of a federal system, as shared by all political theories of federalism, is the sharing of power among regional states. This division of power may lead to the extinction of tyrannical regimes.

The other reason why a federal form of government is chosen over a unitary form is to accommodate divergent local interests that cannot bear centralised rule (Alemante 2003:85). Owing to this, a federal system of government as a solution was high on the agenda during the early phase of post-colonial politics in Africa as a potential way to reconcile unity and diversity. Unfortunately, such attempts ended up being rather short-lived experiments (Erk 2014). Those countries which employed federal systems for a short while and then curtailed them were Congo (1960–1965), Kenya (1963–1965), Uganda (1962–1966), Mali (1959), and Cameroon (1961–1972). Federalism's track record as a source of instability and secession might well counsel against choosing this form of government for Sub-Saharan African states (Alemante 2003:85). Considering the negative experiences, a number of African countries have ignored a federal system of government. This is because the socio-cultural set-up of the African states is so hybrid in terms of identity, language and religion that the existing social realities might not entertain the federal model. The most striking feature of African identities and communities was their fluidity, heterogeneity and hybridity; a social
world of multiple, overlapping and alternate identities with significant movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and linguistic borrowing (Berman 2010:2).

Notwithstanding such scepticism, three countries in Africa (Ethiopia, South Africa and Nigeria) have chosen a federal form of government so as to accommodate ethnic diversity. But there are significant degrees of difference in the ways ethnic power is allocated and used in the three federal governments of Africa. The Nigerian federal structure is to give legitimacy to territory over ethnicity by distributing the core population of each ethnic group in several states and thus Nigeria's federal structure helps avoid the crystallisation of ethnic identity around a particular territory (Alemante 2003:100). The South African constitution-makers rejected the claims of certain ethnic groups to self-governing status on the basis of their distinctive ethnic identity, whereas the organisation of the Ethiopian state is founded upon ethnic federalism, which uses ethnic groups as units of self-government (Alemante 2003:78).

Seen from the perspectives of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s federal structures, Ethiopia’s federal arrangement is highly ethnocentric. Implementing the federal system of government on the idea of ethno-nationalism, as shown in Ethiopia, could worsen matters. To put the idea more precisely, ethno-nationalism, a belief claiming the distinctiveness of a particular people and their right to self-rule in their homeland, will exacerbate community clashes into clashes of tribalism. Therefore, in order to defend a non-ethnic federal system and to promote the welfare of the society, federal states formulate a number of policies. For example, the territorial structure of Swiss federalism discourages the development of ethno-nationalism across language community lines (Alemante 2003:101). Similarly, the Ghanaian Constitution (Article 55:4) strictly prohibits any political party organised on the basis of ethnic identity. Furthering the discussion, Alemante suggested that federalism, even when it is not coupled with ethnicity, has generally not had a distinguished record as a stable form of government, and referred to the fact that even a ‘philosophically and legally’ sophisticated
federal system – that of the United States – has not been spared the tragedy of a costly civil war due to separatist demands (Alemante 2003:85).

Despite the presence of many good ideas and sound principles in the ideology of federalism, there are considerable dangers involved in accepting the idea of federalism in the African context. Here, it should be noted that federalism is not the only factor that influences conflict; there are also a number of perceptible modalities that should be taken into account along with federalism such as the nature of federalism (such as territorial, multinational and ethnic), the forms of federalism (symmetric or asymmetric/congruent or incongruent), the socio-cultural set-up of the society, the degree of autonomy (given for sub-national government), the gravity of the regime’s totalitarian institutional structures, and the like. Under the banner of federalism, the aforementioned factors are easily manipulated by African leaders for their own advantage, and in so doing they spoil the ideological foundations of the concept. The politicisation of African states changed to political ethnicisation as African leaders maneuvered to inherit power (Ake 1993:3). Ethnicity itself (or our natural difference) cannot be a source of conflict. Rather the forms of the federal structure (when ethnic) coupled with the politicisation of tribal identity cause such problems. This will receive more detailed discussion in section four which deals with inappropriate applications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia.

In light of this, the main objective of this article is to show the level of ethnic conflicts caused by the politicisation of tribal identity in Ethiopia. This article is organised in the following sections. Section two gives a brief description of the historical background and the nature of the current political system in Ethiopia. Under this section, I want to portray background information about Ethiopia and explain how the current government of Ethiopia came to power. Section three deals with ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and section four is about conflict-promoting applications of federalism. The last section, section five, presents the conclusion and recommendations. Despite some human rights reports on ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia, no one has made an inventory of ethnic conflicts according to technicality problems of ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia. Thus, analysing such conflicts with more
rigour made available by the social sciences and modern contemporary approaches is necessary. The method used in the study is qualitative, and empirical data such as published documents, letters and reports compiled by human rights defenders and organisations are used.

2. Historical background

Ethiopia is an ancient country with a number of peculiarities; some of which are independence (free from colonialism), drought, poverty, and indigenous scripts. Despite being Africa’s oldest independent country, Ethiopia is one of Africa’s poorest states, better known for its periodic droughts, famines, and intermittent civil conflicts.

With regard to modernisation, Emperor Tewodros was recognised as being the first to begin his modernisation in politics by trying to unify the fragmented polities of Ethiopia under the banner of *ser’at* (ordered governance). Considering the vision of Emperor Tewodros, Emperor Menelik consolidated imperial authority, defended Ethiopian independence, and began the process of creating and supporting modern Ethiopia. Alemayehu (2014) stated that by securing Ethiopian independence and sovereignty, Menelik united Ethiopia and inaugurated the modern Ethiopian state from petty feuding kingdoms. Holding a similar view, Bahru (2002:60) noted that it was to be Menelik’s main claim to historical distinction that he presided over the realisation of an idea that had first been kindled in the fiery mind of Tewodros.

The Ethiopia of today, not the ancient Abyssinia, was born as a result of internal power struggles between Menelik II and forces competing to control additional territories during the 19th century. In the process of territorial expansion, regional lords who surrendered themselves to Menelik II, were allowed to rule their areas by paying a certain amount of geber (tribute or tax) to the ruler of Shoa (central government). Southern rulers who peacefully submitted to Menelik II, such as the rulers of Jimma, Wollega, Bale, Benshangul and Assosa, were allowed to rule their territories by paying a fixed amount of tribute (Bahru 2002:87). One could take this as
a historical justification for a federal system since Ethiopians have lived for longer periods under decentralised forms of government (Assefa 2006:135). For most of its history, it existed as a de facto federal system in which the emperor exercised matters of national importance, while regional kingdoms had power to levy tax, guarantee local security and regulate trade. That is, the regional rulers had some degree of autonomy to govern their respective regions, which is the modern essence of federalism. Thus, the nineteenth century Ethiopian emperor, Menelik, operationalised the federal system of government that was geography-based, not ethnic. In the light of this, Mesfin (1999:142) stated that the structure of the traditional Ethiopian state was federal, having many kings (governing their own provinces) but one king of kings (ruling the whole state). Emperor Menelik II was credited for being the first to implement a federal system before the concept of federalism flourished in the Western political market.

In view of the above, during the imperial periods, a central issue in Ethiopian politics was the struggle between regional and central forces. For example, during the imperial era, the struggle was expressed through continuous disputes between the central king or emperor and the regional lords and princes (Bahru 2002:61). The former power struggles between the central and the regional rulers changed from a struggle for territorial expansion into a class struggle. And the 1974 Revolution which was provoked by the Ethiopian Student’s Movement was a national class struggle. It was not an ethnic conflict. During the revolution, a pool of educated elites, mostly Marxists in orientation, formed a number of political parties and intensified the growing wave of change. The twentieth century Ethiopian elites, participating in the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), viewed the problems in Ethiopia as a result of class conflicts and not as an outcome of struggles between ethnic groups (Aalen 2002:4).

Among the members of the students’ movement, however, the most ethnically conscious students were invariably the Tigrigna speakers (Young 2006:82). Owing to this, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders asserted that the early 20th century students’ movement was a struggle among ethnic
groups. In disagreement with the allegation of the TPLF leaders, however, a number of scholars teaching at the then Haile Selassie I University (HSIU) asserted that the reaction to the massive oppression and exploitation of the people of Ethiopia appeared to be a class struggle (Young 2006:81). According to Gebru, the peasants rebelled against the state not particularly because it was controlled and dominated by the Shoan Amhara, but primarily because it was oppressive (Gebru 1977:215). This movement did not have an ethnic foundation (Mesfin 2012); the main movement with ethnic-centred politics at the time was the one in Eritrea led by the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF). It may therefore be said that the students targeting the ruling class were against human exploitation irrespective of the rulers’ ethnic background. Most student activists rejected the assertion that national divisions were designed to promote tribalism, and were comfortable with the regime's policy of avoiding references to ethnicity in any context (Young 2006:80). Not surprisingly, foreign professors teaching at HSIU at this time often noted the low level of ethnic consciousness of their students (Young 2006:81).

In spite of this general atmosphere, however, the Tigrigna speakers who were ethnically conscious began to spread their particular xenophobia, claiming that the alleged class struggle was actually ethnic. This was due to resentments and antagonisms they had against the then rulers whom they assumed to be Amhara. The Tigrayan nationalists saw the Amhara domination as the major reason behind the problems in Ethiopian society (Aalen 2002:38). But this seems to be a grand misinterpretation of Ethiopian history. First, it was not the Amhara hegemony that caused Ethiopia’s backwardness but rather the power monger rulers.

Secondly, allegations of purely self-interested resource management seem to have been unjustly directed at the population of Amhara. But all Ethiopians or all provinces in the country suffered from lack of schools, industries, medical centres, other infrastructure and basic social services. Tigray was not exceptional. Lack of state investment in Tigray might have limited development, but there is little evidence that Tigray suffered disproportionately to other parts of non-Shoan Ethiopia in this respect (Young 2006:89). The corrupt feudal regime of Haile-Selassie and the
military junta of the Dergue were responsible for the mass oppression, and all ethnic groups were under the yoke of corruption and misrule. In both these cases, the leaders endorsed the validity of the statement that political leadership is a major culprit in the perennial conflict and competition over resources (Adejumobi 2007:139).

It was in this context that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) appeared on the scene and was officially established in 1975. Their manifesto issued in 1976 called for the establishment of an independent republic of Tigray, but this was later modified to cultural and political autonomy for the region within a united Ethiopia (Aalen 2002:6). With the support of the popular mass, TPLF, along with its allies in the form of parties and/or movements, took power in 1991 and the most nationalist regime in modern Ethiopian history was removed from power.

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a set comprising four elements; namely, the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the South Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF). Despite the aforementioned alliance, however, TPLF alone dominated the Ethiopian political scenery and drafted and ratified a constitution in 1994 (Vestal 1999:84). In Ethiopia, political power is confined to and wielded by a very small circle, dominated by the TPLF – representing a minority group in the ruling coalition.

The political culture of EPRDF is different; it is very secretive and stubborn. Reports of murder, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing, public dissatisfaction, famine and similar problems cannot be brought to the media. The Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation has not been allowed to entertain the idea that accounts of ethnic conflict are worth reporting. Government-controlled media closely reflected the views of the government and the ruling EPRDF (Human Rights Watch 2014a:12). The State-run Ethiopian Radio and Television has had the largest broadcast range in the country and the majority of Ethiopians do not have any alternative source of information, either from television, radio or any form of electronic media. The state-owned Ethio-Telecom is
the only internet service provider in the country. The government monitors telephone calls, text messages, and e-mails. Moreover, it jams foreign broadcasts and restricts access to the internet and blocks several websites. Any independent media agency has to avoid reporting on sensitive topics; otherwise, the agency would be accused of defamation or subversion charges. The TPLF-controlled Broadcasting Corporation does not have the real colour of a broadcasting agency; it has developed the habit of slaying truth with the swords of falsehood. Citing the International Telecommunication Union, Human Rights Watch (2014a:14) reported that approximately 1.9 percent of individuals used the internet in 2013 in a population of over ninety million. In this regard Amnesty International (2014/15:148) reported that the Media Law, Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) and Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (ATP) limit freedom of expression and effective citizens’ participation in political activities. Furthering the discussion, Human Rights Watch (2014b:2) stated that unlike most other African countries, Ethiopia has a complete monopoly over its telecommunication sector through the state-owned operator, Ethio-Telecom. Despite low access, the government maintains a strict system of controls over digital media, making Ethiopia the only Sub-Saharan African to implement nationwide internet filtering (Freedom on the Net 2013:266). In view of this, under the present regime of EPRDF, Ethiopia has the third worst internet service in the world, after Somalia and Niger, and is the fourth worst jailer of journalists in the world and second worst in Africa (Alemayehu 2016). Seen from the Ethiopian government’s authoritarian policy perspective, being an honest journalist is terrorism, refusing to cooperate with the government is terrorism, and being conscious of events in general is terrorism.

In view of the above, what is happening in one corner of the country cannot be known elsewhere, unless it is recorded and aired by international media agencies, human rights defenders or the Ethiopian Human Rights Council. It is in such a restricted scenario that the Ethiopian Human Rights Council has documented such reports (see the appendix). Therefore, these ethnic conflicts which have been documented by the Ethiopian Human Rights Council are a small selection from many. All of them could not be recorded by the Human
Rights Council due to the government’s restrictions on independent human rights activists, as well as due to financial and human resources constraints.

3. Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia

Apart from the conflicts stated in the appendix, illustrations provided by Human Rights Watch (2014a:20), Amnesty International (2014/15:148), Moresh Wegenie Amhara Organisation (2016), and the Human Rights Council (1992–2015) stated that there were a number of cases of ethnic tension and ethnic cleansing happening in the country. Fuelled by ethnic federalism or the politicisation of tribal identity, the regional government officials in the Oromia Regional State forcibly evicted about one hundred thousand ethnic Amhara from their homes. The majority of ethnic Amhara living in Western Harergie, Western Arsi, Arbagugu, Jimma, Guraferda, Wellega, Afar, Benshangul, and Western Shoa were displaced, killed or mistreated because of their ethnicity – which they never had a chance to choose before birth. According to these sources, the forced exclusion of people from their places of residence has been continuing (Human Rights Council 2015b:4b).

As can be seen from the table in the attached appendix, there were documented conflicts which took place from 1997 to 2015. These were some of the disputes recorded by the Human Rights Council. The major recurring causes of the conflict were disagreements about the possession or use of land, grazing land or water resources, and about settlements, regional hegemony, access to State resources (funds, jobs, investments) and language policy in education and administration (Aalen 2002:70). Aalen (2002:70) also states that in the southern region there is a large potential for inter-ethnic struggles for regional hegemony because of the region’s ethnic heterogeneity, but that until now, conflicts over self-government and representation have taken place only at local level in the zones or woreda. Examples of such conflicts are the language issue in Wolaita in North Omo zone, the Silte’s request for independence from the rest of the Gurage zone and conflicts between Suri and Dizi pastoralist groups in South Omo zone. The western lowland regions of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella have both a majority consisting of two
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major ethnic groups and a minority of several smaller ones. In Gambella, the Nuer and the Anwak have fought for regional hegemony. In Benishangul-Gumuz, the Berta and the Gumuz, who together make up the majority of the population, have been at odds with each other. In both states, the two majority groups fought against each other for the control of the regional government (Aalen 2002:69). In Somali, the conflicts have been between different pastoralist clans of the Somali tribe. In Afar region, which is also a pastoralist and clan based society, the same problem has been experienced.

The majority of conflicts in Ethiopia that are dubbed ‘ethnic’, are about land and the boundaries between territorialised ethnic groups (Abbink 2006:389). That is, the federal structure which is based on ethnicity contributes to ethnic tensions and conflicts, widening the disparities among the ethnic groups. Had it not been ethnic federalism, there could have been a symmetry model of federalism, with proportional territorial and population size in the various sub-regional states – which could have had the potential to reduce conflicts. Now, however, ethnic groups are competing with each other and several inter-ethnic conflicts have arisen across boundaries of regional states that are drawn along ethnic lines (Legesse 2015:2; Abbink 2006:390). Ethnic conflicts particularly led to injury, death and displacements of citizens in Afar, Gambella, Southern regional state, and Somali Regions (Human Rights Watch 2014a:20). In the present conditions, we contend that the post-1991 regime in Ethiopia, despite its promise and claims to provide solutions, has been less successful than expected in managing ethnic tensions in the country, and has basically only ‘decentralised’ the problems by defining the sources of conflict as local, not national (Abbink 2006:390; Young 1999:329; Yohannes et al. 2005:10).

4. Conflict-promoting applications of federalism

The so-called ‘EPRDF government’ established a federal system focusing on ethnic identity after ratifying the new constitution in 1994 (Ethiopia 1994). The ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article 47 (1) classifies the member states of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ into nine regional states (refer to appendix II). The indivisibility of the Ethiopian nation which has
been the result of thousands of years of interaction has been eroded and the stable ethnic composition has been disrupted by the introduction of ethnic federalism, so that Ethiopians are now at odds along ethnic lines. Legesse (2015:5) reckons that Ethiopian ethnic groups are rivals with each other since the institutionalisation of ethnicity in the early 1990s. Ethnicity which is driven by the politicisation of tribal identity has the tendency to cause problems. The critics of ethnic federalism note that the seed of tribalism which was a cause for ethnic conflict was sown with the coming into power of the EPRDF.

Since the advent of ethnic federalism that politicised tribal identity, there have been a number of conflicts, cases of ethnic cleansing and unspeakable crimes committed against humanity in the country; and all these have taken place without fair responses from the ‘EPRDF/TPLF government’. Ethnic politics generates hostility amongst Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups that hinders group interaction and entails ethnic conflicts. Due to the policy of the ruling party, mutual suspicion and hostility causing ethnic cleansing and conflict are bound to emerge even at the present time. What then are the conflict-promoting applications of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia?

4.1 The politicisation of tribal identity (Ethnic federalism)

As stated above, ethnic conflict cannot be blamed on ethnicity, but rather on the politicisation of ethnic identity by self-seeking politicians. In light of this, of all the modalities of federalism (territorial, multi-national, ethnic, quasi-federal), ethnic federalism, with its politicising of ethnic identity, is obviously the one that can cause inter-ethnic problems. Research studies also show that if ethnic differences are high and politicised and if ‘federal bargain’ type solutions are difficult to achieve, then decentralisation may result in greater ethnic mobilisation and may lead to secession (Abbasi 2010:13). In ethnically polarised countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to vote for their ethnic party, which increases ethnic grievance and the probability of civil war (Valfort 2007:5). As can be seen from the table in the attached appendix, there have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia since the introduction of ethnic federalism. For instance, due to government-spurred
divisiveness, the two tribes (Guji and Borena Oromo) that have historically managed to peacefully alternate control of their own region, have clashed due to the fact that the ‘EPRDF government’ has allegedly been inciting leaders of the subgroups (Holder et al. 2006:23). These scholars further state that the current situation in Ethiopia presents dangers that could affect all ethnic groups in the future (Holder et al. 2006:10). That is, the federal system of government with the politicisation of tribal identity could cause deep ethnic division that brings multiple problems such as secessionist movements and a culture of mistrust.

As noted in the foregoing paragraph, the ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article 47 (1) classifies the member states of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ as nine regional states and divided Ethiopians along ethnic lines thus institutionalising their divisions. Furthermore, the constitution itself has the potential to invite conflict as in the case of self-determinism. Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution states: ‘Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’. Considering article 39 (1), Aalen (2002:59) states that this is clearly a constitutional anomaly, and does not have any parallels in other federal systems today. A government that is concerned with the wellbeing of a nation does not constitutionally encourage ethnically grouped people to set apart from the whole nation. Taking this article into account, some groups, such as the Oromo People Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), have fought against the federal government claiming the right to self-determination up to secession. Amnesty International (2014/15:151) points out that armed opposition groups remained in several parts of the country or in neighbouring countries although in most cases with small numbers of fighters and low levels of activity.

Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution has the potential to create lasting conflict, distrust and hatred among ethnic groups today. Vestal (1999:165) notes that mistrust and hatred among ethnic groups grow out of the EPRDF’s theory of governance. The ‘EPRDF government’ has sought to govern by playing upon animosities between Ethiopia's different ethnic groups (Vestal
Citing the conflicts between the Dizi and Suri ethnic groups, the Oakland Institute’s field research (2014:16) indicates that the Ethiopian government is manipulating existing tensions between and among groups. The Human Rights Council (2015a:7) in its press release states that in every ethnic conflict, the hidden hands of governmental officials have been observed as trying to get political and economic advantages. It was not only the central policy of ethnic federalism that exacerbated tensions and conflicts, but decentralised ethnic-based administrations were also sowing seeds of ethnic awareness and antagonism. In other words, ethnic politics is able to divide the society, and ethnic groups are likely to develop mistrust against one another. In this regard, Turton (2006:14) argues that the federal ‘remapping’ of Ethiopia along ethnic lines, by imposing a fixed ethno-territorial grid on population with a long history of mobility and internal migration, has led to an increase rather than decrease of inter-ethnic conflict.

To get rid of challenges related to ethnicity, countries tend to prohibit discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, to provide individuals with equal rights regardless of their ethnic identity (Alemante 2003:73), and to strictly ban ethnic politics or parties. For example, the multi-national western federations (such as Switzerland and Canada) do not support ethnicity as the chief instrument of state organisation. Even in African countries, such as Uganda and Eritrea, tribal or religious parties are discouraged (Mesfin 1999:157). The Ghanaian Constitution, Article 55 (4), prohibits tribal or ethnic-based political parties and it clearly states ‘Every political party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions’. Contrary to this, the EPRDF Constitution, Article 46 (2), encourages ethnicity and tribal affiliation, and blatantly declares: ‘States shall be structured on the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people’. Ethiopia and Ghana are multi-ethnic societies with ethnic inequalities and historical rivalries but in Ethiopia, ethnic politics are the foundation and the lifeline of the TPLF which requires states to be structured as homogeneous tribal homelands, in much the same way as the Bantustans of apartheid South Africa (Alemayehu 2015). Even during elections, Ghanaian candidates are
required to get a minimum level of support in all regions of the country (Alemayehu 2015) but the Ethiopian government has been committed to perpetuating ethnic distinctiveness and political parties organised along ethnic lines. Accordingly, about sixty ethnically organised parties are found in the Ethiopian political landscape.

In view of the above, a non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy is the only viable option that could guarantee stability, equity and economic development. This can be learnt from comparing Ghana and Ethiopia which are, respectively, democratic and developed, and undemocratic and poor.

4.2 The design of the federal States

The design of federal units and administrative structures, whether symmetric or asymmetric, may cause problems and conflict. As observed by Aalen (2002:66), as well as Yohannes and others (2005:34), the delimitation of the federal units in Ethiopia has not only created very dissimilar constituent parts and an asymmetrical federal system, but also many regional states with ethnic heterogeneity within their borders, and several states in which the competition between ethnic groups or clans for regional hegemony has led to destabilisation and weakening of the regional governments. In symmetric federal arrangements, all federal units have the same powers and the same number of representatives in a second chamber of parliament but in the case of asymmetric federation, all federal units do not have the same powers. For example, Ethiopia and Russia which employ high levels of incongruent and asymmetric federalism, respectively, have experienced moderate-to-high levels of conflict since adopting their most recent constitutional arrangements (Lancaster 2012:60). Under symmetric federalism, sub-regional states are treated as equals as in the case of the United States but in asymmetric federalism, sub-national governments are treated differently, such as in Russia where each ethnic republic has its own president, whereas the Oblasts and the Krai have appointed governors (Lancaster 2012:7). A completely congruent system is one in which no federal subunit has a distinct social or cultural identity. For example, Australia would be a case in hand for a completely congruent federation, despite the fact that the
Northern Territory has the highest proportion of indigenous Australians in any Australian state; on the other hand, the Ethiopian and Belgian examples represent nearly completely incongruent federalism, with the boundaries for those states drawn up on ethno-linguistic lines (Lancaster 2012:24). The principles behind asymmetric federalism's potential to mitigate civil conflict in a state are similar to those of incongruent federalism (Lancaster 2012:22). Ethiopia and Russia are somewhat similar in their designs of provincial units with Ethiopia a nearly incongruent federation featuring ethnically based subunits while Russia has extensive asymmetry with a nontrivial amount of subunits given special status in relation to the other federal subjects and the central government. On the other hand Brazil demonstrates completely congruent and symmetric federalism.

Along with their forms of federation, Ethiopia and Russia have experienced civil conflicts at various junctures but Brazil has so far been a peaceful and stable federal state. Citing the quantitative sections of the study, Lancaster (2012:41) has shown that both incongruence and asymmetry have statistically significant effects on increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and the severity of conflicts. Groups that are not recognised under incongruent or asymmetric federations may organise protests to try to gain a greater level of recognition constitutionally (Lancaster 2012:60). A case in point is the Sidama ethnic groups in Ethiopia having three million people and failing to get the status of a regional state whereas the Harari whose overall population is 185,000 has been accorded a regional state. In the 2006–07 Ethiopian fiscal years, the Harari region received approximately 90 million Ethiopian birr (ETB) (Lancaster 2012:46) but the Sidama Regional Zone got less since it did not have the regional status level. Inequitable distribution of wealth and poor fiscal management are said to cause problems in federalism. The troubles that these particular ethnic groups display show that incongruent and ethnic federalism can be a recipe for grievance and potentially for conflict if an ethnic group is not recognised as important enough by the federal government (Lancaster 2012:46).

Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia does not consider the existing social reality of a society so intertwined that it is hard to draw a line between or among
the various ethnic groups. In the Ethiopian context, most ethnic groups could not inhabit territorially defined geographical areas. Pointing out the limitations of the federal system in Ethiopia, Assefa (2006:135) argues that a significant number of Ethiopians do not live in the places where the majority of the members of their ethnic group are to be found; they have moved, either voluntarily, in search of better opportunities, or by force, due to the Dergue’s resettlement and villagisation.

4.3 Fiscal federalism

Another important issue that needs much attention is the way in which money is distributed from the federal government to various regional states. In federation, central governments distribute funds to sub-national governments and there is a need to have effective systems of revenue sharing between the central and regional governments that could increase the effectiveness of the federal system. In distributing funds to sub-national governments, the central government could use a variety of fiscal federal criteria such as: population size, level of poverty and revenue generation capacity (Lancaster 2012:45). In Ethiopia, the powers of sub-national states are constitutionally protected, but in reality the forms of decentralisation are quite limited by fiscal, political and administrative centralism (Dickovick 2014). Due to the subjectivity of the parameters and the autocratic nature of the federal government, the fiscal federal funds are not distributed to the sub-regional governments in a genuinely fair way. Regional states in Ethiopia have alleged in the past that the EPRDF is mainly focused on disproportionately helping out the Tigray region (Lancaster 2012:45). Since the key federal government positions have been monopolised by one ethnic party, the TPLF of Tigray, there has never been a fair mechanism of allocating the finance. The balance of power clearly lies with the TPLF and the resulting inequalities give rise to situations of violent conflict. The management of the national resources does not serve the national objectives of realising genuine development, reducing poverty and increasing the standard of living. In the absence of an effective, transparent and accountable system, the federal government dominates the
process of fiscal distribution, which creates a sense of discontent among the various ethnic groups.

For the structures of fiscal federalism to function properly, there needs to be a fair and equitable distribution of financial resources between the central government and the states (regions). Where this does not happen, there will obviously be a strong potential for conflict. For instance, a great deal of dissatisfaction in the federal-provincial relationship in Pakistan has been observed around the distribution of financial resources (Abbasi 2010:36). In the Ethiopian context, regional states have a weak fiscal autonomy and they have to depend on the federal government’s allocation of funds, which is quite unbalanced (Lancaster 2012:45).

4.4 Dominant-party governance

In a similar vein, dominant-party control along with an undemocratic nature of a given state could be another factor that could create conflict among ethnic groups. Both the EPRDF in Ethiopia and the ANC in South Africa have dominated elections since the advent of federalism in the 1990s, but South Africa is relatively democratic and Ethiopia authoritarian; South Africa has a relatively advanced economy, but Ethiopia does not (Dickovick 2014). When the less secure People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria is also taken into account, it may be said that dominant-party governance holds across the range of regime types from a relatively democratic South Africa through the flawed democracy in Nigeria to the exclusionary authoritarian system in Ethiopia (Dickovick 2014). The Ethiopian federal structure appears to be that of one-party state governance, which is characterised by highly concentrated and centralised powers maintained by totalitarian institutions such as the military, other security organs and state-controlled mass media.

Despite the fact that the EPRDF has had a federal-like system in theory, the centralised power coupled with authoritarianism and undemocratic nature of the regime equates the government with the communist party of USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia created a situation in which the effectiveness of constitutional federal structures
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has been questioned. Some scholars have argued that democratic deficits in communist countries as well as federal systems, which were organised around national groups, promoted nationalist movements to their eventual fall as federations (Bunce 2004 cited in Abbasi 2010:7).

One of the most significant reasons for the formation of a federal government has been to combat tyrant regimes by decentralising the powers of the government. But an attempt to mix Marxist ideology of one-party rule with federalism is believed to create contradictory scenarios. The former indoctrinates centralisation of political power while the latter teaches decentralisation of power. As it is quite evident today in Ethiopia, the blending of two contradictory ideologies coupled with the modalities of the federal structures (such as ethnic federalism, asymmetric and incongruent forms of federalism, dominant-party governance) provide valid reasons for the prevailing ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

An attempt has been made here above to give an overview of federalism, mainly focusing on its forms and types. In a nutshell, in a multi-national and multi-cultural country, federalism might be an effective method of bringing about political stability and order. However, inappropriate application of the principle in a specific context, such as that of an authoritarian and undemocratic government, may yield just the opposite results, which may contribute to ethnic clashes and conflicts, and to disintegration of national unity.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

Entertaining ethnic diversity in multi-lingual and multi-cultural societies using federalism is a bone of contention for most scholars in the area. Some scholars choose the federal system of government to accommodate ethnic diversity but many commentators have observed that a federal system of government is inherently fragile even without adding ethnicity into the mix (Alemante 2003:56). There is considerable evidence to suggest that ethnic federalism entails conflict since it politicises tribal identity and scholars soundly refute its applicability, especially in the Ethiopian context. When it
was introduced and developed, social critics and intellectuals have stated the negative consequences of ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian context since this nation is an ancient country having multi-cultural and multi-lingual societies that have been assimilated due to thousands of years of continuous interaction, intermarriage, trade, migration, and other social activities. But the ‘current government’ has imposed a federal structure and has politicised human diversity.

Federalism, not ethnic, if appropriately applied, ‘might be an effective method of bringing about political stability and order’ but in the Ethiopian case, the politicisation of ethnic identity by self-seeking political leaders causes political instability. The desire of the self-seeking political leaders is manifested through the politicisation of tribal identity – in their design of the federal states, their fiscal federalism and their dominant-party system. All these (politicisation of tribal identity, design of the federal states, fiscal federalism and dominant-party) cause ethnic conflict and anomaly in the country.

To remedy this acute systemic illness, the ‘government’ has to stop politicising human diversity and the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia needs an urgent reconsideration. A non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy has to be established as the only viable option that could more effectively address the typical causes of conflict and guarantee stability, equity and economic development.

Sources
Abbasi, Zubair 2010. Federalism, provincial autonomy and conflicts. Islamabad, Islamabad Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives (CPDI).


Holder, Christina, Zeba Huq, and Mary Catherine Ryan 2006. Early warning in Ethiopia: Analysis. Human Rights and Genocide Clinic Cardozo, School of Law.


# Appendix 1: List of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia from 1997 to 2015 during the EPRDF regime

**Note:** This list is not complete but sums up the main incidents. The references ‘HRC’ refer to Ethiopian Human Rights Council 1992–2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of the conflict</th>
<th>Places of the conflict</th>
<th>Consequences of the conflict</th>
<th>Causes of the conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Between Guji Oromo and Gedion people</td>
<td>One hundred and forty people died and one hundred thousand people were displaced.</td>
<td>Ethnic-based leadership instead of competence-based leadership (HRC, 35th special Issue, p. 133).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>Between Wolaita and Gamo ethnic groups</td>
<td>Many people died and a number of people were injured.</td>
<td>Ethnic-based leadership (HRC, 35th special Issue, p. 133).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2000</td>
<td>In Northern Shoa between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups</td>
<td>Many people died and a number of people were injured.</td>
<td>Ethnic-based leadership (HRC, 35th special Issue, p. 133).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>In Eastern Wollega, between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups</td>
<td>Many people died and a number of people were injured and displaced.</td>
<td>Ethnic-based leadership (HRC, 35th special Issue, p. 133).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2001</td>
<td>In Eastern Wollega, between Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups</td>
<td>One hundred people were killed; four people were injured; ten thousand nine hundred Amhara were displaced.</td>
<td>Regional leaders decided to cleanse Amhara ethnic groups from the region (HRC, 68th special Issue, p. 158).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2002</td>
<td>In Gambela, between Agniwak and Nuwier</td>
<td>Sixty people were killed; forty one people were injured; eight thousand seven hundred and eighty people were displaced and eight districts were burnt and unknown number of people sank in Baro River and died.</td>
<td>Ethnic competition between Agniwak and Nuwier ethnic groups on administrative matters (HRC,55th special Issue, p. 341).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>In SPNN, between Dizie and Surma ethnic groups</td>
<td>Thirty-one individuals were killed and five people were injured; one hundred and fifty-two residents were burnt; one hundred and sixty-six cattle were stolen.</td>
<td>Due to the politicization of ethnic identity (HRC, 59th special Issue, p. 24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>In SPNN, among Dizie, Manit and Surma ethnic groups</td>
<td>Forty-one individuals were killed; one thousand four hundred and eighty people were displaced.</td>
<td>Ethnic competition (HRC, 66th special Issue, p. 143).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location and Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>In Western Hararga, in Meisa, Woreda between Oromo and Somalia ethnic group</td>
<td>Nineteen people died; twenty-one people were injured; thirty-four camels were stolen; twenty-seven residences were burnt.</td>
<td>Competition between the two ethnic groups on regional hegemony (HRC, 71st special Issue, p. 227).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>In Gambela, between Agniwak and Nuwier</td>
<td>Ninety-three people were killed; forty-two people were injured.</td>
<td>Ethnic identity was politicised by the government and there were competitions among ethnic groups on regional power (HRC, 72nd special Issue, p. 233).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>In Gambela, between Agniwak and Nuwier</td>
<td>Thirteen people died; twenty people were injured; one hundred and ninety three shops were robbed; six thousand families were displaced.</td>
<td>Competition between the two ethnic groups on regional hegemony (HRC, 73rd special Issue, p. 248).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>In Eastern Harerga, between Oromo and Somalia ethnic groups</td>
<td>Fourteen people died and ten people were injured; one thousand six hundred and twenty-eight people were displaced; sixty cattle, four donkeys and twenty-six camels were stolen.</td>
<td>Claims on ethnic boundary (HRC, 82nd special Issue, p. 443).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Between Guji and Gebra ethnic group</td>
<td>Twenty-four individuals died and ten were injured.</td>
<td>The adoption of ‘sons-of-soil’ orientations by regional states (HRC, 87th special Issue, p. 514).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Between Guji and Gebra ethnic groups</td>
<td>Sixteen people died; twenty-five people were injured; property estimated to be fifty-four thousand two hundred and fifty-five birr were destroyed.</td>
<td>A claim to have boundary enlargement (HRC, 87th special Issue, p. 506).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>In Eastern Wollea, in Gidie Kirimu Woreda between Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups</td>
<td>Over one hundred people died and four people were injured.</td>
<td>Conflicts over ‘autochthony’, literally being ‘sons of the soil’, caused by the politicised mentality of the ‘so-called’ indigenous people (HRC, 98th special Issue, p. 757).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location/Region</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Claim/Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>In Oromia Regional State, Guji Zone, Bulie Hora Woreda, between Burji and Guji ethnic groups</td>
<td>Two people died; eight people were injured.</td>
<td>Claims on ethnic boundary (HRC, 111th special Issue, p. 91).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>Adama University</td>
<td>One student was killed and five students injured; nineteen students were expelled from the University</td>
<td>Tribal identity has been politicised since EPRDF took power (HRC, 96th special Issue, p. 736).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haromya University</td>
<td>Ten students were injured and thirty students were expelled from the University.</td>
<td>Tribal identity has been politicised since EPRDF took power (HRC, 96th special Issue, p. 738).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jimma University</td>
<td>Around twenty students were jailed.</td>
<td>Tribal identity has been politicised since EPRDF took power (HRC, 96th special Issue, p. 741).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>In Benishangul, between Gumiz and Oromo ethnic groups</td>
<td>Over one hundred people died; twenty-five injured and over one thousand people were displaced.</td>
<td>A claim to have agricultural areas (HRC, 110th special Issue, p. 82).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>In Benishangul, between Gumiz and Oromo ethnic groups</td>
<td>Sixteen people died; twenty people were injured.</td>
<td>Claims on ethnic boundary (HRC, 27th regular Issue, part two, p. 173).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>In SPNN, among Hamer, Kara and Arbolie ethnic groups</td>
<td>Seven people were killed and nine were injured.</td>
<td>Boundary dispute on water and agricultural land resources (HRC, 134th special Issue, p. 3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: The nine regional states and the two chartered cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) of Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime

Appendix 3: Administrative regions and zones of Ethiopia during the EPRDF regime
Blurring ‘the Other’: Transforming relations in the management of the 1992 ethno-religious conflicts in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna State, Nigeria

*Philip Adémólá Ọláyokù*

Abstract

Nigeria, as a multi-ethnic state, has been rife with perennial conflicts resulting from struggles for territorial dominance, administrative and political legitimacy and resource control. This study thus explores the relational contexts of these conflicts, which are often subtended by contours of ethno-religious differences as was the case between the Hausa and Atyap in the Zangon Kataf Community of Kaduna State, Nigeria. The study details the historical context of manipulation of these differences by state actors in asserting and changing the dynamics of political legitimacy and control. The latter part of the paper describes qualitative research supporting earlier assertions. It employs a qualitative methodology with

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the use of key informant interviews and personal observation involving major stakeholders within a three year period between 2011 and 2014. It subsequently contends that the restoration of peace in the community was dependent on the transformation of relations between hitherto belligerent parties through the adoption of the joint-problem-solving approach and a mediating 14-member reconciliation committee, which created a blueprint for political inclusion. It thus recommends an all-inclusive stakeholder approach in the transformation of relations for the management of resurging ethno-religious conflicts in the region.

**Keywords:** Zangon Kataf crises, history and management, transforming relations, politics of inclusion

**Introduction**

Inter-ethnic/religious conflicts have been prevalent features in scholarly discourses on the political and socio-cultural relations among the diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria. These discourses examine conflicts (among ethnic groups who either co-habit or share boundaries), which result from claims of victimisation, neglect, oppression, discrimination, domination, exploitation amongst other causes (Salawu 2010:348). The occurrences of these conflicts usually take the ethnic and/or religious dimensions which cut across the different geo-political regions in the country; prominent among which have been the Ife-Modakeke crisis (1997), Tiv/Jukun crisis (2001), Umuleri/Aguleri crises (1995, 1999), Jos crises (since 2001) and the Zangon Kataf crises (February, May 1992) (see CLEEN Foundation 2002; Toure 2003). Literature on these conflicts have focused on investigating the causes of ethno-religious violence as well as proffering possible solutions based on the conflict dynamics. While a lot of documentation has been done in respect of the historical sources of the indigene/settler\(^1\) crises within

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\(^{1}\) The indigene/settler dichotomy, within the context of this discourse, means a situation where a group attempts to state claims of legitimacy and territorial control as the first group to settle in a community (indigenes) while the other group (settlers) is regarded as coming later to share the same geo-political space.
the Zangon Kataf context, the purpose of my research was to advance scholarship on the political dynamics and temporal trajectories of the crises as they show the effects of the relational approach to conflict management. It entailed an investigation of the intermittent roles of the state in the manipulation and management of difference within the contexts of the events leading to the Zangon Kataf 1992 post-conflict scenario. The study, in the subsequent sections, historicised the context of relations between the Hausa and Atyap of Zangon Kataf within the political, social and economic spectra from the precolonial through to the postcolonial era. It concludes that the mutual identification of sources of violent conflicts is fundamental to managing them by transforming relations as showcased by the efforts of the fourteen-member reconciliation committee in Zangon Kataf. This all-inclusive stakeholder model is thus important in managing historical communal conflicts between belligerent groups as it is fundamental to the restoration of social relations for stability in troubled communities.

**Methodology**

The methodology for this research involved key informant interviews with 5 lawyers, 30 adult male and 25 adult female Atyap and Hausa indigenes of Zangon Kataf, who included the Hausa district head, members of the Atyap Ruling Council, elders in Zangon Kataf Community, and youth leaders. The interviews were held between April 2011 and September 2014. Four legal counsel involved in the legal proceedings of the post-1992 Zangon Kataf conflicts were also consulted. The interviews were corroborated with personal observations and visits to significant sites such as the market, the Agwatayap’s palace, community boundary locations, the farms, a mass grave site and the central meeting point. The research was conducted using an interview guide with semi-structured questions and a recorder where permitted. The identity of some interviewees have been protected, based on their requests and in line with the ethical guide for the research. Archival materials from the National Archives and grey literature, including

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2 Zangon Kataf is located in Kaduna State, North-central Nigeria.
correspondence and reports of various commissions of inquiry, were also consulted. Field research was conducted during a period of security apprehensions within Kaduna State, with sporadic attacks by Boko Haram insurgents in various parts of the state. This restricted access to state sources as there were lots of bureaucratic bottlenecks due to security concerns. A major challenge for this research was the lack of official documentation of the crises in National and State libraries, and other research centres. This made it necessary to rely on individual collections in private chambers and libraries for the collation of written sources which served as grey literature. The major challenge with this was that some of the documents were not well preserved, while other vital documents had been lost to fire outbreaks, as was the case with work by a renowned researcher on Zangon Kataf at the Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. In spite of these challenges, relevant gatekeepers were identified to help with the snowball sampling of respondents and this aided the collection of data for this study. A research guide also helped in facilitating the interview sessions with non-English speaking respondents.

**Historicising the Atyap/Hausa political and socio-economic relations in Zangon Kataf**

The well documented crises of February and May 1992 emanated from the initial resistance of the Hausa, on 6 February 1992, against the relocation of the central market to Magamiya Road. The socio-economic implication of this territorial redefinition was the potential power shift from the Hausa to the Atyap regarding the control of the economic relations in Zangon Kataf. As some Hausa respondents recounted, the decision by a newly elected Atyap-led Local Government administration was aimed at displacing them from the market; thereby denying them their major means of livelihood. Beyond the underpinning economic argument, the age-old religious rivalry between both groups was also a mobilisation factor during the crises. The Hausa maintained that the new market encroached on their place of worship, and that this implied an attempt of the Christian Atyap to defile their religion. As Ahmed, one of the Hausa respondents recalled:
You cannot blame people for protecting a place where they worship. They flouted a court injunction because they were in charge (of the local government). That was it …. We told them to obey the court injunction and they refused. The law is the law. Who do you blame for that?

As was observed during the research, the historical context of inter-ethnic relations in Zangon Kataf is one in which ethnic identity is synonymous with religion, which remains a significant factor in the creation and maintenance of relations with the other. Thus, religion was ‘a sign post for group boundaries’ (see Caselli and Coleman 2012:29). An understanding of the intersection between religion and identity is thus fundamental to situating the roles of state actors in the management of the Zangon Kataf crises within the right ethno-political context. While the narratives on economic cum religious causes are quite informative as regards the immediate causes of the May 1992 Zangon Kataf crises, there have been studies which indicate that the crises were rooted in a history of hostile social relations between the Hausa and the Atyap, the two major ethnic groups in the area.3 Toure (2003) traced the history of antagonistic relations among the groups to the 1897 military raids of an Emir of Zazzau, Mohammed Lawal, which were carried out in his bid to extend the Zaria Emirate south-eastwards to Atyapland. The resulting hostilities led to the evacuation of the Hausa residents from the area in the same year, for fear of reprisal attacks by the Atyap. The Hausa reportedly did not return until the British invaded the area in 1903, though the raids continued between 1900 and 1902. Animosities between the two groups further escalated with the appointment of a Hausa district head (from Zaria) in Zangon Kataf at the introduction of the District System in 1907 (Kazah-Toure 2003). The appointment, according to informants, led to several acts of resistance

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3 Zangon Kataf, as a district under colonial rule, is reputed to be cosmopolitan with other notable groups in the area namely the Ikulu, Tacherak (Kachecere), Fulani, Angan (Kamatan), Bajju (Kaje) and Fulani. See Re-assessment Report on Katab District Zaria Province by Mr H.M. Brice-Smith (Source: National Archives Ibadan-NAI) and Kazah-Toure (2003). However, the town’s cosmopolitan outlook today encompasses people of different ethnic extractions including the Igbo, Edo, Ijaw and Tiv as was discovered during the fieldwork.
by the Atyap against what they perceived as a political disenfranchisement within their homeland. One such action was the refusal to pay taxes via the official channels, and intermittent questioning of the educational competence of the district head. During this period, an administrative solution was devised to douse hostilities through the appointment of some Atyap indigenes as chiefs or village heads at the lowest cadre of governance within the new political structure.

The political structure in the Zangon Kataf District, as documented in 1922, included the district head (also known as Katuka), assisted by a district mallam (teacher/instructor), a messenger, three dogorai (palace/district guards), a forest guard and a cattle inspector, who were all Hausa. The judicial system of the district was also altered with the introduction of area courts, which were being run by Islamic Law. According to the 1922 assessment report, the courts were headed by the Hausa Alkali and administered with three other Hausa assistants who sat along ‘pagan assessors’. The label ‘pagan assessor’, used in reference to non-Hausa/Muslims, who practised the traditional religion at the time, corroborated the claim that the political structure in the North discriminated against non-Hausa/Muslim groups (including the Atyap). As such, their inclusion in the administrative and judicial systems of the district logically resulted from their continuous agitations against what they considered Hausa oppression. According to Buba Mannasseh, a member of the Atyap Youth Forum:

…There was never a time we have accepted subjugation in our history … an Atyap man is a strong willed individual with dignity, but also peace loving. That was why it was easy for the missionaries when they came here. We are (majorly) Christians and the Hausa are not comfortable with this. Jihad never got to us, we fought them back before the white men imposed the emirs on us ….

Several Atyap informants referred to the documented continuous resistance of their forebears to the census being conducted by the Hausa on behalf

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4 Re-assessment Report on Katab District Zaria Province.
of the British colonial administration as evidence of their protests against policies of socio-political exclusion. The reason generally adduced for this was that they considered themselves more competent than the Hausa in terms of carrying out this task, as figures were often manipulated in favour of the Hausa who count non-humans as part of their number. These census-based controversies were also captured by the 1922 re-assessment report which reflected irregularities in figures, wherein boys were counted as men in the Zangon Kataf District, apparently for the purposes of taxation. Following from this, the Atyap resisted the census because they felt they were being over-taxed since censuses were conducted to monitor the taxation regime. In certain instances, the Atyap were reported to have resisted disproportionate tax charges which they considered unjust. The Atyap resistance to the Native Authority administration continued till the post-independent era as violent demonstrations involving them and other groups were reported to have taken place between 1946 and 1966 (Suberu 1996:50).

The Hausa in Zangon Kataf are well renowned as traders. Little wonder there is a historical link between the profession and their earliest presence in the town. The first Hausa to arrive in the town is identified as Mele, a successful trader who contributed significantly to the market activities in the town. Mele is said to have invited his kinsmen to join him at Zango, a town renowned for its commercial significance dating as far back as the early 20th century. The blossoming economy thus conferred a cosmopolitan status on the town, which has residents from different parts of the country. The Zangon Kataf market was the largest in the district, situated ‘on the main trade routes from the North to Jemaa, Keffi, Abuja and Bida in the South and from Bauchi and Jos to the South and West’5. Due to its geographical centrality, it was a stop where traders, either travelling northward or southward, took breaks from their journeys. The market retains its historical significance as a viable centre of economic activities till the present, giving credence to economic undertones of the root causes of

5 Re-assessment Report on Katab District Zaria Province.
the 1992 crises in addition to religious, ethnic and political undercurrents. From a historical perspective, the political marginalisation of the Atyap under the colonial structure further punctuated the hostilities between them and the Hausa, resulting in intermittent clashes that climaxed in the well documented 1992 market crises which left over 1,528 people killed, 518 injured, 133 houses destroyed and 26 farms vandalised (Akinteye et al. 1999; Kazah-Toure 2003; Madugba 2001; Suberu 1996). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the crises, it is important to note that the historical context of antagonistic relations between the two groups guided the interventions of the 14-member reconciliation committee which emphasised transforming these relations to restore sustainable peace in the community.

The State and the exploitation of difference in Nigeria

The roles of the state in the manipulation of difference among indigenous ethnic groups in Nigeria were aptly captured by Awe (1999:4–13), who traced the shift from the inclusive accommodating pre-colonial politics through the emergence of exclusive colonial politics to the corrupt and oppressive political climate in post-independent Nigeria. The assertion of Awe that there had been political structures (either centralised or decentralised) in pre-colonial Nigeria, which were altered through the introduction of new social political orders by colonialists (both Mediterranean and Western), has been well corroborated in extant literature by renowned politicians, historians and scholars such as Lugard (1922), Stride and Ifeka (1971), Ikime (1980), Ade Ajayi (1989), Alagoa (1992), Falola and Heaton (2008). The introduction of the indirect rule system (as shown in the Zangon Kataf scenario above) was a paradigmatic shift in the content, focus, nature and methods of political rule in hitherto independent communities which became a conglomerate on 14 January 1914 in the bid to create a modern Nigerian state (Lugard 1922; Awe 1999:8; Nast 2005:140).

6 Kazah-Toure (2003) well documented the pre-British colonial antecedents of raids by Jihadists in Southern Zaria.
Similarly, Heidi Nast’s historical analysis of slavery and concubinage within the political institution in Kano concluded with instances of how Kano’s political and economic structures were replaced with the advent of colonial rule, despite the seeming respect for and preservation of traditional institutions (Nast 2005:139–165). Awe, from a broader spectrum, categorically stated that ‘What was supposed to be an indirect rule was in reality a direct one that ignored the traditional institutions of government’. She exemplified this with the Northern Emirate System within which emirs became ‘colonial agents’ in Muslim communities, while the Non-Muslim areas of the North had ‘British supported chiefs’ imposed on their hitherto independent political heads (Awe 1999:8). This is akin to the redefinition of political leadership contexts in colonial Francophone Africa as discussed by Geschiere (2009:15). Therein, though autochthonous groups (people of the land) were identified with particular territories, the control of these territories was reassigned to imposed non-indigenous chiefs (allogenes) considered to be more industrious than the ‘backward locals’. This colonial method of governance was thus a violence-based power relation which was purportedly meant to prevent the African from degeneracy and vice, thus redefining his socio-political identity as well as geography for economic benefits (Mbembe 1992:18). Subsequently, this defined relations as the masses became further separated from governance whereby the state became embodied in autocratic individuals in post-colonial contexts, as hitherto well defined identities became fluid in well-manipulated incoherent socio-political climates (Mbembe 1992:7, 5). It is important to note that this alien operational model of the colonialists, which made the governed unconditionally submissive, never gained legitimacy among Africans. The introduction of the indirect rule system in Northern Nigeria was thus significant in the creation of fears and suspicion among the other indigenous groups against the ruling hegemony of the Hausa, Fulani, Nupe and Kanuri, as noted by the Willinks Commission in 1954.7 The change

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in the political atmosphere subsequently led to the colonial redefinition of identity and space along the indigene/settler paradigm, which further crystallised the struggles over land ownership, self-determination and socio-cultural control (Nwosu 1999; Osaghae and Suberu 2005:17).

The importance of clarifying the historical context of the shift in relationships between the state and the governed in Nigeria follows from Mamdani’s (2002:766–767) argument against the cultural theory of politics, which interprets political actions and their consequences synchronically as opposed to the diachronic interpretation of realities within the historical context. The latter helps in the proper placement of events within the right politico-historical context; thus providing an objective basis for understanding such events and their root causes. Within this diachronic context, one could clearly understand that the indirect rule policy, rather than provide an inclusive social ambience, which was fronted with the inclusion of indigenous regents and chiefs within a new political order, resulted in further fractionalisation of communities. This was because people felt alienated under the new governance regime of compulsion, as opposed to the precolonial participatory politics where leaders prioritised accountability to their community.

This distortion of political administration changed the political destiny and right to territoriality of indigenous groups of Northern Nigeria, bred dissension among the Hausa and non-Hausa groups, led to crises and the breakdown of peace processes within the broader context of ‘ethnic stereotypification’ as it was in the case of Zangon Kataf. As against the manufactured stereotypes of Hausa domination in Zangon Kataf, Hausa residents decried the fact that they were also politically excluded as most political decisions were taken from Zaria without their knowledge or participation. This contradiction thus presents them as being both politically (having no say in governance) and socially alienated (as they were not considered indigenous to Zangon Kataf). Within the broader Nigerian context, the alienation of the governed from administration also had socio-economic implications as colonialism bred class distinctions between the educated elites and the so-called unlettered people, with
new identities of the sophisticated urbanised and the less developed rural populations.

**Identity, space and the management of difference within the Zangon Kataf context**

Awe (1999:10–13) identified ethno-religious sentiments, corruption and the ‘oil curse’ as responsible factors for further exclusion of the masses from governance in post-colonial Nigeria. The politics of elite recycling and self-perpetuation in power, which included a long interjection of military dictatorships, has further distanced the ruled from governance. In particular, ethno-religious manipulations remain ready tools in the hands of political elites through which they hunt down rivals in attaining and maintaining political power and wealth (Ibeanu 2000; Ukiwo 2005; Stewart 2009). The emergent post-colonial relations from such manipulations could well be described with Mbembe’s (1992:5) ‘mutual zombification’ whereby political actors and the governed coexist in separate but interrelated spaces – with changing identities to fit into specific socio-political contexts often driven by interests and benefits beyond their design and control.

The dynamics of these constantly changing identities and relationships, within the Nigerian context, is such that they have overlapping macro (national) and micro (state and local government) layers. An understanding of the interrelatedness and interdependence of group relations at these three governance levels is thus significant in the management of hostile relationships among warring ethno-religious factions. It is the formation of such ever dynamic and complex relations that validates the need for a transformation of hostile relations by integrating the conflicting parties within the conflict management process. This approach probes beyond framed positions to redressing societal structures and institutions within a gradual process of attaining win-win outcomes for parties in conflict (Miall 2004:3). This is premised on the fact that root causes of violent conflicts are not usually limited to the immediate location of the conflicts, with relationships having degenerated over time. The context of the
Zangon Kataf conflict scenario as presented above consequently reiterates the degeneration of relations over time between the Hausa and the Atyap (see Kazah-Toure 2003; Osinubi and Osinubi 2006; Adeleye et al. 1999; and Adebanwi 2007), which needed to be reversed in restoring peace to the communities. The inclusive approach of the Kaduna State Government in inaugurating a fourteen-member reconciliation committee to unearth the remote and immediate causes of the crises was accordingly a significant step at transforming relationships through dialogue, in order to restore peace to the area. Going beyond the framed immediate causes of aggression by each of the opposing groups, the committee explored the underlying effects of political exclusion that bred violence over time, so as to help both parties trade mutually beneficial concessions to allow for a more inclusive socio-political climate in Zangon Kataf.

This intervention validated the importance of an inclusive space for a stable polity as underscored by Malpas (2004) who advocated the need to unpack cross-cultural intersections of place and identity in conflict contexts. This is because the self is defined according to experiential relations with other ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ within a particular space (Malpas 2004:4–10).

The link between place and identity in Zangon Kataf was captured by Adebanwi (2007:216, 238) in describing the space-dependent power relations among the Hausa/Atyap groups as a battle for territoriality. He defines territoriality as the enlivening or empowerment of space in which ‘possession’, and by implication control, of a territory empowers individuals or groups with ownership claims to dominate and control others within that particular territory. The potentiality for such control enhances ethnic mobilisations among groups who are often engaged in political, economic, demographic, ecological and cultural competitions within shared spaces (see Wilkes and Okamoto 2002:3–4). These competitions expand the dimensions of relations beyond those between persons and communities, to their interactions with land and the environment.

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8 The market relocation (in February 1992) and the uprooting of crops from farmlands (in May 1992) were immediate causes but not the root causes of the crises, as the interventions of the Rahila Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry showed.
The factors highlighted intermittently emerged during interviews with both the Hausa and Atyap residents as the bases for ethno-religious mobilisation in the build-up to the 1992 market crises in Zangon Kataf, with the overarching themes of identity and territoriality underlining the spill-over of violence to other parts of Kaduna State. The struggle for political control of the Zangon Kataf District (and subsequently the local government), between the Atyap and the Hausa, is linked to the perceived demographic threats of the Hausa whose number significantly increased over time resulting in the encroachment – with the help of the British – into land belonging to the Atyap. With the Hausa dominating Zango town, a space located in the heart of the Atyapland central to their economic existence and survival, the Atyap suspected a conspiracy to further disengage them from their land.\textsuperscript{9}

The Atyap, like other predominantly agro-economic cultures, regarded land as central to their economic existence. In line with their tradition, they do not give out land permanently but lease it to visitors for an agreed period of time, after which they are expected to return it.\textsuperscript{10} From a cultural perspective, there were also conflicts regarding the belief and legal systems, linguistic dominance, and inter-ethnic marriages amongst others. For instance, with the Islamic religion considering traditional religious practice as paganism, the introduction of the Sharia legal system by the colonial administration was resisted by the Atyap, who considered it a defiance of their traditional legal culture. This religious otherness was further accentuated when the Atyap embraced Christianity. The Atyap particularly complained against the condemnation of their local alcoholic drink (\textit{Burukutu}), and the impossibility of having daughters-in-law from Hausa extraction. The dominance of Hausa as the lingua franca in Zangon Kataf, as in most parts of the North, was also considered as a threat to the Atyap language and culture with the younger generations losing touch. Suffice it to state that the dichotomy in the relations between

\textsuperscript{9} Interview with Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Jury Ayok (retired).

\textsuperscript{10} Interview with Maj. Gen. Zamani Lekwot (retired).
these two groups extended beyond the microcosm of Zangon Kataf local government to the macrocosm of Hausa/non-Hausa distinctions in other parts of Northern Nigeria.

The State and identity politics in the management of the 1992 Zangon Kataf crises

The macro dimension of the Atyap/Hausa stereotypical relations was one of overlapping identities in the post-February/May 1992 violent crises. The Kaduna State government, which had set up a commission of inquiry named *The Zangon Kataf (Market) Riots Commission of Inquiry* after the February crisis, extended the mandate of the commission to examining the causes and actors of the May crises, which began while the commission was yet to submit its report. Within the historical circumstances of prevailing differentiation, the Atyap considered the composition of the commission and its procedures as very unfavourable to their cause. This was, firstly, because the seven-member commission was composed of 6 Muslims and only one Christian, Mr William Shera, who was not trusted to be capable of representing their interests. As some informants opined, the second reason was hinged on territoriality, with claims that the location of the commission's hearing in Kawo, Kaduna State, was deliberately chosen to prevent them from attending the proceedings, given its distance which made accessibility difficult for aged and maimed witnesses. There was therefore an interplay of territoriality, ethnic sentimentality and religious biases trailing the perception of this state-led intervention by both groups. Thus, while the Hausa were pleased with the initiation, procedures and outcomes of the sittings of the commission, the Atyap refrained from making official representation at the commission's public hearings. For them, the Hausa had their kith and kin (in government) controlling the whole intervention process, and this did not guarantee justice.

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11 The Commission was chaired by Hon. Justice Rahila Hadea Cudjoe and the other members were Massoud A. Oredola, William P. Shera, Ja’afaru Makarfi, Garba Galadima, Abbas Usman and Musa Gaiya.

12 Interview with Anonymous Atyap Respondent.
At about the same period, the federal military government under General Ibrahim Babaginda set up two judicial tribunals under Section 2(1) and (2) of the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree No. 2 of 1987 as amended. These tribunals were to focus on the causes of the civil and communal disturbances of Zangon Kataf town. The first tribunal, which was chaired by Hon. Justice B. O. Okadigbo, a retired high court judge, comprised six members and tried twenty-three suspects; while the second, headed by Mr. Justice E. A. Adegbite, was made up of seven persons and tried thirty persons. It is important to note that those tried were part of a total of about sixty-two Atyap elites (that included chiefs, high ranking civil servants, retired servicemen, intellectuals and senior pastors) who were arrested by security agents and kept in custody. Sources of this study did not reflect any major Hausa personality arrested in the aftermath of the crises.

Consequently, the arrest of key members of the Atyap group by the federal government was considered a macro dimension of Hausa injustice within Northern Nigerian politics. It was indeed emphasised, during interview sessions with some of the arrested victims, that the then president, General Ibrahim Babangida, visited the scene of the crisis on 26 May 1992, and wept. He was credited with the assertion that ‘all those arrested in


14 The creation of the tribunals of Inquiry by the Federal Military government which sat at the same period with the state commission on inquiry indicated the possibility of a special interest by the government in the crises. The creation of two tribunals sitting simultaneously reflected the government’s intention to hasten its decision-making process as the case was practically ‘hijacked’ from the state commission, which could not interrogate the suspects and had to take its decisions without their representation as was contained in its final report. A similar approach was adopted by the Okadigbo-led tribunal who took its decision without the representation of the defence counsel for the accused Atyap since they had to withdraw from the case with the promulgation of retroactive decrees by the federal government to further indict the suspects. These procedural challenges on the part of the government, both at the federal and state levels, were largely responsible for the little impacts of their interventions.
connection with the crisis will be declared guilty until they are proven innocent’. This statement was regarded as malicious and is believed to have impacted the outcome of the tribunal’s proceedings. It was reported by Akintunde and others (1993), that along with the president’s interest, the secretary to the state government, Aliyu Mohammed, also took personal interest in the proceedings having lost two of his nephews during the crises. The reason given by the then president when asked for reacting differently to the Zangon Kataf crises was that ‘the mode of destruction in Zangon-Kataf (sic) did not allow for compliance with the normal procedure of dissolving a local government council’ (Akintunde et al. 1993:13). The dissolution of the Atyap-led Zangon Kataf local government inferred the loss of territorial influence of the Atyap in local politics. For the Hausa, the removal of the then local government chairman was justified, having suffered major casualties during the crises. The Hausa informants maintain that the arrest of the Atyap ought to be considered appropriate since they were responsible for initiating the crises and they (the Hausa) were only defending themselves. Without attempting to delve into the debate on the root cause(s) of the crises, what could be deduced is that the utterances of people in government (considered to have strong affinity to the Hausa) and the imbalance in the composition of the membership of the commission and tribunals (which were dominated by Muslims) further instigated ethno-religiously motivated hostilities between both groups.

The manner of arrest of some of the later convicted suspects was also one that left the feeling that the Atyap would not get justice from the federal government’s interventions. For instance, Major General Lekwot, the most prominent arrested suspect in connection with the violence, recounted in an interview that on 19 May 1992, he had been invited to the police headquarters in Kaduna by Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Uba Ringim, who was sent from the force headquarters in Lagos. On getting there, he was taken to the Wuse police station in Abuja where he was eventually thrown, with no opportunity for discussion or defence, into a cell close to hardened criminals. Likewise, a day later, ACP Jury Baba Ayok (retired) (the displaced local government chairman) and Major Atomie Kude
(retired) alongside nineteen other Atyap elites were invited for a meeting in Zonkwa, only to be conveyed in waiting buses by the Police Commissioner Simeon Adeoye to Gabasawa police station in Kaduna without any warrant or explanation. From the Atyap account, the continuous victimisation of their elites around Kaduna town lasted for about two months with the total number of those detained in Kaduna prison put at sixty-two.\(^{15}\)

**Sourcing for sustainable peace: The Committee for Reconciliation and the search for lasting peace for the Zangon Kataf community**

The government of Kaduna State subsequently initiated steps to ensure the restoration of sustainable peace to Zangon Kataf after initial attempts failed to restore stability to the area. In doing this, they adopted a non-adversarial means of inclusive dialogue by holding a series of meetings with representatives of both Atyap and Hausa communities. The informants, from both ends, expressed how this was a welcome development as an all-inclusive dialogue was crucial to reversing the strained relationships between them. As one of the committee members opined:

…The committee was balanced. The government ensured this through consultations and by bringing in equal representations based on the recommendation of both us (Hausa) and the Atyap. You must know that it was a thorough process in making these choices; the governor was careful in choosing the mediator (Late Air Vice-Marshall Mu’azu) to coordinate the committee …. But again, it is all about the implementation. Go through our recommendations, some have yielded results, others did not see the light of the day. In any case, we sat together to discuss the crises and make recommendations ….

This joint problem-solving approach encapsulated an agreement by the representatives of both ethnic groups on 14 November 1994 that each would submit seven names for the formation of a fourteen-member reconciliation committee with a ‘neutral, responsible and impartial’ person within the

\(^{15}\) See The Addendum to the Kataf Community Memorandum of 30\(^{th}\) July, 1999, p. 9.
state to serve as an arbitrator. The Military Administrator of Kaduna State, Col. Lawal Ja’afaru Isa, in a letter dated 30 November 1994, formally informed the Late Air Vice-Marshall Usman Mu’azu (then retired) about his nomination as arbitrator to facilitate the meetings of the committee.

The chairmanship of the committee was to be alternated during the various sessions while Alhaji Hussani Hayatu served as the secretary of the committee. A Hausa committee member, in an interview, stated that the balance in the committee’s representation was sufficient to make it credible, as it allowed for detailed considerations of the perceptions of both groups on the remote and immediate causes of the crises.

The terms of reference of the committee were thus highlighted as follows:

- Explore the possibility of addressing both the remote and the immediate causes of the disturbances of Zangon Kataf in February and May 1992.
- Determine the ingredients for lasting peace in Zangon Kataf.
- Determine and suggest strategies on how this desirable lasting peace can be achieved.
- Submit findings and recommendations within three weeks of inauguration.

The committee was inaugurated on 15 December 1994 at the Igabi State House Lodge, Kawo, Kaduna State. The committee adopted a methodology, which took cognizance of incorporating major stakeholders within the intervention process. It included fact-finding visits to eminent personalities such as traditional rulers, representatives of affected communities and religious organisations, as well as esteemed personalities and leaders of thought in the Zangon Kataf Local Government, and Kaduna town.


17 The other members of the committee stated in the letter included Dan Kato, Zakari Sogfa, Francis Mutuah, Joshua Bityong, Ninak Shekari, Jury Ayok and Duniya Bungon for the Atyap Community; and Ibrahim Zango, A. T. K. Lawal, Muhammad Inuwa, Mohammed El-Idris, Aliyu Magaji, Kabiru Mato and Ibrahim Bisallah for the Hausa community.

18 Interview with Dr Kabir Mato in his Office at Emeka Anyaoku Street in Abuja, 20 November 2012.
The second part of the methodology involved the analysis of findings from the above engagements; and the third part focused on the treatment of the terms of reference.

This initiative was also given legitimacy by residents of the state as reflected in their various feedbacks to the secretariat of the committee. Notable among such feedbacks was the letter of the Emir of Birnin Gwari, Mallam Zubair Jibril Maigwari II, which he entitled ‘Proposal on Zangon Kataf’. Writing from his experience as a vice-principal of a secondary school in Zangon Kataf at the time of the crises, he articulated the politics of difference as a root cause resulting from ill-feelings introduced by the civil-servants, businessmen, and retired and serving soldiers. These actors, for him, had inordinate cravings for wealth, political and territorial control. In his view, the solution may not be merely rebuilding the communities and resettling the victims, but also ensuring fairness to all the parties. Among other things, he proposed that the farms in contention should be rebuilt, expanded and transformed into a national village where people of different ethnic affiliations could live alongside members of the community who remain behind.\(^{19}\)

The representatives of the Zangon Kataf Local Government Communities also submitted a joint memorandum to the committee which contained three resolutions. These representatives comprised the Bajju Development Association, Ikulu Development Association, Kamatan Development Association and the Kataf (Atyap) Youth Development Association. From this coalition of the non-Hausa indigenes in the area, the first request was the immediate unconditional release of all those arbitrarily jailed in connection with the crisis to allow for meaningful negotiations. Secondly, they demanded equal recognition of all the ethnic groups in the area through the creation of chiefdoms to ensure political inclusion through self-determination, and thirdly that efforts at restructuring the

community and reintegrating different ethnic and religious groups be made following the examples of Zonkwa, Unguwar Rimi, Samaru-Kataf and Kagoro in which hitherto hostile relations have been transformed.\textsuperscript{20} Some points were also made by the Igbo community’s leader, Chief Cyprian Ihejiahi. He corroborated the need for an Atyap chiefdom, the creation of an integrated settlement for all residents of Zangon Kataf with its own community development association, cooperative unions and social clubs. He finally pleaded for equal compensation for all victims of the Zangon Kataf February/May Crises, and the release of all the innocent convicts in prison.\textsuperscript{21} These recommendations took cognizance of the importance of creating a safe space through integration, by which territoriality and ethno-religious disparities are downplayed.

The committee sat and submitted its report in March 1995, which contained their terms of reference, ingredients for reconciliation and some cardinal points. The first part of the report dealt with the immediate and remote causes of the instability and disturbances in Zangon Kataf. The four immediate causes identified included the manipulation of the vulnerable youth population; negative reactions of individuals, communities and interest groups to the February crises; the Government/Emirate Council’s attitude to the February and May 1992 crises; and the market relocation to the new site.

It emerged that the failure of the political leadership to provide economic security in Nigeria had disempowered the youths and made them vulnerable to elite manipulation. In the bid for political and territorial control by the elites of the warring groups, the media was identified as a tool for instilling negative sentiments among members, especially the youth, through bias.


and sensational reportage. The committee affirmed Awe’s (1999) argument on the contradictions between post-colonial political administration and the governed by identifying the quartet of the Federal government, Kaduna State Government, the Zangon Kataf Local Government administration and the Emirate council as culpable parties in the aftermath of the February crises. The post-violence reactions from these political actors were specifically criticised based on the ethnicisation and politicisation of their interventions. In addressing the root causes, the committee emphasised the need to educate the populace on de-emphasising ethno-religious sentiments and struggle over territoriality. This was to be done through an all-inclusive educational system which bridges the inherited Islamic/Missionary educational divide. It affirmed the need for the new market in addressing its requisite expansion, but its establishment should allow for social and administrative inclusion of all stakeholders. The committee also identified the importance of addressing the feelings of dissociation of the people from their political affairs, and afterwards recommended self-determination for the Atyap through the creation of the Atyap chiefdom.

The Atyap Chiefdom was restored under the government of Alhaji Ahmed Makarfi, alongside about twenty-five other chiefdoms belonging to non-Hausa indigenous groups. The Chiefdom is headed by the Agwatyap III, currently Mr Dominic Gambo Yahaya,22 alongside the Atyap ruling council that includes representatives of residents from other ethnic extractions. The numerical strength of the Hausa population was also considered in choosing a Hausa district head for Zango town, who is also incorporated into the Atyap ruling council. This inclusive politics has been critical to maintaining peace in the town. The Hausa and Atyap groups, in the aftermath of the committee’s intervention, developed alliances through the Atyap/Hausa Youth forum, a gathering of youths from both ethnic extractions where discussions on security and developmental projects in the chiefdom are made. This forum was adduced as the reason for the

22 HRH Sir Dominic Gambo Yahaya was the local government chairman of Zangon Kataf during fieldwork for this study and served as a major respondent, having been arrested after the 1992 crises. He was installed on 12 November 2016.
non-occurrence of the deadly Boko Haram attacks in Atyapland, despite the fact that some neighbouring communities were affected. From the political perspective, the late Agwayiap II, HRH Dr Harrison Yusuf Bung gon, was credited for ensuring the peaceful conduct of the 2011 and 2015 elections in the chiefdom, through a series of community meetings with residents on the need to avoid violence during the elections. As a way of sustaining smooth relations among the Hausa and Atyap, their children are made to attend the same primary and secondary schools where they are taught to inculcate a culture of acceptance and peaceful coexistence.

In the committee’s report, the historical, social, cultural and religious antecedents of the Hausa were identified as responsible factors for the kind of secluded pattern of settlement which to some extent alienated them from the Atyap. In managing this, the committee urged the government to expand the Zangon Kataf town to accommodate the integration of other ethnic groups. The expansion was to be done through a new layout which includes the provision of facilities that will aid social interactions. During the fieldwork, some residents of the town confirmed that plans for the new layout have been approved by the state government to cover areas surrounding the Agwayiap’s palace, and the goal is to ensure the integration of all resident ethnic groups into the community.

In concluding its report, the committee acknowledged the willingness of both communities to restore serenity and cordial relationships in Zangon Kataf. It however drew attention to three areas in which there was stalemate and therefore needed the government’s urgent attention. These were the resolution of ownership of the disputed farmlands, the release of the white paper on the Justice Cudjoe Commission of Inquiry, and the release of the detainees. With the benefit of hindsight, the informants maintained that the government, through a series of meetings with stakeholders from both parties, was able to amicably resolve the disputes on land ownership. This largely entailed the Atyap conceding to accommodate the Hausa within the Atyap Chiefdom. The whitepaper on the Justice Cudjoe Commission of Enquiry was also released, though the procedures and recommendations of the commission remain unacceptable to the Atyap. It is currently
available online on the website of the Kaduna State government. Suffice it to state that the verdict passed by the Okadigbo tribunal included death sentences on six prominent members of the Atyap community including Maj. Gen. Zamani Lekwot (retired), a former military administrator in Rivers State from 1975 to 1978. The sentence, which was a subject of both national and international appeals, was subsequently commuted by the Supreme Military Council to five years imprisonment; a term which was fully served by them. Therefore the demand for the unconditional release of the Atyap elites was not met and this has an outstanding implication of their stigmatisation as ex-convicts in spite of several criticisms against the process of their conviction.

**Conclusion**

This study has been able to historicise the 1992 Zangon Kataf conflicts while examining the colonial roots of the state’s role in the manipulation and management of difference among co-habiting ethnic groups struggling for the assertion of identity and territorial control. The state interventions through a federal tribunal and state commission under the military entailed an exclusive process of convictions without fair hearings. These were insufficient in transforming perennial hostile relations, which led to the February and May 1992 crises. This study thus contends that the transformation of relations in the management of the crises was enhanced through an all-inclusive dialogue adopted by the reconciliation committee. This was very vital in engaging key issues that underpinned the emergence and escalation of conflicts in Zangon Kataf. The legitimacy of this approach is palpable through the involvement of different community leaders and associations in the reconciliation process. The effectiveness of this transformative method is reflected in the creation of the Atyap Chiefdom with an inclusive political composition which entails representation of non-Atyap groups in the Agwatyap’s advisory council. The council had facilitated the creation of an Atyap/Hausa joint consultative forum among the youths of the community, which is a community-based association for dealing with issues of security and development. Thus, the participation of
members of the community further contributed to blurring of the lines of otherness, thereby helping to build trust and restore peace in the Chiefdom.

**Recommendation**

The on-going clamour for restructuring in Nigeria is indicative of the fact that the political arrangements of the post-modern state present certain historical challenges of ethnic and religious crises in the region. However, the government has not taken appropriate cues from history, especially in terms of the management of the crises – as they often use the military to inject quick fix solutions in conflicts where there is need to transform relations. The resurgence of agitations in the South-east, for instance, have been met with a military operation labelled ‘Exercise Egwu Eke’ (Operation Python Dance), which has been bedevilled with allegations of human rights abuses by the military. While this agitation is not in isolation, there is also the predominantly middle belt challenge of the Farmer/Herder conflicts which has recently occasioned the resurgence of crises in Zangon Kataf, underscored by the age-long struggle over economic and territorial control within the context of ethno-religious suspicion. While curfews and deployment may have helped in restoring cold peace to these troubled regions, sustainable peace can only be restored through the transformation of relations. It is therefore imperative that the government revisits its approach and embrace dialogue with all stakeholders in devising lasting solutions.

**Sources**


Transforming relations in the management of 1992 ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria


Experimenting with a reconciliation pedagogy in South African primary school history classrooms: Constraints and possibilities

Reville Nussey*

Abstract

In the South African context, the need for peacebuilding is sometimes not acknowledged in a post-conflict society, although there are ongoing everyday examples within the educational sphere that challenge this assumption. A way of addressing the need for peacebuilding in education is via a reconciliation pedagogy, which uses oral history tasks and cooperative learning in the history curriculum. By drawing on the similarities and differences between a reconciliation pedagogy, and reconciliation as articulated by the ‘4R’ framework for peacebuilding, this article shows that there are constraints and possibilities inherent in this process at school level. The main argument is that there are a number of practical constraints within and beyond the classroom which hinder peacebuilding in practice.

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Using a method of narrative inquiry, this article focuses on the results of the research conducted by a history teacher educator who observed and interviewed eight teachers in history primary school classrooms in Johannesburg. While some of the successes of using a reconciliation pedagogy show that it has the potential to facilitate peacebuilding from the ‘bottom up’, teachers’ intentions and how they implement a reconciliation pedagogy affect whether or not sustainable peacebuilding is possible in the classroom.

**Keywords:** Peacebuilding, Reconciliation pedagogy, ‘4R’ framework, Oral history, Cooperative learning, Primary school history teachers, History education

**Introduction**

In the South African context, the need for peacebuilding is sometimes not acknowledged. One of the reasons is that given the transition to a democratic state in 1994, and the holding of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (1996–1998), there is a belief that both events addressed the conflict in South Africa in a comprehensive manner. While this view may be partially true, one of the unfortunate legacies of apartheid lingers on in the form of overt and covert social conflict. An example from the field of education is how the social barriers of the past continue to affect the present, as is shown by tensions in relationships among pre-service teachers in some South African university lecture rooms (Carter and Vandeyar 2009; Nussey 2012). This problem is symptomatic of the need for peacebuilding initiatives, not only in the university context but in schools too, to deal with the ongoing effects of apartheid. But what is meant by peacebuilding and what role could education play in this process?

Novelli and others (2015:10) have argued that peacebuilding is a ‘slippery’ term, with a variety of meanings, from establishing safety to putting in place measures to transform a society in a post-conflict setting. Furthermore, they suggest that there is a lack of knowledge about peacebuilding on the part of educationalists as well as a reductionist view of education held by
peacebuilders. To address these disparate views, Novelli and others (2015:10) developed the ‘4R’ framework of ‘redistribution, recognition, representation and reconciliation’, which is a ‘normative, but non prescriptive vision of the broad components of a peaceful and just society’ and applied it to the education sector (Novelli et al. 2015:3). For example, ‘redistribution’ implies an ‘equitable distribution of resources’; ‘recognition’ refers to ‘status equality’ of all participants; ‘representation’ indicates ‘involvement in decision making at multiple frames’; and, finally ‘reconciliation’ focuses on ‘building positive relationships’ (Novelli and others 2015:13). This framework aims to achieve social justice in a post-conflict situation, and is informed by Nancy Fraser’s (1995) ideas on justice, Johan Galtung’s (1976) conception of positive and negative peace and John Paul Lederach’s (1999) ideas on reconciliation. It intends to provide a comprehensive overview of a relationship between education and peacebuilding.

Novelli and Sayed (2016:17) have applied these ideas to a research focus which emphasises ‘the role of education in promoting peace, social cohesion and sustainable development from a “4R’s perspective”’ as part of a peacebuilding framework based on a few post-conflict societies, including South Africa. ‘Reconciliation’ is one of the 4R’s in this framework, and for the purpose of this paper, I propose to focus on articulating the relationship between education and reconciliation, because it is impossible to do justice to the whole of the 4R framework in this article. Furthermore, I propose to use Novelli and Sayed’s (2016:19) conception of reconciliation, which they define as ‘dealing with past events, injustice, and material and psychosocial effects of conflict, as well as the development of trust’. In a table, they outline the relationship between education and reconciliation as follows:

- Teaching the past, present and future
- Understanding one’s own positionality when teaching the past, present and future
- Healing and ‘understanding that humanises’
- Teaching multiple narratives and histories

(Novelli and Sayed 2016:19)
The link made between reconciliation and education is not a new idea (Akhluwalia et al. 2012; Bekerman and Zembylas 2011; Magill et al. 2007; Paulson 2011; Zembylas et al. 2011), and the concept of reconciliation is contested (Bloomfield et al. 2003; Cole 2007). Nonetheless, the strength of Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) conception of reconciliation is that it combines key ideas in a manner that shows how reconciliation and education could contribute to peacebuilding in an insightful and holistic way. However, this framework is broad, and it raises the question of how to translate these peacebuilding ideas into practice at the level of the school classroom. I suggest that a reconciliation pedagogy is able to put aspects of Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) framework into practice, because both use parts of Lederach’s (1999) ideas concerning reconciliation to inform their theoretical underpinning (Nussey 2012). Another similarity is an emphasis on the importance of teaching multiple narratives and histories while teaching about the past, present and future. A reconciliation pedagogy implements this in the classroom by using oral history, which encourages the emergence of multiple narratives about the past, and shows the interconnection between past, present and future in a concrete manner. Furthermore, a reconciliation pedagogy’s use of cooperative learning, where learners work in heterogeneous groups on a task based on their respective oral histories, opens up the possibility of developing, in Novelli and Sayed’s (2016:19) framework, an “understanding that humanises” in the classroom. Yet, there are differences too between Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) framework and a reconciliation pedagogy, as they emphasise the importance of the teacher’s positionality and include the possibility of healing (I will discuss the relevance of these ideas at a later stage in this article).

But it is insufficient to discuss the similarities and differences between Novelli and Sayed’s framework and a reconciliation pedagogy at a theoretical level alone, because if these ideas are going to contribute to sustainable peacebuilding, then they need to be put into practice, and evaluated for their efficacy. Given the similarities between a reconciliation pedagogy and Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) framework, the former term is used to cover both conceptions in this article. But where there are differences,
then a distinction between the two is made by referring directly to Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) framework. This leads to the main question that this article addresses: What are the constraints and possibilities of using a reconciliation pedagogy as a peacebuilding tool in history classrooms at primary school level? To answer this question, I provide a brief overview of oral history and its role in the South African history curriculum, the rationale for my classroom observations in eight primary school history classrooms in Johannesburg, and interviews with eight teachers. Then I describe the methodology used, and how I collected the data for this project. Next, I report on the findings to the research question posed, and discuss some of the constraints and possibilities of using a reconciliation pedagogy in some South African primary schools.

Rationale: Oral history, social justice and teachers’ practice

Oral history has been used since time immemorial, but it has gone through periods where its importance was downplayed in the discipline of history, and then enjoyed a resurgence of interest internationally (Portelli 1998; Ritchie 2015; Thomson 2007). Broadly speaking, ‘oral history [is] the term used for the recording of any kind of memory of the past … [and it] focuses on just one theme, or one phase in life’ (Thompson and Bornat 2017:viii). In the South African context, oral history has played an important role (Bonner 2013; Field 2008; Lekgoathi 2007, 2010) in reclaiming knowledge of events in the country’s history that were passed down from generation to generation according to a rich oral tradition. Oral history has played a role in establishing social justice, as it has helped to capture people’s stories, particularly those from the perspectives of black people, whose views were largely excluded from the historical archives.

The value of social justice informs the South African schools’ curriculum, where an explicit link is made to the South African constitution (1996), which aims to ‘[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights (Department of Basic Education 2011:5). History, which is linked
to geography as part of a learning area called the social sciences, is often tasked with addressing social justice issues. The history curriculum uses oral history projects as a way of implementing this aspect of the curriculum. This is one of the reasons why it is important to research how practising teachers are using oral history tasks in the classroom, and if these tasks are being used to foster social justice and reconciliation as part of peacebuilding. But there is research that suggests that some practising teachers are experiencing difficulties in implementing oral history tasks in the classroom (Kros and Ulrich 2008), as well as coming to terms with their own personal backgrounds (Weldon 2010). Many of the teachers grew up during apartheid or continue to feel its effects in the present, which suggests that there may be constraints for teachers using oral history tasks in the South African school context.

Duckworth (2015:109) suggested that oral history could be used in peace education as a way of dealing with traumatic events, such as 9/11 in the United States of America, which allows students ‘the opportunity to create their own meaning around this event’. She argued that the doing of oral history tasks allows for diverse views of the past to emerge, which challenge master narratives of this past. In addition, Duckworth (2015:110) suggested that this approach also encourages agency, because those who do oral history tasks become ‘authors of history’ and not simply readers of history. The advantages Duckworth (2015) identified in using oral history tasks resonated with my own experience, as in a university history methodology course in 2006, diverse narratives emerged during an oral history assignment on ‘Life before and after 1994’. The participants were pre-service primary school teachers and they were active agents in the oral history process, so that there was a shift to becoming authors instead of readers of history. This provided the starting point of this project, which developed into further research with former students once they became practising teachers in the primary school classroom between 2008 and 2011.

However, there is an underlying assumption in Duckworth’s (2015) book that the doing of oral history is an easy task in itself, which reveals a rather simplistic understanding of the nature of oral history. The process of doing
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an oral history may appear to be simple, for example: you identify someone to interview, request an interview (and if granted), ask the interviewee questions, transcribe the interview, and then present it in different ways. But this process hides a number of complexities. I have discussed these issues in detail elsewhere. For example, within the discipline of history, there are concerns raised about oral history with regard to ‘claims to knowledge, such as “the truth” … and the omissions and commissions of memory’ (Nussey 2016:15). However, my purpose in this article is to move beyond these theoretical concerns, to focus on the constraints and possibilities of using oral history in practice in the classroom as part of a reconciliation pedagogy, and to explore the implications for peacebuilding.

Research methodology and data collection

The methodology used follows a ‘narrative inquiry’ qualitative approach, suggested by Clandinin and Connelly (2000:49), where research is the study of experience. There was triangulation in this research between policy documents such as the social sciences curriculum (intermediate phase) according to the Revised National Curriculum Statement (Department of Basic Education 2011), the classroom observations and the interviews with the teachers about the oral history tasks, and their potential link to a reconciliation pedagogy. A brief description of how this triangulation worked follows. The policy documents informed the research at two levels: the values of ‘[h]uman rights, inclusivity, environmental and social justice … as defined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’ (Department of Basic Education 2011: 5), which underpin the whole school curriculum; and, the use of oral history, which is a form of ‘valuing indigenous knowledge systems: acknowledging the rich history and heritage of this country as important contributors to nurturing the values contained in the Constitution’ (Department of Basic Education 2011: 5) in the history curriculum. This research aimed to understand how teachers interpreted both the values and the use of oral history found within the policy documents from their own perspective and in practice
in the classroom, and whether this triangulation showed the need for peacebuilding via a reconciliation pedagogy.

The sample for this research evolved organically from interviewing students about the 2006 university oral history assignment, once they became practising teachers at primary schools. In an interview conducted with Zahiera\(^1\) at the beginning of her teaching career (2009), she agreed to a follow-up observation in her classroom at school A. There were three more social sciences teachers, Cathy, David and Eva, who had been part of the 2006 history methodology class at school A, and they agreed to participate in this research. For the purpose of comparison with these first year teachers, four more experienced social sciences teachers, Nancy at school A, Kagiso at school B, Joyce and Robyn at school C, volunteered to be included in this study.

These teachers taught history as part of the social sciences curriculum at different levels of the intermediate and senior phases of the primary schools, and they taught at the intermediate phase (grades four to six), and part of the senior phase (grade seven).\(^2\) In total, the research sample included one grade four teacher (Eva), four grade five teachers (Cathy, David, Robyn and Zahiera), one grade six teacher (Joyce) and two grade seven teachers (Kagiso and Nancy). In order to conduct research in the classroom, I requested that they combine an oral history task with cooperative learning, which is an approach to pedagogy informed by social psychology, and based on ‘the most widely accepted theory of positive intergroup relations: Allport’s (1954) contact theory’ (Slavin 1985:11). This theory suggests that if diverse groups come into contact with one another, then this will lead to ‘familiarity and attraction’ (Miller and Harrington 1990:47). Cooperative learning is a form of group work, which is best described by Alexandre Dumas as ‘all for one, and one for all’. It is an approach based on the

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1 The names of all the teachers in this article are pseudonyms, and the data is sourced from my unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Nussey 2012).

2 Grades four to seven are usually part of a primary school, even though grade seven is considered part of the senior phase.
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following principles: to establish heterogeneous groups, so that the groups are not friendship based; and to divide a class into groups of between four and six members, where the members of these smaller groups were formed by mixing different languages, genders and races. All the members are equal (which links to an important aspect of the 4R framework, namely, ‘recognition’ [Novelli et al. 2015:13]), and a common task is used to foster (among others) ‘positive interdependence’ (italics in original) among the members of each group: this means that they either ‘swim or sink’ together, and there is both individual and group accountability in terms of assessment and ‘group processing’ (italics in original) of the task (Johnson and Johnson 2010:229).

The time spent observing the teachers using oral history and cooperative learning tasks ranged from a single to a double lesson (Zahiera, Eva, Cathy, David, Nancy, Kagiso) to two days in their respective classrooms (Joyce and Robyn), and the interviews averaged an hour with each of these teachers. There were variations in the time spent observing teachers for the following reasons: it depended on the amount of time the different schools and teachers were willing to allocate for this research; and, the realisation during the research period that I needed more time to observe the teachers within the classroom setting. While this sample is small, and it is impossible to make generalisations based on these findings, nonetheless this research offers valuable insights as to the constraints and possibilities of using a reconciliation pedagogy for peacebuilding in practice.

Findings

Teachers’ approaches and intentions

For the purpose of the classroom observations, all the participants were requested to do an oral history task, based on a topic of their own choice. Two of the teachers linked this request to the sections they were busy teaching: one included a comparison of prices in the present and the past, while the other asked why and when the learners’ families moved to Johannesburg. These topics generated animated discussion among the learners, but their
engagement with the past seemed to be rather superficial. While some different narratives about the past were present, these oral history tasks did not encourage much ‘dialogue about memories’ (Field 2008:1) nor did they generate a discussion that raised issues related to social justice. This may have been the result of the age of the learners, who were in grades four and five. But these observations challenged the view that the doing of any oral history task could necessarily be linked to reconciliation as a form of peacebuilding, and it also showed how important the choice of topic is, as well as a teacher’s reasons for doing an oral history task.

The majority of the teachers chose to do a topic that involved a comparison between the old and new South Africa, such as, the old and new South African coat of arms, apartheid and democratic legislation, and life during and after apartheid. Again, this emphasised how important the choice of topic is, and it showed that it was possible to do in-depth oral histories with grades five to seven learners. I observed a number of multiple narratives about the past, and the learners engaged more thoughtfully with these tasks, which suggested that these topics had the potential to assist peacebuilding.

**Learners’ prior knowledge of apartheid**

For those teachers who chose to focus their oral history tasks on a topic related to apartheid, it was a challenge to introduce the topic in a way that the learners had sufficient background to conduct their interviews. For the most part, the teachers gave the learners worksheets on the oral history project, and went through it with them. This meant that they drew on the learners’ prior knowledge about apartheid, which was appropriate in some cases. However, in other cases, the learners appeared to have insufficient background to conduct their oral histories, and this negatively affected the quality of their oral history tasks.

**Interviewees: challenges and successes**

Another constraint, concerning the use of oral history tasks in the classroom, was the request to the learners to find someone to interview about a South African history topic. There is an assumption that all of the learners have
someone that they could easily interview, which is not necessarily true. Some of the children were recent immigrants/refugees or children whose parents or grandparents were no longer alive, and these learners battled to find someone to interview. There were also parents who felt that they did not have much information to offer on the topic, or who did not want to speak about the past, ‘because it made them feel sad’ (Journal observation, 23 October 2009). This comment hinted at the ongoing effects of apartheid on an older generation, and the importance of and the difficulties of being interviewees in an oral history task on this topic. Overall, this meant that it was not an easy task for many of the learners to find a suitable person, who had a knowledge-rich background, to conduct an oral history interview.

However, Joyce, at school C, was successful in identifying suitable interviewees for her class, as she benefitted from an opportunity that arose during a Grandparents’ Day held at the school. When the grandparents visited her classroom, many observed that the classrooms at their old schools were ‘not like this’, and Joyce request their help with the oral history task. The grandparents volunteered to be interviewed about their lives during apartheid in front of the whole class, and this addressed the problem of learners not having suitable interviewees within their own families. This successful solution showed the importance of including and briefing the school’s community when an oral history task is given to learners, and it shows how a task of this nature has the potential to foster peacebuilding within and beyond the classroom.

Drafting of interview questions

Furthermore, another constraint to doing an oral history task effectively at primary schools was related to who set the questions for the interviews. In most cases, the teachers gave the learners set questions. While teachers could provide guidance at primary school in terms of the kinds of questions that the learners might ask, in practice, this approach created difficulties for the content of the oral history task. The result was that many of the learners were not as invested in their interviews when a teacher set the questions. In some cases, the learners did not understand the purpose of the questions,
nor did they probe the interviewee’s answers. The teacher’s questions were also open to misinterpretation by the learners. For example, the question set by Eva, at school A, was, ‘Why did your family come to Johannesburg?’ It led to some unexpected answers, such as, ‘By foot or by train’ (Journal observation, 23 October 2009). These answers were understandable given the context of the theme of transport that was being covered in this grade four class, but the learners interpreted the question the teacher asked as a ‘how’ one, instead of exploring the reasons why their families moved to Johannesburg. This showed the importance of learners understanding the purpose of the question, and for the teacher to mediate that understanding. It also showed that not every oral history task could be used for the purpose of reconciliation and peacebuilding.

However, an alternative and more successful approach to the setting of the interview questions about apartheid was demonstrated by Robyn at School C. She presented her class with some set questions about the topic, and then allowed them to devise their own additional questions for the interviews through a cooperative process. After this process, there was a discussion of what made for good or bad questions in a whole class setting. Further, she viewed all these new questions devised by the learners before they did their oral history interviews. The reason why Robyn followed this approach was that she did not want her learners to ask inappropriate or offensive questions during their interviews.

Some guidelines for international oral history projects recommend that the learners should devise their own ‘meaningful’ questions (Ritchie 2015:201), which is applicable to the South African context too. Learners need to ask questions that they feel are relevant to their own lives and also to be able to probe the answers they receive from the interviewee, so that the oral history interview forms part of a genuine enquiry process. If an aim of doing oral history tasks is peacebuilding, then it also seems even more appropriate for the learners to ask their own questions. However, Robyn’s caution regarding the learners’ own questions might be necessary given the controversial issues that an oral history task about apartheid could reveal. She also explained to the learners before they did the interview that
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apartheid was a traumatic experience for many people, and ‘if someone refuses to do the interview, it’s not that they don’t like you, it’s because apartheid is a sensitive issue’ (Journal observation, 22 October 2010).

**Awareness of sensitivities**

There is also the possibility that ‘when interviewing trauma survivors, who display hypersensitivity, a mistimed question can severely unsettle the interviewee’ (Field 2006:36). This does not mean that oral history tasks about contentious issues should be abandoned, but that a certain amount of care should be taken, as demonstrated by Robyn. However, if an interviewee is re-traumatised as a result of an oral history interview, then a school needs to offer counselling services to help the interviewee deal with this situation. Alternatively, the schools need to arrange for other sources of help from members within the community who are able to assist the interviewee.

The preparation and some of the results of the oral history interviews revealed constraints and possibilities for both the teachers and learners in terms of the task and for peacebuilding. But the quality of the oral history tasks in practice depended on how the teachers approached the oral history task and what their intentions were in doing so. It also depended on the following: the amount of background the learners had as prior knowledge; who was identified as knowledge-rich interviewees and how this identification was made; the kinds of questions that the learners asked and who formulated them; as well as an awareness of the sensitive nature of particular topics of some oral history tasks, and what impact this could have on the broader community. It also showed that the doing of oral history tasks did bring multiple narratives and histories into the classroom, but that this did not necessarily contribute to peacebuilding in all cases.

There was another part to the process of doing this oral history task, that is, the pedagogy used by the teachers either during the preparation for the task and/or the presentation of the results of the class’s oral history interviews, namely, cooperative learning. In the next section, I present some of the
constraints and possibilities I observed when teachers used this pedagogy during their lessons, and the implications of adopting it for peacebuilding.

**Constraints and possibilities of using cooperative learning in the classroom**

While oral history has been linked closely to the pedagogy of cooperative learning in other countries (Ritchie 2015) as well as peace education (Johnson and Johnson 2010), this was not a common approach used by the teachers I observed. The more experienced teachers (Joyce, Kagiso, Nancy and Robyn) acknowledged that they had not thought of linking an oral history task to the pedagogy of cooperative learning in their classrooms before my request for them to use this approach in the classroom. But all the teachers were aware of the theory of cooperative learning as a teaching and learning strategy from their university methodology courses, although some of the first year teachers battled to implement it in practice, because they mixed up different cooperative strategies with ordinary group work. However, the more experienced teachers were able to use this pedagogy extremely effectively in both the preparation and presentation of the results of the oral history tasks.

I observed different ways of structuring the cooperative activities: where a group selected the most interesting story within the group to be shared with the whole class (Zahiera, Clare), used the stories to fill in a table (Joyce), or created a joint mindmap of the oral histories (David). Another way was when a group selected aspects of each member’s oral histories, then combined these selections into a coherent whole by using dramatisations (Eva, Nancy, Robyn).

There are some practical problems regarding the use of dramatisations as a way to present oral histories in the classroom. The first issue is that it was a time-consuming activity, which makes it difficult for teachers to include this kind of activity while working with a curriculum that has strict time-frames. Another practical issue that proved to be a constraint for the teachers was the following: dramatisations need space for the learners to move, both while they work in groups to prepare for the dramatisations and
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for the final presentations too. This is a problem, especially in overcrowded or small classrooms. But this issue was addressed in innovative ways by two teachers: Nancy split a class of forty-nine learners into two adjoining classrooms, and then moved between the two rooms while the learners were preparing for their dramatisations. Robyn used the school playground as a space for the learners to practise, and then organised the school hall for the presentations of the learners’ dramatisations. Both teachers developed successful solutions to the problem of insufficient classroom space for a class’s dramatisations. Nonetheless, the issue of space remains a challenge to implementing a reconciliation pedagogy in practice at schools.

However, dramatisations provided an effective approach as a cooperative strategy for a reconciliation pedagogy for the following reasons: it encouraged the learners to engage in greater depth with their own oral history narrative, as they explained more about their respective interviewees to the group; they also entered into in-depth ‘difficult dialogues’ (Tupper 2014:469) with the other members of their groups as they discussed multiple narratives which emerged from one another’s oral histories. This in-depth engagement happened during the process of preparing for the group’s dramatisation, which showed how the link between an oral history task and cooperative learning has the power to contribute towards peacebuilding in the classroom, by developing an “‘understanding that humanises’”, as well as ‘trust’ (Novelli and Sayed 2016:19). In Robyn’s class, one of the girls approached her to say ‘I almost cried!’ (Journal observation, 22 October 2010) when she learnt more about apartheid from her group.

But there is also the space for conflict and disagreements to emerge during this process, and this is a valuable part of peacebuilding too. Conflict can highlight differing perspectives about a contested past, and by locating them within oral histories, it can help to make these perspectives more accessible to learners at a personal level, and help to develop their understanding about them. This is part of the difficult process of truly engaging one another, as Johnson and Johnson (1994:69) argued that ‘[c]o-operation and conflict go hand-in-hand’, so that skills in conflict resolution also play an important part of peacebuilding. An example of
Conflict that Kagiso described in his interview was a boy who reported that his white interviewee stated: ‘but during apartheid … the transport system was better, the level of education was higher … certain things about apartheid were good actually’ (Interview 22 February 2011). The context of this remark was ambiguous, because it was unclear whether it described the better functioning of many aspects of South African life for white people under apartheid or whether it was nostalgia for a lost past. But the rest of the group responded negatively, and Kagiso intervened to mediate the conflict, and helped to ‘unpack’ the interview. This incident offered a valuable opening point for a discussion about apartheid – as to who holds these views, why they are held, and the contested nature of these personal ‘truths’. It showed how a reconciliation pedagogy allows for the entry of multiple narratives about the past into the classroom, and for conflict to be used as a way to develop an understanding, which not only clarifies a learner’s background, but also develops an understanding that ‘humanises’ (Novelli and Sayed 2016:19).

However, not every conflict can be resolved in the classroom. While a conflict of ideas (both intellectual and emotional) is a necessary part of a cooperative strategy, some conflicts can only be resolved in the broader society and not the classroom, as is reflected by the inclusion of ‘redistribution’ in the 4R framework (Novelli and Sayed 2016). For example, the issue of land redistribution in South Africa is a contentious one (Cousins 2016), but while possible solutions may be discussed in the classroom, the issue of land distribution requires a political solution by the state.

**Effects on teachers’ practice: the potential for peacebuilding?**

In the interviews after the lessons, many of the teachers identified positive aspects concerning the inclusion of oral history tasks in their classrooms. Kagiso and Zahiera found that it made the classroom more inclusive, as different learners contributed during the lesson, instead of the ones who usually spoke. This process gave the teachers greater insight into their learners’ backgrounds, and the teachers felt that it had the advantage of
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encouraging interaction between the different generations in the learners’ families outside the classroom. Zahiera said that many of her learners were ‘so lost’, because they ‘don’t know where they come from’, whereas her oral history task had helped the learners to start finding out about their own backgrounds. David was also in favour of using an oral history task for the following reasons: it ‘will help people open up and deal with issues of the past’ because ‘you’re not going to get it out of a textbook …. Discussion is the only way you can open people up to how they really feel’. His views emphasised how the effects of the past continue in the present, how important dialogue is when dealing with the emotions and, by implication, how the doing of an oral history task provides an important route to peacebuilding.

However, there were a few challenges during the process of doing an oral history task, as Joyce and Eva noted that some of the parents did not give the learners much information or did not cooperate during the interviews, and resorted to monosyllabic answers. This meant that these learners were unable to do the oral history tasks effectively, and it also indicated the extent to which the effects of apartheid continue to affect intergenerational relationships in the present. Clare mentioned that she found that some of her learners became aggressive when the topic of apartheid was raised: ‘I think that’s the most important, … getting the parents involved, because they are the ones that are teaching their children [about apartheid]’ and ‘a lot of the children have been affected by their parents and their families …. so they take that anger from home’. It appears that there is a need for peacebuilding initiatives in the classroom and the broader community too, in order to deal with these legacies of the past, and an oral history task is a way of addressing this issue. None of the teachers took this next step to encourage their classes to report back the results of their oral histories to their communities, as a way of acknowledging the interviewees’ time and effort. A report back is important for another reason: if the findings of the oral history tasks are presented to the school community, then there is the potential for peacebuilding beyond the confines of the classroom, as it
could provide an opportunity to open up a much needed discussion about apartheid in the broader community.

Yet it is debatable to what extent the use of oral history could lead to ‘healing’, as suggested in Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) framework of the relationship between reconciliation and education. Some oral historians have raised questions about whether telling one’s story leads to healing (Field 2006:34; Thomson 2015:23). This relationship between telling one’s own story and healing is complicated as was shown during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings, where ‘[t]he victims and survivors responded differently to the TRC hearings. Some found solace and catharsis. Others felt their wounds were reopened and left unattended’ (Villa-Vicencio [2006] cited in Clark 2012:194). This ambivalence was reflected by the teachers, as David’s statement about a reconciliation pedagogy that it ‘will help to heal the wounds of the past’ contrasted with Clare’s acknowledgement of the justifiable anger that some of the learners were bringing into the classroom from their homes. At best, using oral history tasks in the classroom could start a process of reweaving relationships that may lead to the long term goal of healing relationships in the broader society.

All of the teachers supported the need for a reconciliation pedagogy as a peacebuilding tool in general, but not all of them supported its practice in their own classroom. For example, Nancy challenged the need for reconciliation in her context, because her entire class consisted of black learners. She argued that ‘their [oral] stories were from a similar experience. But even ... where people were treated better ... the children weren’t offended.’ Nancy was indirectly referring to the different experiences for those who were labelled African, Coloured or Indian under apartheid. The members of all of these groups were discriminated against, as apartheid forced the different groups to live in separate geographical areas, but African people alone had the additional burden of carrying passes, as ordered by the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act of 1952 (SAHO 2017).
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A counter argument to Nancy’s view is that she was generalising on the basis of race: some people were accused of being informers (sometimes mistakenly) in black communities as was shown at the TRC in the case of Ms Maki Skosana (TRC Vol 5 1998:364). Furthermore, there were political conflicts within black communities (supported by the apartheid government), such as the violence between ‘[c]omrades’ and “vigilantes” in KwaZulu-Natal and on the East Rand in the mid-1980s and towards the end of apartheid (TRC Vol 2 1998:299, 584–585). This suggests the need for peacebuilding is not only a matter between black and white people in South Africa, but it is something that is needed by most South African communities.

In addition, there was also a lack of acknowledgement of Nancy’s position as a white teacher who taught black learners in her classroom. Unless teachers develop an awareness of how their own position affects relationships in their classrooms, they too can be a hindrance to the peacebuilding process. This shows the importance of ‘understanding one’s own positionality when teaching the past, present and future’ (Novelli and Sayed 2016:19), which is an important contribution their link between reconciliation and education makes towards peacebuilding.

Overall, the majority of the teachers saw the value of doing oral history tasks using cooperative learning for their practice, as well as the benefits that applied beyond the classroom. It fostered a learner-centred approach in the classroom, and enabled learners to engage both with an older generation and their peers about a contested past. It made for a worthwhile learning opportunity from sources that are not always found in the classroom, and despite some of the constraints identified above, it has the potential to contribute to peacebuilding both within and beyond the classroom.

Conclusion and recommendations

This research showed some of the possibilities and constraints of applying a reconciliation pedagogy, and the ideas that informed Novelli and Sayed’s (2016) conception of reconciliation, to actual practice in the classroom for
the purpose of peacebuilding. The emphasis on ‘teaching multiple narratives and histories’ (Novelli and Sayed 2016:19) allows for the subject of history to play a crucial role in this framework, and a reconciliation pedagogy’s use of oral history tasks ensures that multiple narratives are present in the history classroom. But it was not always easy for the teachers to implement an oral history task successfully in a primary school classroom, which leads to the following recommendations:

• Teachers need to be aware of their own positionality;
• They have to choose a topic that has depth, with the intention of encouraging learners to examine and discuss issues of social justice, such as, apartheid;
• The oral history task needs to be carefully introduced, so that the learners have sufficient background knowledge to do the oral history task effectively;
• The learners need to devise their own questions for the oral history interview (even if the teachers vet their questions), so that the learners care about the process and can ask their own follow-up questions;
• The teachers need to be pro-active by identifying knowledge-rich interviewees on behalf of learners, as many learners may experience difficulties in finding interviewees;
• Finally, the teachers also need to ensure that the process of doing an oral history for the purpose of peacebuilding is given sufficient time, despite the constraints of a crowded curriculum.

The use of cooperative learning as a means of preparing and presenting the findings of the oral history tasks also showed how challenging this pedagogy is to implement in practice in the classroom. There are constraints of space, such as, small classrooms that were not built to accommodate a large number of learners, although some teachers solved this problem in innovative ways. However, though not all the cooperative activities necessarily led to peacebuilding, dramatisations of the oral histories encouraged greater depth of discussion among the learners both in preparation for and debriefing of the activity. This leads to a further recommendation:
• Dramatisation can be used with good effect, as this particular form of cooperative activity showed the greatest potential for peacebuilding. When cooperative learning is used appropriately by the teachers, then it provides the opportunity for relationships to develop in the classroom either through cooperation or conflict. This process has the potential to contribute towards social justice, as it helps the learners to develop an ‘understanding that humanises’ (Novelli and Sayed 2016:19) and possibly to trust one another, but whether this process will necessarily lead to ‘healing’ (Novelli and Sayed 2016:19) is debatable.

Two final recommendations are:

• A school may use an oral history task as a way of engaging with parents and the broader community: it provides a way of building reconciliation from the bottom up, as it interweaves the history classroom with the broader community, so that multiple narratives about the past emerge.
• This process needs to be done sensitively, however, as there is the danger that oral history interviews may re-traumatise some members of the community, for whom the school may have to provide counselling services.

Nevertheless, the advantage for peacebuilding is that oral history interviews encourage a meaningful interaction between the different generations about the past: this helps the learners to find out where they come from, and allows an older generation to share their memories (which may be contested) with another generation. It is also important for the learners to present their dramatisations to the community, as a means of reporting back what they have learnt, because this could open up a space for discussion among the older generation too.

The most important result of this research is that all the teachers acknowledged the need for a reconciliation pedagogy in the classroom and beyond, as Joyce stated, ‘I’m living in [a] post-apartheid [society], … [but] we are still struggling to unite as one’. Whether it is possible for South Africans to ‘unite as one’ is questionable, but a reconciliation pedagogy, which uses oral history and cooperative learning tasks, encourages the
learners to engage with one another and an older generation, so that there is a possibility for understanding and trust to develop. But teachers’ roles are crucial during this process, as their awareness, intentions and how they implement the process will affect whether or not this process leads to sustainable peacebuilding in the South African context.

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Reville Nussey


The quest for happiness as an underlying motive for violent conflict in Africa

Mark Chingono*

Abstract

Violent conflicts continue to be a major feature of much of Africa’s political landscape. Not only are Africa’s conflicts increasing, but they are also interpreted and theorised in varied ways, with irreducible discrepancies. In the dominant literature, ethnicity, religion, resources, territory, poor governance, and the struggle for power, among others, have been identified as the major causes of violent conflict on the continent. This paper, a broad brush that raises more questions than answers, argues that, underlying these apparent causes of violent conflict is the undying desire for happiness. It concludes by paraphrasing Von Clausewitz’s dictum that war in Africa is a pursuit of happiness by other means and, therefore, to prevent it, policy should promote popular happiness.

Keywords: happiness/unhappiness, violent conflict, development, democratic governance, ethnic identity, Africa

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Introduction

The enthusiasm and euphoria that surrounded Africa’s independence have turned into anguish and rebellion as economic stagnation, poor governance, corruption and brutal repression of dissent continue to frustrate popular dreams of happiness and prosperity. With more and more Africans increasingly unhappy about their lives and the performance of their governments, the continent has steadily slid into a Hobbesian state of nature of ‘war of each against all’ (Hobbes 2016:7). Furley (1995:1) notes, ‘from the 1990s there has been no diminution in the number of violent conflicts [in pursuit of happiness] in Africa’. The consequent deaths, infrastructural destruction and other costs have not only been increasing, but have also been mortgaging the continent’s development. As IANSA, Oxfam and Saferworld (2007:1) observe, ‘armed conflict in Africa costs around $18bn per year’, seriously derailing development. Many are fleeing conflict and migrating to other countries, and in 2016 alone about 5,000 died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe (Al Jazeera 2017). African wars have been deadly, but their motives have been usually misunderstood.

While in the dominant literature conflict has been attributed to ethnicity, religion, resources and territory (Gomes Porto 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Furley 1995), this paper contends that underlying these apparent causes of violent conflict is the undying desire for happiness. As Epicurus (2014:3), pointed out, ‘we all desire happiness as an end in itself, and all other things are desired as a means for producing happiness’. Unhappiness, in particular, frustration with the growing gap between people’s aspirations for prosperity and happiness and the reality of pauperisation and unhappiness (see table 1), is the main driver of violent conflict in Africa. The apparent causes identified in the literature are thus best seen as ‘symptoms’ of deeper causes, which are invoked only when convenient. If happy, people from different cultures, ethnicities, nations, races, religions and regions can live together in peace. As the ‘Charter for Happiness’ (GNHUSA 2016) aptly notes: ‘Families, neighborhoods,
businesses, organizations, cities, states, nations and the international community thrive when people are happy'; but when there is unhappiness there is strife and violence. The point is: ‘Happiness: everyone wants it, yet relatively few seem to get enough of it’ (Haden 2014:3). The fact that ‘relatively few seem to get enough of it’ is at the heart of the problem of violent conflict in Africa.

Essentially representing relentless efforts to escape from unhappiness, rebellion is both a means for achieving the ultimate goal of happiness, and a consequence of the failure to achieve it. Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee (1997:9) point to the subtle connection between conflict and unhappiness when they say: ‘Instances of revolt against the neo-colonial state constitute the antecedents of the new social movement for democracy, which is basically concerned with fulfilling the failed expectations of independence’ of freedom and happiness. This paper hopes to shed some light on this complex subject, if only to invite others to undertake deeper research.

**Methodology**

Empirically and methodologically, the paper is based on a comparative field opinion survey conducted by the author in 1997 in Cambridge (UK), Cape Town (SA) and Rusape (Zimbabwe). Respondents were asked, among others, to: Define happiness; state whether or not they valued happiness; state whether or not they were happy; and to say whether or not they believed it is possible to create a society in which everyone can be happy. A detailed discussion of the results of the survey is contained in a forthcoming book: ‘The Pursuit of Happiness and its Many Consequences’. Here suffice it to mention that 70 per cent of the 300 respondents said they valued happiness, about 40 per cent were unhappy, and 56 per cent were pessimistic about the possibility of creating a society in which everyone can be happy.

The paper also relies on secondary literature, both the print and electronic media. Analytically, the paper adopts a holistic and multidisciplinary
approach that draws from political science, psychology, development economics and peace studies. The discussion stresses the objective political, economic and social conditions under which African people subjectively experience happiness, and violently pursue it. At one level, the paper is a critique of the inequalities of happiness, the dominant ideologies that legitimate them, and the political, economic and social conditions that produce these disturbing and destabilising inequalities. By looking at happiness, unhappiness and conflict from a holistic and multidisciplinary perspective, the paper offers a useful corrective to the shortcomings of the perceptually biased dominant conflict theories and policies frameworks. In short, the paper attempts to put the pursuit of happiness into a political and historical context, as well as to offer a wider frame for considering public policy options for promoting popular happiness.

**Conflict and happiness in the literature and in history**

Although the relationship between the pursuit of happiness and conflict is a critical issue in need of further exploration, the substantial bodies of literature on conflict and happiness suggest no direct connections between the two, and each anyway says very little about the other. Consequently, we know a lot of each, but not enough together, and too little about the intrinsic and complex relation of unhappiness to conflict. For instance, the dominant discourses on violent conflict tend to focus on its surface manifestations, generally eschewing the underlying powerful psychological desire to be happy. Pervasive violence is generally explained by reference to its apparent manifestations, such as ethnic, religious, ideological tensions and the struggle for power.

Singer (cited in Gomes Porto 2002:6), stresses that ‘territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, dominance, equality and revenge’ are the main causes of violent conflict in Africa. Wehr (1979), in a more illuminating analysis, identifies seven competing approaches to understanding the causes of conflict and, by implication, of unhappiness: conflict is innate
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in social animals; it is generated by the nature of societies and the way they are structured; it is dysfunctional in social systems and symptom of pathological strain; it is functional in social systems and necessary for social development; it is an inevitable feature of competing state interests in conditions of international anarchy; it is a result of misperception, miscalculation and poor communication; it is a natural process common to all societies. In contradistinction, this paper stresses unhappiness as the fundamental underlying cause of violent conflict in Africa.

Unhappiness breeds hatred of the perceived causer of the unhappiness, the enemy. According to Galtung (2012:8), ‘hatred is a psychological preparation for violence …. I have to hurt somebody in order not to be harmed myself’. Hatred and unhappiness become the basis for ‘fight’, just as ‘fright’ becomes a basis for ‘flight’ (Galtung 2012:8). In short, hatred is a ‘necessary condition for war’ (Galtung 2012:8), and once war has erupted, killing the ‘enemy’, euphemised as victory, becomes a source of happiness. If many are ready to die or kill for happiness, what really is it?

What is happiness?

Aristotle (2014) considered happiness to be the ‘meaning and purpose of life, the whole aim and end of existence’, whose quest for motivates and justifies action (Aristotle 2014:1). In the same vein, Epicurus (2014:3) declared: ‘Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting point of every choice and every aversion, and to it we always come back’. For Bentham (1907:1), ‘happiness is the greatest good’, and therefore government should aim for the greatest happiness of the greatest majority. Similarly, rational choice theorists posit that rational agents are always supposed ‘to maximize … happiness’ (Lehrer 2009:100). Gilbert (2014:19) goes further and asserts: ‘Happiness – You fight for it, strive for it, insist upon it, and sometimes even travel around the world looking for it’. As the violence in Africa suggests, in the pursuit of happiness, self-interest often looms large, and with catastrophic consequences. In short, many people value and pursue happiness, and depending on circumstances, they pursue it either peacefully or violently.
There are two competing views on the sources of happiness or unhappiness. On the one hand, scholars like Strack and others (1991:1) believe that ‘happiness depends on ourselves’, that it comes from the ‘inside’, and that it is a personal choice, an individual responsibility, and the consequence of personal effort. For Freud (cited in Rose 1993:89), unhappiness or misery is ‘privatized, internalized angst’, which ‘belongs to the individual in her or his relation to herself or himself’. Freud, as noted by Rose (1993:93) also blamed the miseries on the inadequacies of our systems for regulating relationships at family, community, national and global levels.

On the other hand, materialists consider happiness and unhappiness as a product of the external environment, a result of material economic and political conditions and power relations. For Reich (cited in Rose 1993:89) the dynamic of manufacturing unhappiness and misery is ‘not internal to the subject, but passes between the subject and the outside that has direct effects upon psychic processes…’. Misery and unhappiness come from society, and are therefore a public phenomenon, which occur ‘out there where the people were… where it is really happening’ (Reich, cited in Rose 1993:89). Clear from these debates, and from the opinion survey conducted by the author, people from different ideological standpoints, classes, cultures, races, sexes and ages answer differently the question: ‘What is happiness?’ As one of the respondents aptly remarked: ‘There are perhaps as many definitions of happiness as there are people in the world’. Our views depend, to a large extent, on who we are.

 Though it means different things to different people, broadly happiness is a subjective feeling which is mediated by external forces. The external environment offers either opportunities or constraints to one’s pursuit of happiness. For instance, one cannot be happy on an empty stomach or in a war situation where death is an ever present threat. Essentially, happiness is a result of a constellation of conditions, which include biological/genetic traits, psychological predispositions, beliefs, spirituality, as well as social, economic and political conditions. On a ‘broad systemic level’, happiness ‘means peace, economic and environmental justice, equality,
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and wellbeing so that all people, animals, and the planet can thrive’ (GNHUSA 2016).

A subjective feeling of satisfaction based on a finely tuned blend of both feeling and reason, and influenced by the environment, expectations, power and knowledge, happiness is achieved when most physical, mental, spiritual and aesthetic needs are met. According to Maslow (cited in McLeod 2014:1), these basic human needs include physiological needs (air, shelter, water, food), safety and security, social needs (friends and family), esteem (self-esteem, confidence and achievement), and self-actualisation (authenticity, credibility and spirituality). In both its hedonic and eudaemonic senses, ‘happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his life-as-a-whole favourably … [it] is about satisfying needs and wants and being satisfied by that satisfaction’ (Veenhoven 1984:22). As Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee (1997:11) observe, and as the experience of war-torn Africa suggests, ‘these needs can become a necessity, or even a political demand for a new social project, when [people’s] situation deteriorates or when they are in a period of crisis’. In other words, when most basic needs and wants are not met, as in much of Africa, unhappiness increases, and this in turn forces many potentially peaceful people to pursue happiness violently.

The pursuit of happiness in history

Historically, ‘the happiness of the human species has always been at the focus of attention of the humanities …’ and social sciences (Strack et al. 1991:1). Political ideologies, revolutions and religions are all based on promises of happiness – on earth or in heaven. The state’s long, contested and convoluted history, about its nature and limits, centred on how best to structure it to promote stability and individual happiness. Similarly, commerce and capitalism flourish because of their promises of happiness, through the provision of desired goods and services.

Underscoring the importance of happiness, the United States (US) Declaration of Independence, for example, stresses the pursuit of
happiness, together with liberty and private property, as a fundamental human right. Building on that tradition, today the Gross National Happiness USA (GNHUSA 2016) movement is campaigning for the signing of the Charter for Happiness, which obliges government to create conditions for happiness. In 2012, the United Nations (UN) Network for Sustainable Development published the first World Happiness Report and in 2013 the UN General Assembly, to its credit, endorsed the value of happiness as an important development goal by declaring 20 March the International Happiness Day. To avert violent conflict, Africa must follow suit in endorsing happiness as the ultimate goal of development and society itself.

The quest for happiness in Africa

In Africa, the centrality of happiness to the lives of many people is expressed in folklore, literature, songs, names of people and places. For example, among the Shona of Zimbabwe, common names include farai (be happy), farisai (be very happy), tichafara (we shall be happy), and rufaro (happiness—the name of a stadium in Harare). Similarly, in siSwati of Swaziland, common names include jabulani (be happy) and jabulisa (make happy). In fact, at the heart of the independence struggles in Africa was the quest for freedom, which is a fundamental condition for happiness. As Chingaira (1980) sang at Zimbabwe’s first independence celebration, Africans ‘want to be very happy’. This demand for happiness and a ‘better life seems to be common to all world philosophies and religions: it is the search for the Kingdom of God on Earth’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee 1997:11).

Far from being happy, the sad reality is that far too many Africans are increasingly becoming unhappy. As shown in table 1 below, on a Cantril ladder question asking respondents to value their lives on a 0 to 10 scale, with the worst possible life as 0 and the best possible life as 10, Africa has the lowest mean of subjective well-being and happiness in the world (Helliwell et al. 2016:7).
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Table 1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America, Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>7.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>6.578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>6.575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>5.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent states</td>
<td>5.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>5.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>5.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>4.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>4.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>4.370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to these figures, Africa is the world’s unhappiest continent. Happiness levels within the continent vary considerably. For example, as the opinion survey shows, South Africans are happier than Zimbabweans: the massive migration of Zimbabweans into SA is essentially in search of happiness. Even though it is the unhappiest continent, there is also happiness amidst hard times, and indeed not every unhappy African is pursuing happiness violently.

The political, economic and social conditions on the continent do not support popular happiness. Authoritarianism and brutal suppression of dissent has meant that freedom is reserved only for the lucky and happiness for the few. Economic stagnation and rising unemployment are forcing youth into crime, piracy, migration, violent extremism and rebellion. As Mkandawire (2002:102) notes, much of post-independent Africa has witnessed a sharp decline in income per capita, growth and development: ‘the number of the poor as measured by various indicators has increased both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the population’. There has been an ‘increase in social inequality in virtually every country, and the persistence of … egregious disparities’ (Mkandawire 2002:102). Rising inequalities in happiness have forced many to ‘fight for happiness’.
As with the central character in Tolstoy’s epic, *War and Peace* (1988:33), who declared: ‘I am going to war because I am not happy with the life I am living’, many in Africa are apparently going to war because they are not happy. In pursuit of happiness some are fighting for control of the state, access to economic resources and for democracy as means to achieving happiness. Others are mobilising around ethnic and religious identity while still others are resisting globalisation.

**The apparent causes of violent conflict and their links to unhappiness and conflict**

Different scholars have identified different variables as the main causes of violent conflict in Africa. As shown below, these apparent causes are outward manifestations of the undying desire to be happy. This seems to be the case because, when happy, people from different economic, ethnic, religious and national groups can live together in peace, but when unhappy they quarrel and fight.

**Poor governance**

The state as the ultimate embodiment of power can be the most powerful weapon in the violent struggle for happiness, but may also be the most vital means for guaranteeing present and future security and happiness. Its legal monopoly of power allows those who control it to decide ‘who gets what, why and how’ of the scarce resources as well as what constitutes ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ happiness – abortion, sexuality, religion, and drugs. It is not surprising therefore, that in order to guarantee their present and future security and happiness, different economic, ethnic and religious groups in Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan, among others, are engaged in vicious struggles to capture and control the state. Almost invariably, and as typical examples of poor governance, Africa’s ruling elite has tried to use state power to promote its own happiness at the expense of the masses, who then expressed their dissent and resorted to rebellion.

Poor governance, typically manifested in the failure to provide security to citizens, deliver quality essential goods and services, solve economic
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problems, and promote popular happiness, ‘is the most important single cause of violent conflict in Africa’ (Hutchful and Aning 2004:143). More specifically, poor governance has led to increased unhappiness, a loss of the ‘incredibly stabilizing faith in the state’ (Wallerstein 1999:57), and has dented the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled. As Gramsci (1971:23) warned, when this happens, ‘violent solutions can occur, and the traditional means of using the state to maintain dominant-class hegemony deteriorates’. Indeed in Africa, as hegemonic discourses disintegrate due to poor governance, corruption, cronyism, oppression, ethnic and religious marginalisation, attempts at ‘violent solutions’ are occurring at an alarming rate.

With some of the poorly governed, and unhappy, ready to fight for happiness, ‘poorly governed countries will remain the primary locale of present and future wars’ (Gomes Porto 2002:6). On the other hand, good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in preventing violent conflict and promoting development and happiness. In a nutshell, poor governance has compounded the state’s legitimacy crisis, which in turn has catalysed the degeneration of politics into warfare, and has led to increased calls for good governance and democratisation.

Destabilising democracy

Democracy, as ‘rule by the people and for the people', is for many ‘the political vehicle for decent livelihood, equal rights, a reasonable income, access to education and health’ (Wallerstein 1999:88). As a means towards majority happiness, calls for democratisation are calls for more happiness, which are triggered by rising poverty and unhappiness on the continent.

In theory, democracy should promote popular happiness, its legitimate end. However, in reality, far from increasing popular happiness, struggles for democratisation have brought more violence and unhappiness in Africa. Part of the problem is that democratisation is seen by some African leaders as a threat to their power, oft ill-gotten wealth and happiness. To defend
their privileges, they often suppress democratic forces through political violence, generating counter-violence and increasing unhappiness.

In Burundi, the Central African Republic, Kenya and Gambia, for example, calls for democratisation have been destabilising, and indeed have led to the death of many. Even more disturbing, in Moslem Africa, and partly reflecting what Huntington (2011:1) calls ‘the clash of civilizations’, attempts at democratisation, which is deemed anti-Islam by Islamic Jihadists, have led to increased political instability and anti-west militancy. As Wallerstein (1999:18) rightly notes:

Everyone speaks of it .... But democratization will not diminish, but add to, the great disorder.

Democracy, by allowing many ideas about happiness and the good society to flourish, has led to increased political contestation, violence and unhappiness in Africa. The point is, as Obama, the former US president (Al Jazeera 2016b) reasoned: ‘Democracy is simple when everyone has similar tastes, beliefs and values. It is more complex when people have different backgrounds’ and different ideas about happiness and the good society. The inherent challenges of pursuing happiness through democratisation in Africa have also been compounded by globalisation.

**Unwelcome globalisation**

Globalisation, characterised by simultaneous economic integration and disintegration, convergence and clashes of cultures and civilizations, has led to a fascinating redefinition of the unhappiness-conflict dialectic in Africa. While the increasing integration of Africa into the global economy offers numerous opportunities for increasing happiness levels, through, for instance, easy access to quality goods and services, it also generates anxiety and tensions. Those disaffected by the impact of globalisation have depicted and violently resisted it as new forms of colonialism, westernisation and imperialism, by which the West seeks to impose supposed universal truths and notions about happiness, human rights, good governance and democracy on the continent. As Wallerstein (1999:155) points out,
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western truths and ideas of happiness, which are being spread through globalisation, ‘are not universal truths and if there exist universal truths, they are complex, contradictory and plural’.

In colonial and post-colonial Africa, the supposed western universal truths may actually constitute a form of violence against the ‘other’, and therefore a source of resistance and counter-violence. In Mali, Nigeria and Somalia, for example, the Islamist insurgents are violently rejecting ‘western truths’ and values of happiness, democracy and gender equality, which they deem anti-Islamic, and they seek instead to establish their own Islamic value systems based on Sharia Law.

As Wallerstein (1999:155) notes, ‘humanity’s greatest self-imposed limitation’, and indeed a pernicious source of violence and unhappiness in Africa, is the West’s dismissal of African indigenous knowledge systems, which are different ways of knowing based on different cosmologies, epistemologies and ontologies, as ‘primitive’ and ‘superstitious’. In short, globalisation, by introducing new values about happiness which challenge old ones, has been an invidious source of violent conflict in Africa, violence which has been amplified by the intense competition for economic resources.

Resource control

Economic resources, such as oil, minerals, gas, water, timber, productive pastures and farming land, which could be a vital means towards attaining the ultimate goal of happiness, are now ‘the main drivers of conflict’ which are ‘central to the origins and continuance of many civil wars’ (Collier and Hoeffler 1999:3). As Gomes Porto (2002:2) notes, resources, ‘both scarce and abundant, together with other variables, now play an important role in the onset and escalation of violent conflicts’. In countries with abundant but inequitably distributed resources, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Nigeria, many are resorting to violence in order to have their share of ‘the national cake’, and be happy. In the unending conflict in the DRC, for example, extreme economic inequality, in a country with
abundant diamond and other precious minerals, created unhappiness and hence conditions for violent conflict. Similarly, in Nigeria oil has sparked localised rebellion, while in Sudan control of oil and ecological resources fuelled the civil war.

As the fortune of one becomes another’s misfortune, resources, such as oil and minerals in the Sahal region, have attracted the US, France and China, leading to competition and militarisation of the region (Al Jazeera 2016a). The ‘war on terror’, which has seen the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) set up bases in the region, train local armies and introduce drones, is masking a far greater struggle for shrinking resources that are needed to oil the US military industrial complex (Al Jazeera 2016a). In Libya the US, France and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervened to depose Gaddafi primarily to access Africa’s largest oil reserves (Al Jazeera 2016a) – as captured in a people’s mural in Johannesburg, entitled ‘Multinationals are murderers’ (mural photographed by author, 1997). The point is, as Hobbes (2016:3) said, ‘hasty acquisition and aggression begets antagonism’.

Clearly, notes Gomes Porto (2002:14), a ‘new geography of conflict, a reconfigured cartography in which resource flows rather than political and ideological divisions constitute the major fault lines’ has emerged. Whether motivated by grievances or greed, struggles to access and control ecological resources as a means to achieving happiness, remain a major cause of conflicts in Africa (Gomes Porto 2002:2). As a violent expression of a distributional conflict, resource wars are about the perennial political questions of ‘who gets what, why and how’ of the resources necessary to achieve happiness – questions whose urgency have been amplified by stagnating development.

**Insufficient and/or unwanted development**

Development, depending on context and situation, can promote or undermine happiness, while lack of development invariably causes unhappiness and conflict. According to Epicurus (2014:3), the first
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theorician of pleasure, the ethical and legitimate end of science and development is happiness. This ‘belief in promoting happiness through development is an old one, and is indeed a recurrent theme in the history of moral philosophy’ (Veenhoven 1984:1). Development improves the quantity and quality of goods and services, raises the standards of living, and thus contributes to the ultimate goal of happiness. Development also capacitates individuals, communities and nations in their pursuit of happiness, and through science and technology, it makes production more efficient and cost effective. From this standpoint, development is therefore a necessary condition for happiness.

Yet, paradoxically, and as a manifestation of the fundamental ambivalence of civilization, development has simultaneously undermined certain traditional forms of happiness while creating new ‘western’ ones. In particular, development and modernisation have brought new values of happiness which have led to conflict between traditionalists and modernists, rural dwellers and urbanites, the older and the younger generations, and feminists and patriarchs. For instance, issues like children’s, women’s, and gay and lesbian rights are dividing society: in the name of ‘culture’ and community happiness these vulnerable groups have been subjected to violence. Escobar (1995), critiquing western development discourses and practices, argues that development has increased unhappiness and entrenched post-colonial dependency on countries of North America and Europe. For Escobar (1995:back-cover blurb), development policies are nothing more than ‘mechanisms of control that were just as pervasive and effective as their colonial counterparts’, and ‘the struggle against developmentalism is nothing less than a struggle for reclaiming the dignity of cultures that have been turned into a set of experimental subjects, waiting to be sacrificed at the end of a defined set of operations...’. In a nutshell, by denigrating local cultures, beliefs and practices, western forms of development have contributed to unhappiness in Africa, and to that extent, constitute a form of violence, which in turn has led to counter-violence in the form of wars of self-determination and militant calls for Islamic states.
While certain forms of development may generate unhappiness, lack of development or underdevelopment causes even greater unhappiness and violent conflict. As Gurr (cited in Gomes Porto 2002:14) notes, ‘for the last half century at least, societies at low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than prosperous societies’. In a similar vein, Collier and Hoeffler (1999:7) observe: ‘Civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low income countries… [and] the higher the per capita income on an internationally comparable measure, the lower is the risk of civil war’. They add, ‘higher income per capita reduces the duration of civil war and the probability of its occurrence’ (Collier and Hoeffler 1999:7). As Azar (1990:155) concludes: ‘Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment’. In short, the lack of development and the deteriorating economic conditions have contributed to increasing unhappiness and violent conflict.

To recapitulate, the ‘creative destruction’ of ‘Janus-faced’ and ‘something of a Faustian bargain’ development in Africa has ‘brought forth both the positive and darker sides of a disruptive process...’ (Mkandawire 2002:102). A socio-economic process of transformation and a cultural discourse development entails the ‘creative destruction’ of the ‘old order’ and the replacing of it with a new one. Such a process also involves multiple actors whose diverse interests, priorities and ideas about happiness render development a contested process, characterised by conflict between its beneficiaries and losers, the happy and the unhappy. This complex relationship between development and happiness has been further complicated by the exponential population growth.

**Population explosion**

With sex as one of the most easily accessible sources of happiness, especially to the poor, the African population is growing exponentially. As Bish (2016:1) notes, ‘while population growth slows in the rest of the world’, ‘it continues to rise in Africa’ – in spite of the HIV/AIDS pandemic – and its growth rates have far outstripped development rates. The problem is, while the population is growing, the resources necessary to guarantee
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its happiness are dwindling and governments’ capacities to deliver goods and services are overwhelmed. In other words, population explosion puts pressure on limited resources, and results in violent competition for declining economic resources. The sooner the continent adopts stringent population control policies, the better and happier it should become, for ‘involvement of governments in fertility management has positive influences in promoting peace, security and development’ (Kirk 1996:383).

In a word, population explosion, in a context of dwindling resources and limited development, has intensified violent competition for resources, and reflecting the power of dominant ideologies, the competition has taken ethnic and religious forms.

Ethnic mobilisation

Ethnic identity, as a biological fact and/or social construct, provides the frameworks within which happiness is defined, experienced and pursued. It influences happiness by providing a sense of belonging, giving cultural and moral guidance, defining power relationships, and articulating beliefs about common ancestry and destiny. Because of the distinct ethnic dialects, traditions, and body markings or ear piercing, ethnicity is easily used as a potent political tool for effectively mobilising groups in violent pursuit of collective and individual happiness, and as a weapon for denying some groups access to resources essential to achieve happiness. As Gomes Porto (2002:8) observes, ethnicity is ‘most likely to provide the basis for political mobilisation and conflict when it provides the basis for invidious distinctions among peoples … that are deliberately maintained through public policy and social practice’.

Ethnically based conflicts have erupted in Burundi, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and in Mozambique, where in pursuit of happiness, ethnicity was ‘created or de-emphasized by power seeking political elites in historically determined economic and social arrangements’ (Sisk 1996:12). In conditions of economic inequities and injustices, as in these countries, ethnic – and religious – loyalties are exaggerated and hatred of strangers
amplified, consequently making ethnicity a major source of violent conflict and unhappiness in Africa.

**Religious fanaticism**

Religion, having ‘played a particular role in the formation of the European modern nation-state system itself is at once special and dangerous’ (Lee 2014:1). It is an important force which determines one’s identity and happiness, as well as readies one to sacrifice or to kill. To believers, religion provides a moral and ethical guideline on how to live happily, on earth and in heaven. Some religions, like Islamic fundamentalism, also punish offenders and non-adherents by, for instance, stoning to death women who commit adultery and executing those accused of apostasy or infidelity in some Muslim communities. In the name of religion, and to promote certain religious doctrines about happiness and the ‘good society’, many are ready to kill in cold blood.

Unhappy with their lives, many in Africa have ‘discovered’ God as their source of eternal happiness and salvation. Remarkably, as political, economic and social conditions continue to deteriorate, and many become unhappier, there has been a tantalising religious resurgence of considerable proportions on the continent. Men of the cloth, clerics, pastors, preachers and prophets are vying for influence and competing for ‘clients’ to offer their ‘holy’ recipe for a happy and prosperous life. In Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and South Sudan where Jihad, a new militant religious ideology that seeks to establish Islamist states that promote Islamic conceptions of happiness, has emerged. In Somalia al-Shabab, an Islamist insurgent group which emerged from the ruins of the country’s civil war, and is linked to al-Qaeda, is waging a brutal insurgency against the African Union supported weak state. Similarly, in Nigeria, Boko Haram, which means, ‘western education is forbidden’, is engaged in a bloody war against the central government and is trying to form its own state in northern Nigeria under strict interpretation of Islamic law. Boko Haram draws its ‘support from uneducated, unemployed and socio-economically disadvantaged Nigerian Northerners who are fed up with corruption,
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heavy-handed state security forces and neglect of the north’ (De Villiers 2015:3). By promising happiness and martyrdom to its adherents, Jihad has attracted youth who are ‘deeply discontented with their governments’ (Khour, cited in Weekend Argus 2015).

These manifestly religious wars are driven by the desire to access resources that are essential to satisfying that never ending quest for happiness. As De Villiers (2015:3) aptly observes, these conflicts are triggered by ‘local grievances as a result of political and socio-economic marginalisation and the inequitable distribution of resources’. The irresistible attractiveness of religion in times of hardship and desperation subsists in its ability to offer simple answers to complex questions, which are beyond our comprehension. To paraphrase Nietzsche (see Hayman 1997:49), instead of letting rapid change, uncertainty and pauperisation disorient us, we cling on to the faith that stabilises us. Thus, as Marx pointed out, religion is simultaneously ‘an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering … the sign of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of soulless circumstances … the opium of the people’ (see Bottomore 1963:41). In a nutshell, the appropriation of religious – and ethnic, nationalist and peasant – ideologies to justify war, is conditioned by obtaining objective material conditions of unhappiness.

To sum up, the quest for happiness has motivated and justified violent political action in Africa. As Epicurus (2014:3) asserted, ‘all other things’, including war, ‘are desired as a means for producing happiness’. However, partly because of the level of political awareness, and the power of dominant discourses, ideologies and propaganda, war, ‘as a means for producing happiness’ has often taken ethnic, religious, and nationalist forms. Groups competing for economic resources tend to find scapegoats in different ethnic, race and religious groups, who are blamed, stereotyped, vilified, marginalised and attacked as the source of trouble and unhappiness. Hindes (1986:130) explains why this is usually the case: ‘If we are concerned with actors’ reasons for actions and with what makes it possible for those reasons to be formulated, then it may be more important to concentrate on the discourses available to and employed by them …’. In Africa, with
its complex relationship between structure, knowledge, belief and action, the discourses that most ordinary people are able to employ in assessing conditions and in informing political action are mostly based on religion, ethnicity and traditional culture. In a nutshell, the anatomy of Africa’s civil wars is to be found in its peripheral capitalist political economy, which by definition generates conflict through competition, profiteering and individualism.

**Towards a holistic theory of conflict and happiness**

The persistence of violent conflict in Africa challenges us to ‘rethink our world … and to look critically and creatively at many of society’s traditional beliefs’ (Higgs and Smith 2016:1). There is need for more convincing and holistic explanations of our continued unhappiness and propensity to engage in violent conflict. Specifically, there is need for a holistic theory that delves beneath the surface to expose the underlying motivation for violent political action, and that illuminates different ways forward to happiness, peace and prosperity. Below is an attempt to delineate some of the key elements of such a holistic theory of conflict and happiness.

First and foremost, a holistic theory of conflict and happiness should move beyond the limits of disciplinary ‘intellectual silos’. This is necessary precisely because individual psychological traits, feelings, emotions as well as material political, economic and social conditions all influence how happiness is experienced and pursued. The sources of unhappiness and conflict are both internal and external to the individual – and to the continent too. While the real world of happiness/unhappiness is built through ego, individual drive, instinct and reason, that is, biology and psychology, these have to succumb to the constraints offered by the real world of politics, economics, culture and tradition. Therefore, the theory should be located at the intersection of psychology, political science, economics, and conflict/peace studies.

Second, the theory needs to reconsider the dualities of cause/effect, inside/outside, victim/villain, reality/fantasy. This is necessary, because,
in African conflicts, the effects are also the causes, the sources of happiness also the sources of unhappiness, and some victims are also villains. Unhappiness is both cause and effect of conflict, just as economic resources, power, culture, ethnicity, religion and social relationship are sources of happiness and unhappiness. A classic example of a victim/villain is that of a former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA, Uganda) fighter who was kidnapped at age nine on his way to school by the LRA, and who after becoming a commander in the rebel movement engaged in gross human rights violations, and is now being tried by the International Criminal Court for these crimes. Violent rebellion has also triggered a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence, in which cause and effect, and victim and villain become indistinguishable.

Finally, such a comprehensive theory of conflict and happiness should accommodate opposites within a single encompassing perspective, shifting along various axes of the time-space continuum: between western and local notions of happiness; between conflict and happiness at individual and societal, micro and macro levels; and between conflict and happiness as a cause and consequence of a new paradigm of social relations. Such a holistic theory of the psychology, politics, economics and sociology of happiness is urgently needed to inform policy on how best to promote popular happiness and remedy the inadequacies of our political, economic, and social systems.

Policy options

In Africa, the world’s unhappiest continent, war is not just ‘a continuation of politics by other means’. Instead, as an anti-thesis to happiness, it is also simultaneously a consequence of bad policies, and a continuation of bad policies by other means. Bad policies, poor governance and the relegation to the margins by policy makers of the central notions of happiness have fermented bitterness, unhappiness, and violence. At the heart of violent conflict in Africa is the failure of development policies to satisfy the desires and expectations of a people whose socio-economic, cultural, and political life has been shaped by the quest for happiness. Contrary to
popular beliefs, as captured in commonsensical clichés like ‘I choose to be happy’, ‘happiness starts with you’, ‘your happiness depends on you’, happiness and unhappiness are not solely individual problems. Instead, they are public policy issues, fundamentally because the intended and unintended consequences of individual unhappiness can be costly, and even catastrophic, to society.

Ultimately, the questions of happiness, unhappiness and conflict are bound up with those of the political, economic and social organisation of society, for these can present either opportunities or constraints to individual and collective pursuit of happiness. The fundamental questions thus become:

- What systems of political governance and economic organisation best meet people’s aspirations for happiness, the ultimate goal of individual action and final end of development?
- What should be the nature, power and limits of the state?
- How should individual happiness be related to the good of others?
- How can people peacefully pursue happiness and effectively negotiate the multiple hazards of globalisation, cosmopolitanism, climate change, resource depletion and population explosion?

The honest answer to these important questions is that, there are no easy answers to them. All that can be said with some degree of certainty is that happiness, that ever important quest, never ceases to animate and motivate humankind into political action – peaceful or violent, depending on context. If happiness is the motivator of action and, ‘the greatest good’, then government should aim for the greatest happiness of the greatest majority.

To promote popular happiness and avert violent conflict, Africa needs to adopt a Charter for Happiness based on a holistic policy framework and ‘a new economic model – one that makes happiness and wellbeing our new bottom line’ –and that supports the political, economic and social conditions of happiness, which include development and ‘economic, environmental, political and social justice’ (GNHUSA 2016). Development should be inclusive, aim at reducing the inequalities of happiness, and
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be measured by the extent to which it promotes individual and collective happiness. Similarly, business needs to have a purpose beyond profit and to assume its social responsibility of giving back to community – capitalism with a human face? Equally important is sensitivity to local values and practices about happiness, respect for differences and minority rights; since tyranny of the majority is as bad as dictatorship in its consequences. The right to the pursuit of happiness comes with an ethical responsibility to exercise that right ‘in ways that honour and respect the richness and diversity of our planet, making it possible for all people to pursue happiness … while personal happiness is a worthy goal in itself, its greater value lies in its capacity to help us all be better citizens of this planet’ (GNHUSA 2016). In other words, to prevent violent conflict, policy should seek to promote the happiness of all as the ethical objective of development, the prime goal of good governance, and as a fundamental human right.

Summary and conclusion

There is a complicated relationship between the practical politics of happiness, unhappiness and conflict in Africa. The desire for happiness, often suppressed through political ideology, religious doctrine or economic necessity, is not only one of our ‘most basic human desires’, but is also the main motivation and justification for violent political action in Africa. As shown, people in Africa value and pursue happiness, and depending on circumstances and context, they pursue it either peacefully or violently. The apparent causes of violent conflict identified in the literature are only a means to the ultimate goal of happiness: ethnicity, religion and ideology provide the broad parameters for defining and pursuing happiness, while territory, resources and markets are essential to achieve happiness. Since when happy, people from different ethnic, religious and national groups can live together in peace and harmony, ethnic and religious tensions should be seen as symptoms, and not causes, of unhappiness and violence. However, these different identities, histories and cultures mean that there are conflicting accounts of how best to organise society and promote popular happiness.
The widespread belief in war as a means for ending Africa’s miseries seems unfounded. On the contrary, wars are producing far more unhappiness than happiness, especially for the ordinary people caught up in the cross-fire. Africa’s wars have mortgaged the continent’s development, for where there is anarchy and war ‘there is no industry, navigation, cultivation of the social, building, art, or letters, and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 2016:23). In a vicious circle, rising inequalities in happiness have exacerbated political instability, which in turn has further amplified the inequalities in happiness.

To sum up, war and society itself are a result of actions of individuals searching for happiness. In pursuit of happiness, and as the Hobbesian irrational instincts of self-preservation, loom large, Africans have become both agents and victims of violence. Given the current global political Zeitgeist of rising nationalism, divisions, hatred, xenophobia, and ‘multinational colonialism’, the pursuit of happiness will remain violent for the foreseeable future. In conclusion, and to paraphrase Von Clausewitz (1982:11) war in Africa is a pursuit of happiness by other means and, therefore, to prevent it policy should aim at improving the happiness of all.

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Mark Chingono


Japan’s international peace operations in South Sudan: Peacekeeping and civilian protection dilemmas

Daisuke Akimoto*

Abstract

After the independence of South Sudan from Sudan on 9 July 2011, the Japanese government decided to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to South Sudan under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Despite the post-conflict military clashes in South Sudan, the Japanese government did not withdraw the SDF, but instead, the Abe administration assigned a new mission, the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (‘rush and rescue’), to rescue staff of international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGO) in preparation for possible armed attacks during peacekeeping operations. The new mission can be regarded as Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (proactive pacifism) in action, and the policy is congruous with the purpose of ‘human security’ and ‘protection of civilians’. This paper aims to investigate Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping operations in South

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Sudan and examine associated dilemmas facing the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers in UNMISS – which need to be overcome for future international peace operations.

**Keywords:** Japanese government, *kaketsuke-keigo*, Peace and Security Legislation, peacekeeping operations (PKOs), protection of civilians (POC), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

**Introduction**

This paper examines Japan’s contribution to the international peacekeeping operations (PKO) in South Sudan. Since the enactment of the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, or the so-called 'PKO Law', in 1992, the Japanese government has contributed to a range of international peace operations authorised or supported by the United Nations. After the independence of South Sudan from Sudan on 9 July 2011, Japan under the reign of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration decided to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to South Sudan with the stated goal of peacekeeping and nation-building of the newest country in the world under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (MOFA 2011a).

The security situation in South Sudan has not always been stable, and military clashes have sporadically erupted from time to time. Despite the outbreak of military clashes, especially the occurrence of violence in Juba in July 2016, the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not withdraw the SDF, but instead, assigned a new mission, the so-called ‘*kaketsuke-keigo*’ ('rush and rescue') to rescue staff of international organisations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in case of possible armed attacks during peacekeeping operations. The addition of the new mission was based on the Peace and Security Legislation enacted by the Abe government in September 2015.

This article attempts to analyse and shed light on the notions of ‘human security’, ‘protection of civilians’ (POC), and ‘*kaketsuke-keigo*’ as key analytical concepts. The concept of ‘human security’ was proposed by
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994, and the Japanese government has promoted the realisation of the concept as one of the diplomatic pillars. The human security concept embraces two types of freedom: ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. The Japanese government has contributed to human security of post-conflict countries through financial contribution (freedom from want) and peacekeeping operations (freedom from fear) (e.g. Akimoto 2013).

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) currently tends to authorise ‘use of force’ in terms of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) and POC in peacekeeping operations. The R2P mandate is regarded as one of ‘the most significant normative advances’ of UNPKO (Thakur 2007), and the POC mandate is connected with the R2P concept. It is noteworthy that ‘use of force’ based on the POC mandate has been authorised by the UNSC in almost all of the recent peacekeeping operations in Africa (Shinoda 2012:15; Inoue 2012:72–73). Nevertheless, it seems that the POC mandates are ‘extremely challenging’ and difficult to implement in the military operations (Breidlid and Lie 2011; Willmot 2016). It was with regard to the POC mandate that the Abe government decided to send a kaketsuke-keigo mission to South Sudan.

This paper focuses on dilemmas in the peacekeeping operations in South Sudan in relation with the POC mandate. To this end, this research conducts an analysis of the complicated dilemmas at three levels, 1) international, 2) national, and 3) individual, originally proposed as an analytical framework to examine causes of war (Waltz 2001). In an application of the three-level perspectives, this article seeks to analyse endeavours as well as dilemmas of the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers in the UNMISS operation by examining official Japanese government documents, Japanese and international newspapers, and on-site reports by Japanese peacekeepers.

Accordingly, this article begins with Japan’s response to the peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. From an ‘international-level’ perspective, peacekeeping and civilian protection dilemmas, which the United Nations
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has been faced with, will be examined in relation to Japan’s policy on UNMISS. From a ‘national-level’ perspective, the domestic debate on the new mission, *kaketsuke-keigo*, will be discussed with a focus on the political dilemmas of the Japanese government. From an ‘individual-level’ perspective, this paper analyses personal dilemmas of the Japanese peacekeepers in UNMISS by examining on-site experience and daily reports by the Japanese peacekeepers. Finally, it will consider the implication of Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ for Japan’s peacekeeping operations in South Sudan for the purpose of overcoming the three-level dilemmas for future international peacekeeping operations.

**The DPJ Government and peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, 2011–2012**

Japan’s commitment to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan dates back to the period of the DPJ government (September 2009 – December 2012). In a meeting with Prime Minister Naoto Kan on 8 August 2011, UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon stated that the United Nations expected Japan to contribute to UNMISS. In response, during his meeting with the UNSG on 21 September 2011, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, successor to Prime Minister Kan, mentioned that the Japanese government intended to support UNMISS. Moreover, Prime Minister Noda delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly and stated that Japan planned to dispatch the SDF to UNMISS after the investigation in South Sudan. On 15 November 2011, the DPJ government decided to dispatch two SDF personnel to UNMISS as staff officers. It was decided that the unarmed Japanese staff officers would work as a logistic officer at the logistics planning office and a database manager in the joint mission analysis centre at the UNMISS headquarters (MOFA 2011b).

Based on the Cabinet decision of 11 November 2011, two staff officers were dispatched to Juba on 28 November 2011. As well as the two staff officers who were already sent to the UNMISS headquarters, the DPJ government decided to send an engineering unit composed of about 330 SDF personnel to UNMISS in order to improve infrastructure, such as maintenance
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and repair of roads and buildings. Also, another engineering unit that consisted of 40 SDF personnel was sent to South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya to support transportation and supply in the areas (MOFA 2011c).

The decision to dispatch the SDF to UNMISS was made on the basis of the ceasefire between Sudan and South Sudan. Nonetheless, on the morning of 26 March 2012, it was reported that military clashes between Sudan and South Sudan had broken out, and military forces of South Sudan occupied a major oil mine in the Heglig area, which is located inside the territory of Sudan. On the next day, the Sudanese government dropped bombs on an oil mine of South Sudan as retaliation. The UNSC, on 27 March 2012, issued a press statement to demand that both Sudan and South Sudan refrain from escalating the military clashes into another full-blown military conflict. On 28 March 2012, the DPJ government expressed its concern about the ‘military clashes’ on the border region, and called on both governments to settle the issue by peaceful means (MOFA 2012a). The military clashes indicate that ‘oil’ was a crucial factor to the border conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (Hamilton 2012).

On 24 April 2012, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union held a ministerial meeting and issued a Communique on the arrangement which required Sudan and South Sudan to cease their adversarial behaviour within 48 hours with a view to reducing the bilateral military tension. Moreover, the UNSC adopted a resolution based on the PSC Communique demanding the two governments cease hostilities and provocations including bombing, withdraw their armed forces from each other, and start negotiations under the leadership of the African Union on 2 May 2012. The Japanese government expressed its intention to support the PSC statement as well as the UNSC resolution on the next day (MOFA 2012b).

Besides the SDF dispatch, Japan made a financial contribution to the ‘human security’ of South Sudan. On 13 July 2012, the Japanese government decided to donate US$ 2.04 million as emergency grant aid in order to support Sudanese refugees who fled to South Sudan as a result of the
deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the southern part of Sudan. The humanitarian aid by the DPJ government was aimed at enhancing living conditions and basic services, such as water, healthcare, and hygiene in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (MOFA 2012c).

The governments of Sudan and South Sudan decided to withdraw their troops from Abyei and to start negotiations over the issues including oilfields. On 3 September 2012, the Japanese government supported the progress in the negotiations based on the PSC Communique and UNSC Resolution 2046 (MOFA 2012d). At the conclusion of the bilateral negotiations under the auspices of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, both Sudan and South Sudan signed agreements on security arrangements, oil, and nationality. In response, the DPJ government welcomed the agreements and expressed its support for the peaceful coexistence of the two nations (MOFA 2012e).

Meanwhile, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2057 to renew the mandate of UNMISS for another year, until 15 July 2013. In response to the UNSC resolution, a Cabinet decision was made on 16 October 2012 to extend the term of the SDF dispatch to UNMISS for another year, until 31 October 2013 (MOFA 2012f). Thus, the commitment by the United Nations to the international peacekeeping operations in South Sudan seemed to be active; and Japan under the reign of the DPJ was reactive but, based on its human security diplomacy, cooperative in the international peace operations. As a result of the 2009 general election, the Abe government, a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito, replaced the DPJ government, and Japan's commitment to UNMISS became more active than the previous government.

**The Abe Government and peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, 2013–2014**

Prime Minister Abe’s policy of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (proactive pacifism) was proposed in the National Security Strategy on 17 December 2013
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(Cabinet Secretariat 2013). The ‘proactive contribution to peace’ concept is basically consistent with the ‘human security’ policy, and further developed Japan’s commitment to human security and peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. On the basis of its ‘proactive contribution to peace’ policy, the Abe government supported a decision by the Human Security Trust Fund to extend its financial assistance for South Sudan to US$ 321,000 in total as part of a project entitled, ‘Human Security in Africa: Assessment and Capacity Building to Promote Sustainable Peace and Development’. The project was designed to resolve ‘human security issues’, such as conflicts, poverty, environmental degradation, health problems, and involuntary resettlements (MOFA 2013a).

On 31 May 2013, Abe had official talks with South Sudan President Salva Kiir, who visited Japan to attend the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), in Yokohama. President Kiir expressed his expectations for Japan’s contribution to infrastructure building and human resources development, and the prime minister stated that Japan would expand its peace operations to these fields and to the states of the Eastern and Western Equatoria (MOFA 2013b). The Abe-Kiir talks in TICAD exemplifies the prime minister’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ diplomacy.

On 22 October 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announced that Hilde Johnson, Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Republic of South Sudan and the Head of UNMISS, would visit Japan from 26 to 31 October. The main purpose of Johnson’s visit was to inspect the training of the SDF in preparation for peacekeeping operations in UNMISS. In response to the visit, the Abe government expressed its willingness to continue its ‘proactive contributions toward the achievement of peace and stability’ in South Sudan (MOFA 2013c).

On 15 December 2013 however, the security situation in South Sudan deteriorated due to military clashes between military forces of South Sudan and military groups loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar, who was discharged by the President in July of that year. On 17 December 2013,
the government forces attacked the residence of the former Vice-President and detained some ministers and related suspects. From 4 January 2014, negotiation for a peace process was started by conflict parties in Addis Ababa, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) proposed an agreement to cease adversarial conducts by the parties. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) amounted to some 923,000 by the end of April 2014. In this context, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida organised a ‘ministerial meeting’ to resolve the South Sudan issues on 4 May 2014. Moreover, the foreign minister sent a message that the Abe government supported an agreement signed by the conflict parties on 9 May, and Japanese peacekeepers would continue its nation-building operations in South Sudan (MOFA 2014a).

In response to the increased number of IDPs in South Sudan, the Abe government decided to extend a donation of US$ 12 million as ‘emergency grant aid’ through the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, the International Organisation for Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Thus, the Abe administration made a financial contribution to ‘human security’ of South Sudan (freedom from want) in the fields of water, food, sanitation, health and medical care, and shelters as basic human needs of the local people (MOFA 2014b).

On 25 November 2014, UNSC Resolution 2187 was adopted to extend the mandate of UNMISS until 30 May 2015. In response, on 10 February 2015, the Abe government decided to extend the SDF dispatch to UNMISS for about six months until 31 August 2015. The extension of the SDF dispatch to UNMISS required the prime minister to report the change of the mission to the Diet in accordance with Article 7 of the PKO Law (MOFA 2015). Thus, Japan’s contribution to ‘human security’ of South Sudan was made by its ‘financial contribution’ and the peacekeeping operations, mainly ‘engineering activities’ on the basis of Prime Minister Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to peace’ policy.
The Abe Government and peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, 2015–2016

Despite the peacekeeping endeavour of UNMISS, it turned out that the United Nations and its member states failed to prevent military clashes and the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan including widespread killing of civilians and sexual assault. After the outbreak of the military clashes of December 2015, it was reported that serious human rights violations, such as sexual assault in refugee camps, continuously occurred, and the refugee camps were described as the ‘rape camps’ of South Sudan (AFP 2015). The Human Rights Watch noted in its annual report that they witnessed attacks on civilians, use of child soldiers, arbitrary detentions, torture, and enforced disappearances in 2015, while freedom of expression was violated in the country (Human Rights Watch 2016). Still, the Abe government decided to extend the SDF dispatch to UNMISS for international peace cooperation to 31 October 2016 (MOFA 2016a).

On the night of 8 July 2016, fighting erupted between troops on the side of President Salva Kiir and soldiers loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar occurred in Juba, near the Parliament of South Sudan. It was reported that at least 272 people died in three days of military clashes between the two armed groups. Control of the army of South Sudan was fragmented along ethnic lines, and it was difficult to integrate the various disparate ethnically-dominated factions into a more unified and cooperative national army due to ethnic confrontation. Especially after President Kiir fired former Vice-President Machar in July 2013, it became almost impossible for the two dominant ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer, to unite their troops (Yomiuri Shimbun Chokan 2016; Japan Times 2016a).

In the crossfire, two Chinese peacekeepers tasked with a POC mandate were killed, and some experts on African studies warned that it would escalate into another civil war. For instance, Clemence Pinaud, Assistant Professor of Indiana University, observed: ‘We most likely witnessed an acceleration … into a full-on war in Juba between the two parties’ (Japan Times 2016c). Meanwhile, the UNSC demanded that Kiir and Machar ‘rein
in their forces and end the fighting’, and shortly thereafter, the two leaders ordered their soldiers to cease hostilities (Japan Times 2016c).

In response to the worsened security situation, the Abe government decided to evacuate Japanese nationals from South Sudan. To this end, three Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) C-130 transport planes were dispatched from Komaki Air Base in Aichi Prefecture. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) also chartered an aeroplane to withdraw the JICA staff from South Sudan. Other Japanese personnel who were in charge of official development assistance (ODA) were transported by C-130 aeroplanes from Juba to Nairobi in Kenya (MOFA 2016b).

In spite of the military clashes, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stated that: ‘We don’t consider that any armed conflict as defined by the PKO Law has broken out in the operation area of UNMISS’ (Japan Times 2016b, 2016d; MOFA 2016b). Moreover, Defence Minister Gen Nakatani decided not to withdraw the SDF personnel from South Sudan, explaining that the situation was ‘not one that should be classified as an armed conflict’ and that no direct attack against the seventh division dispatched from Chitose Air Base in Hokkaido was conducted (Japan Times 2016d).

On 17 July 2016, The Japan Times described the security situation of South Sudan as ‘the anarchy of war’. The United Nations announced that the ‘war-torn nation’ was in danger of a ‘hunger catastrophe’, and the World Food Program also warned that the ‘latest conflict is going to push even more people into hunger and despair’ (Japan Times 2016e). Although Defence Minister Nakatani stated that the situation in South Sudan did not ‘fall under the category of armed conflict’ in terms of the PKO Law, as both conflict groups stopped their skirmishes, the report by The Japan Times noted that order within the country ‘has yet to be restored, with fighters reportedly engaging in looting’ (Japan Times 2016f).

Among the military assaults in 2016, the rampage in the Terrain Hotel in Juba on 11 July was the most problematic incident for the United Nations
in terms of the POC mandate. Despite the occurrence of violence in the capital city of South Sudan, the United Nations was not able to crack down on the military clashes, and it was reported that the UN peacekeepers ‘ignored rape and assault of aid workers’ (The Guardian 2016). It was stressed that the South Sudanese soldiers killed a local journalist, targeted aid workers, beat and robbed people, raped several female foreigners, especially Americans. It was also testified that no embassies, including the embassy of the United States, responded to the desperate calls for help. In addition, UN peacekeepers from Ethiopia, China, and Nepal refused to rescue and protect the civilians in Juba (The Guardian 2016).

In order to strengthen the UNMISS mission, the UNSC decided to increase the number of peacekeepers from 12,000 to 17,000 troops, based on UNSC Resolution 2304 adopted on 12 August 2016. Among them, 4,000 troops were planned to be deployed as the ‘Regional Protection Force’ authorised by Resolution 2304. The establishment of the Regional Protection Force was heralded as a sign that the United Nations was ‘finally getting serious about protecting South Sudan’s civilians’ (Helms 2016; United Nations 2016). However, the incident of the Terrain Hotel simply indicates the dilemma of the POC mandate in UNPKO. Simply put, the ‘POC mandate’ in international peacekeeping operations is not necessarily successful as with the case of UNMISS. This is the limitation and dilemma of international peace operations authorised by the UNSC.

The ‘New Mission’ of Japanese peacekeepers under the Abe Administration

In the case of Japan’s PKO policy, Japanese peacekeepers were not officially assigned to conduct such a mission as ‘protection of civilians’. The Japanese peacekeepers in UNMISS stayed in a safe area, and therefore, did not conduct the POC mandate. Yet, UNSG Special Representative Hilde Johnson complained that ‘the SDF cannot be deployed to dangerous zones, while Koreans are dispatched to unstable areas such as Jonglei’ in July 2013 (Fukushima 2014). Indeed, the security situation in Jonglei was unstable (Breidlid and Lie 2011), and the Japanese government decided to dispatch
the SDF to Juba without the POC mission. Still, the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation legitimatised a new rescue mission of the SDF for civilians in peacekeeping operations. On 15 November 2016, the Abe government made a Cabinet decision to dispatch the eleventh contingent of the SDF engineering unit with the new mission to South Sudan. In accordance with the Cabinet decision, the SDF personnel were officially allowed to conduct *kaketsuke-keigo* missions to help UN or NGO staff under attack in the midst of peace operations in South Sudan (Mainichi Shimbun 2016a).

In the light of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which forbids ‘use of force’ in international conflict resolution, it was considered that the new mission, *kaketsuke-keigo*, could be regarded as ‘unconstitutional’, if the SDF ends up in directing weapons against ‘a state or quasi-state organization’ (Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security 2014). To legitimatise the new mission, the Abe government enacted the Peace and Security Legislation. In addition, the concept of ‘*kaketsuke-keigo*’ technically includes not only the ‘protection of civilians’, but also the protection of ‘foreign soldiers’ in the same peacekeeping operations in a broader sense (e.g. Akimoto 2016).

Although the expansion of peacekeeping missions by the SDF aroused public concerns, the Abe government argued that it made sure that ‘appropriate limits are in place’ (Japan Times 2016g). Indeed, as a coalition partner of the LDP, Komeito, a pacifist political party supported by a Buddhist organization, contended that the new mission was designed to rescue those defined as ‘civilians’ such as UN personnel and NGO staff working in South Sudan, but not to protect those defined as ‘soldiers’ of other countries that can defend themselves in principle. Natsuo Yamaguchi as Chief Representative of Komeito argued that Japan’s contribution should be based on the ‘Five Principles’ of Japan’s PKO participation: 1) ‘ceasefire’ between conflict parties, 2) ‘acceptance’ by the conflict parties, 3) ‘neutrality’, 4) ‘withdrawal’ when the three conditions are not met, and 5) ‘minimum necessary use of weapons’. Yamaguchi also highlighted that even if the Five Principles are satisfied, the Japanese government should
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withdraw the SDF in case of the degradation of security in South Sudan (Komei Shimbun 2016).

Thus, the dilemma of the Japanese government stems from the relationship between Article 9 of the Constitution and the kaketsuke-keigo mission related to the POC mandate in the UNMISS operation. Even after the addition of the new mission, however, the Japanese peacekeepers were and remained unable to conduct the kaketsuke-keigo activities for other peacekeepers. In addition to the issue of the new mission, Defence Minister Tomomi Inada was forced to resign from the Cabinet on 27 July 2017 due to ‘allegations of a cover-up of SDF’s South Sudan mission logs’ (Japan Times 2017b). The resignation of the defence minister symbolises the national-level dilemma regarding Japan’s commitment to the UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. Simply put, the national-level dilemma was caused by constitutional limitations on the SDF, which is not a formal military organisation.

**Individual dilemmas of the Japanese Peacekeepers in South Sudan**

As with the case of the national-level dilemma, it can be argued that the SDF members were faced with individual-level dilemmas. As examined before, the Japanese peacekeepers could have been forced to make a decision to direct fire against those who intended to attack them during the UNMISS operation. Regarding this issue, Shigeru Suzuki pointed out that overseas missions would increase the mental burden on SDF personnel even in post-conflict peace operations (Suzuki 2015:111). In fact, it has been reported that 56 SDF members, who were sent to post-war international missions in Iraq and the Indian Ocean, committed suicide after the overseas dispatch (NHK 2015).

With the addition of the new mission mandate, Japanese peacekeepers conducted special training in the use weapons and brought wearable cameras on their helmets in order to prove that their shootings were legally justifiable (Mainichi Shimbun 2016c). Nevertheless, if a Japanese
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peacekeeper kills a civilian by mistake, ‘there are no rules to punish him for committing the crime of professional negligence … leaving him in legal limbo’ (Mainichi Shimbun 2016c). This was the most serious individual-level dilemma of Japanese peacekeepers with the *kaketsuke-keigo* mission in South Sudan.

On 19 November 2016, SDF personnel as the eleventh contingent conducted a kick-off ceremony in Aomori City prior to the dispatch to South Sudan. The family members of the SDF, including their children and a wife with a baby, attended the ceremony, but reportedly, mass media were not allowed to report the feelings of the family members paying attention to their ‘mental burden’, and it was reported that there was a ‘tension’ in the atmosphere of the ceremony. On the same day in the city, there was a demonstration opposing the SDF dispatch to South Sudan (Mainichi Shimbun 2016b).

With the addition of the new peacekeeping mission to the SDF in UNMISS, the Ministry of Defence made a decision to increase ‘condolence money’ from 60 million yen to 90 million yen in case Japanese peacekeepers pass away in the line of duty. It was also decided that 8 000 yen as an additional allowance shall be paid to the SDF staff, each time they conduct ‘*kaketsuke-keigo*’ (Asahi Shimbun 2016). Although there were opposing opinions inside the Japanese government arguing that the increase of condolence money might make the public more wary of the risk of the new mission mandate, some official of the Ministry of Defence insisted on the necessity of increasing the allowance explaining that the SDF would conduct risky and dangerous activities in accordance with the new mission (Asahi Shimbun 2016).

In the meanwhile, Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan may well have faced stressful and difficult missions. For example, a Japanese peacekeeper told a reporter of *Mainichi Shimbun* that the SDF contingents in UNMISS tried to reduce their mental stress by deliberately overturning a table. The Japanese peacekeepers in the UNMISS operation were in a difficult environment where the temperature was over 40°C (Mainichi Shimbun 2012). Captain Takuhiko Hosokawa, who worked as an information staff
officer of UNMISS, noted that ‘there are only a few paved roads in Juba. Many of the roads around the city are not surfaced’. As for safety, it was reported that ‘there are intertribal conflicts over cows and bordering issues with Sudan’, although ‘the situation in Juba is stable’ (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012a). Lieutenant Yoshitaka Hashimura described the security situation in Juba as ‘improving’ and ‘stable’, and noted that ‘I was never put in danger during my three months stay there’ in his on-site report in April 2012 (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012b). Captain Nobuhiro Arai noted the difficulty of the engineering and construction tasks during the rainy season in South Sudan. Due to the heavy rain in the season, the engineering unit needed to reschedule their operations repeatedly (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012c). Major Yuichiro Koma who worked as a logistics officer in UNMISS noted in his on-site report that there were no ‘serious violent crimes’ or ‘criminal activities’ in Juba except for minor offences, such as theft, yet he refrained from walking outside at night and going to the ‘off-limits areas’ designated by the United Nations (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2012d).

The on-site reports above are public and official statements, but some Japanese peacekeepers might have gone through stressful and traumatic experience during their missions in South Sudan, which might have been left unsaid. According to an interview by Mainichi Shimbun, about 20 SDF, who were dispatched to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan and witnessed traumatic scenes during the operations, would need special medical treatment for post-traumatic syndrome disorder (PTSD) (Mainichi Shimbun 2017b). The necessity of special trauma counselling for former Japanese peacekeepers who were sent to UNMISS indicates the untold individual dilemmas of the SDF staff. The true feelings of the Japanese peacekeepers regarding negative aspects in the UNMISS operation were not officially expressed in their daily reports.

Nevertheless, it was disclosed that some daily reports of the Japanese peacekeepers involved in the UNMISS operation described aggravated
situations in South Sudan under the term ‘combat’. The Japanese government, however, explained that it was not ‘combat’ or armed conflict, but ‘shooting cases’ or military clashes. Indeed, some parts of the report were covered in ‘black ink’ in order to conceal specific contents of their experience and activities (Mainichi Shimbun 2017a). Furthermore, a Japanese peacekeeper who was sent to the UNMISS operation committed suicide right after he returned from South Sudan in April 2017 (Shimbun Akahata 2017). The individual-level perspectives offer an insight into the individual dilemmas and mental stress of the Japanese peacekeepers, although they signify at the same time Japan’s proactive contribution to the peacekeeping operations for human security of the people in South Sudan.

The implication of Japan’s ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ policy

So far, it has been argued that the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers were confronted with international, national, and individual dilemmas in the peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. The existence of the dilemmas, however, does not mean that UNMISS, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers were not contributive to peacekeeping/nation-building operations in South Sudan. On the contrary, the Japanese peacekeepers in cooperation with the United Nations made a significant contribution to the international peace operations, especially in the field of ‘engineering activities’ in South Sudan. The engineering operations by the Japanese peacekeepers can be assessed in terms of ‘engineering peace’ of South Sudan (Boutellis and Smith 2014).

Some analysts pointed out that Japan’s contribution to peacekeeping operations in Africa, especially South Sudan, could have been motivated by realistic and strategic reasons based on national interests or international prestige (Saraiva 2013; Pajon 2017). Regardless of the realistic motivation or ‘proactive contribution to peace’ ideal, the Japanese peacekeepers were appreciated by an orphanage in Juba and were highly praised by the President of Juba University for contribution to peacebuilding operations and cultural exchange with the local people through the ‘Sports for Peace’
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and ‘Nebuta Festival’ in March 2017 (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2017a). In this context, the Japanese peacekeepers were ordered to withdraw from South Sudan by the end of May 2017 (MOD 2017a). The Japanese peacekeepers completed withdrawal from South Sudan, and safely returned to Aomori Airport on 27 May 2017 (Japan Times 2017a).

Since the kaketsuke-keigo mission was added in the end of 2016 and was terminated by the end of May 2017, evidence regarding the implication of the Peace and Security Legislation for Japan’s peace operations in South Sudan seems to be as yet unclear, but Prime Minister Abe at least succeeded in implementing the legislation at a policy level to UNPKO though for a short period. In addition, Japan’s commitment to UNMISS amounted to more than five years, and the ‘engineering activities’ in South Sudan (five years and six months) were the longest ever in the history of Japan’s peacekeeping cooperation among other engineering missions in Cambodia (about one year), East Timor (about two years and three months), and in Haiti (about three years) (Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2017b).

Moreover, Japan’s contribution to road repair in South Sudan was two times larger than the road repair in Cambodia, and Japan’s contribution to building construction in South Sudan was four times larger than the building construction in Haiti (MOD 2017b:5). In response to Japan’s decision to withdraw the SDF from UNMISS, President Kiir expressed his personal gratitude toward Prime Minister Abe and the Japanese government for the contribution to the nation-building in South Sudan through the official development assistance and peacekeeping operations (MOD 2017b:5). Thus, although the Abe government eventually withdrew the SDF from UNMISS, its contribution to the peacekeeping operations for South Sudan under the policy of ‘proactive contribution to peace’ can be regarded as measurable and meaningful.

Through the analysis of the three-level dilemmas, lessons in the UNMISS operation are summarised as follows. First, it is significant for the United
Nations to strengthen the peacekeeping forces so that there exists ‘peace’ to maintain. Also, it is necessary for the UN peacekeepers to cooperate with the Regional Protection Force in the case of UNMISS. Second, the Japanese government needs to explain the importance of the kaketsuke-keigo mission in UNPKO so that the SDF can properly conduct such a mission in future. For this reason, further military training and special trauma counselling for Japanese peacekeepers should be provided by the Ministry of Defence. Japanese peacekeepers might be able to train for the POC mandate with other UN peacekeepers from Asian countries, such as China, South Korea, and India, but the kaketsuke-keigo mission shall be limited to a safe place in accordance with the Peace and Security Legislation.

**Conclusion**

This paper has examined Japan’s commitment to the international peacekeeping operations in UNMISS in terms of the dilemmas of the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers responding to the changing security situation in South Sudan. Through the analysis of the three-level perspectives, it was confirmed that the United Nations, the Japanese government, and the Japanese peacekeepers were respectively confronted with political and personal dilemmas related to the peacekeeping operations including the POC mandate in UNMISS.

Internationally, it was revealed that peace operations of the United Nations are not necessarily effective in the maintenance of solid ‘ceasefire’. In the case of South Sudan, the fighting parties are not only countries but also different ethnic groups. In this situation, the international community did not recognise the military clashes inside South Sudan as a violation of ceasefire. This is why the UNSC did not withdraw the UN peacekeepers from South Sudan, even after the sporadic but serious military clashes. In this context, the UN peacekeepers failed to protect the local people and humanitarian aid workers in Juba in July 2016. Although the UNSC decided to increase the number of peacekeepers to strengthen UNMISS, the POC mission still remains a difficult and challenging military operation. It became clear that the POC mission authorised with ‘use of force’ is the
international-level dilemma of UNPKO, which is supposed to be conducted under ‘ceasefire’.

Domestically, the Abe government added a new mission, ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ to the SDF, in spite of the military clashes and the worsening security situation in South Sudan. The new mission used to be suspected as ‘unconstitutional’ in terms of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, but it was legitimatised by the enactment of the 2015 Peace and Security Legislation. The Japanese peacekeepers became legally capable of rescuing ‘civilians’, especially staff of international organisations in the UNMISS operation. Still, the Abe government decided not to conduct the mission to rescue peacekeeping ‘soldiers’ of other countries in the UNMISS case, although it is legally feasible under the Peace and Security Legislation. Yet, the Abe government ended in withdrawing the SDF from UNMISS earlier, and Defence Minister Inada was forced to resign from the Cabinet due to the issue related to Japan’s peace operations in UNMISS. This is the national-level dilemma of the Japanese government which is constrained by Article 9 of the Constitution.

From an individual-level perspective, it was an obvious dilemma for Japanese peacekeepers to conduct the new mission, kaketsuke-keigo, in the UNMISS operation. Likewise, personal dilemmas recorded in the on-site reports by the Japanese peacekeepers in South Sudan and reported by Japanese and international newspapers were scrutinised. It turned out that the Japanese peacekeepers who provided official statements did not note that the security situation in South Sudan, especially Juba, was dangerous. Yet, it was revealed that their peacekeeping operations in the country were difficult, stressful, and even traumatic in various ways as shown in the daily reports and newspapers. The new mission could have increased the risk of the Japanese peacekeepers, and might have led to a nightmare scenario where they would need to direct fire against other people or be shot to death. This is the individual-level dilemma in self-defence measures during their peacekeeping operations.
Therefore, it is significant for the United Nations, the Japanese government, and Japanese peacekeepers to overcome the dilemmas related to international peacekeeping operations in future. In particular, it is imperative for the United Nations to strengthen the peacekeeping forces so a ‘ceasefire’ and ‘peace’ exist and are to be maintained. The Japanese government needs to explain the necessity of the kaketsuke-keigo mission in relation to the POC mandate in UNPKO. In addition, proper military training and special trauma counselling for Japanese peacekeepers should be provided. Despite the dilemmas and difficulties at the three levels, the Japanese peacekeepers contributed to ‘human security’ and ‘engineering peace’ in South Sudan, and the Japanese government will need to continue further commitment for the nation-building of South Sudan under the policy of ‘human security’ and ‘proactive contribution to peace’.

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Yomiuri Shimbun Chukan 2016. 11 July. Minami Sudan tairitsu nebukaku (Deep-rooted confrontation in South Sudan).
Having served as the BBC Sudan correspondent from 2009 to 2012, James Copnall has compiled an insightful account of the bitter-sweet split of the two Sudans (Sudan and South Sudan) in July 2009. This updated edition is a timely contribution that further highlights the intricacies of what Copnall terms as ‘bitter and incomplete divorce’. Since the book was first published in 2014, South Sudan has descended into civil conflict or strife on two occasions – both reflective of the author’s prognosis of the split. As for Sudan, the country still reels from the aftermath of the split. The underlying unresolved tensions between Khartoum and Juba had in 2012 threatened to
Nicodemus Minde

ignite an all-out war and Copnall contends that ‘the two states are still joined by conflict’ (p.4).

Copnall’s central thesis is the intractable relationship between the two states despite the split in 2011. Based on his experience in the two states, Copnall in a thematic analysis looks at the points of convergence and divergence in the two states with the aim to illustrate the overall closeness of these two once hostile enemies. His analysis of the differences of peoples and identities in the Sudans moves away from the simplistic dichotomy of African and Christian South and the Arab and Muslim North. In explaining the rich diversity of the two countries, he uses examples that indicate cultural, religious, linguistic and geographical intersections and linkages.

Building on the peoples and identities, the updated edition further draws our attention to the similarity in the politics of power consolidation in the two countries. Sudan’s President Omar Al Bashir and his South Sudan’s counterpart Salva Kiir continue to decentralise powers so as to strengthen their domestic hold on to power. While the book looks at how this has shaped the political landscape in the Sudans, it further sheds light on the binary interconnectedness of power politics and economy which continues to join the two countries by the hip. While Sudan’s Bashir consolidated his power on domestic and international fears, Kiir strengthened his ethno-political and military base leading to breaking ranks with Riek Machar, his one-time ally and Vice-President.

The book also touches on the crucial aspect of instability and insecurity in the two Sudans. The inter-ethnic rebellions which in some cases cut across the border divide have been a cause of instability both in Sudan and South Sudan. While Sudan grapples with the yet-to be resolved Darfur civil war, the two areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile ‘show how Sudan and South Sudan's destinies are still interwoven’ (p. 142). Rebel insurgencies around these border areas in both countries point to the insecurity challenges that still characterise the two states even after the split. This is compounded by the presence of oil reserves in the contested areas which remains a source of instability and insecurity.
Further to the analysis of this insecurity, the book details the regional and international interests in the two countries. The author highlights the differing relations with players around the world, and also mentions some of the international economic interests in the two countries. He looks at the relations between the Sudans and the US, UK, Norway (Troika countries) and China, as well as at regional interests such as those of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Copnall manages to show how the lives and narratives of ordinary people reflect the strenuous relationship between the two Sudans. For example, he tells the love story of Garang Thomas Dhel (a Southerner from the Dinka tribe) and Hiba al Makki (a Northerner lady from an elite family). This episode is a reminder of the bitter identity struggles in Sudan. After many attempts to convince Hiba's family, Garang eventually managed to marry the love of his life. Yet despite the split in 2011, the two countries continue to grapple with outstanding issues. For South Sudan, independence did not herald a new beginning, and its descent into war in 2013 and 2016 served as a reminder that separation was not the panacea to their problems. In conclusion, Copnall gives a critical prognosis of the way forward. He argues that for the two countries to prosper, they need to quickly move away from the narrative that differentiates them to one that fosters mutual cooperation.

As an updated edition, however, the book fails to comprehensively capture the two spates of the post-independent civil wars in South Sudan. The book gives an abstract overview of the violence that broke out in December 2015 – the culmination of the ethnic and political differences between President Kiir and Riek Machar. But the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict of South Sudan (ARCSS) which was reached between the two warring factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – SPLM in Government (SPLM-IG) and SPLM in opposition (SPLM-IO) led by Riek Machar – is not thoroughly examined in the updated edition. The nuances around the two civil strifes and the negotiations leading to the ARCSS in August 2015 could have strengthened Copnall’s central argument of the interplay between the two countries even after the divorce.
Despite it being a journalistic account of the two Sudans, Copnall’s analysis also has a fair measure of academic input. The book is drawn from a large number of interviews with party officials, rebels, religious leaders, activists, journalists and academics in both Sudan and South Sudan. This makes the book a good reference text in understanding the ethno-political situation and the confluence between politics and economy that surround the bitter-sweet divorce.

The book is a timely contribution to understanding the split of South Sudan from Sudan. It also offers an excellent social-political and economic analysis of the two Sudans from the time of the divorce in 2011. I strongly recommend the book to students and practitioners of peace and conflict in Africa.